BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Four
Of course, not all instances of dōrodokia were explained as the machinations of a
pro-Macedonian faction plotting against the city. Unsurprisingly, in fact, most cases of
dōrodokia involving domestic issues were not filtered through a Macedonian lens; it is
striking, though, that narratives about domestic dōrodokia nevertheless were shaped by a
similar anxiety over the fate of the democracy. As suggested by a number of dramatic
changes at this time—including moving the location of treason trials (eisangelia) from
the Assembly to the lawcourts, granting the Areopagus Court authority to investigate
potential crimes against the state, and renewing an anti-tyranny law (337/6)—many
Athenians believed that the democracy was in danger and only the laws could save the
city from ruin. 44 Even if Macedon was not considered the specific source of danger, the
threat of stasis was thought to be only growing.
Demosthenes’ sensational portrait of Philip’s dōrodokoi in fact points to deeper
structural problems in the democracy in the last half of the fourth century. As we will
examine in this last section, the persistent fear of citizen defection thus shaped the
development of a second, related picture of the dōrodokos who was again likened to a
traitor, but of a somewhat different sort. This time he was thought of not as a
Macedonian hireling, but as a dangerous citizen who rejected the rewards of democracy,
thereby betraying the people, the laws, and even the democracy itself. In this way, the
figure of the dōrodokos continued to be used in a range of domestic scenes, as well, to
think through what ‘democratic’ politics should look like.
44 Eisangelia: Hansen (1975: esp. 53-5), Rhodes (1979: 108). Areopagus: For changes to the Areopagus
at this time, see especially Wallace (1989: 131ff.). Following Chaeronea, the Areopagus was granted the
power to sentence to death anyone who left the city: under this aegis Leocrates was prosecuted (Lyc. 1.52,
53), but the court also seems to have prosecuted others as well (e.g. Aeschin. 3.252). Anti-tyranny law:
SEG 12.87; Ostwald (1955: esp. 119-28), Mossé (1970), Teegarden (2007: 104-40). In addition to these
institutional changes, it appears that at this time the eisangelia procedure for treason or overthrowing the
democracy was increasingly exploited even in trivial cases: Hyp. 4.1-3; cf. Hansen (1975: 29-31), Todd
(1993: 114).
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