BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Four
Once the polis had acquired these revenues, they had to be managed for the
community’s benefit. One marked difference around this time is how public monies were
concentrated into fewer and fewer hands. Through the middle part of the century we find
a shift from disbursement of all funds by approval of the Assembly to the creation of an
‘allocation’, or merismos, to specific officials to be used as needed within their own
domain. 31 Simultaneously, the domain of the Theoric board, created or at least heavily
reorganized in the 350’s, grew considerably over a period of a few decades until it
encompassed the construction and maintenance of public buildings, certain religious cults
and festivals, and even war and defense policy. 32 It, too, was managed by citizens elected
to the Theoric board, not by the Assembly as a whole. 33 With both the collection and
management of the polis’ revenues, therefore, increasing dependence on elite
involvement—and especially elite goodwill—could have amplified fears that elites might
defect. 34
31 Cf. IG ii/iii 2 29 (386 BCE), IG ii/iii 2 223 B, 226 (both dated to 343/2 BCE), AP 48.2, Arist. Pol.
1321b31. On the growing use of the merismos in public finances, see especially Rhodes (1980: 309-15),
Hakkarainen (1997: 5-6).
32 See, for example, Cawkwell (1963: 56-7), Hakkarainen (1997: 6-7); the fund itself was called the
‘common administration of finances’ (koinh\ dioi/khsij, Aeschin. 2.149). Theoric handouts to citizens:
Theopomp. FGrH 115 F 99, schol. ad Dem. 10.11 (=Dind. 203.21). Building programme: Din. 1.96,
schol. ad Dem. 3.29 (=Dind. 133). Our sources seem to confuse the origin of the Theoric Fund with earlier
monies to citizens: e.g. Pericles’ misthophoria and jury pay (cf. Plut. Per. 9) or Agyrrhius’ provision of
pay or Assembly attendance (cf. Hesych. s.v. draxmh\ xalazw=sa). While some scholars have thus
assumed that the Theoric fund had existed long before Eubulus in the 350’s and 340’s—e.g. Jacoby (ad
Philochorus FGrH 328 F 33), see further citations in Cawkwell (1963: 55n.53)—I view these as
anachronistic references to institutions that performed a similar kind of function: see Ruschenbusch (1979)
for a cogent argument in favor of Eubulus’ creation of the Theoric fund.
33 Cawkwell (1963: 58-9). On the election of the Theoric commission, see AP 43.1.
34 Hakkarainen (1997: 14-19) perceptively points out that around this time elite contributions became more
regularly rewarded with charis from the community, that is, that a formal system of reciprocal exchanges
emerged: see further Whitehead (1983) on the central importance of philotimia as a civic pursuit at this
time. I will take up this idea in the next section, but for now it is worth pointing out that one reason why
the provision of charis became regularized was that it needed to be: without the guarantee of charis in the
form of public honors, elites very well may have defected. In this way, the institutionalization of an
explicitly reciprocal relationship between elites and the community could have stemmed from heightened
anxieties over elite defection.
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