BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Four
For Demosthenes, a disease (no/shma) was sweeping across Greece, infecting
leaders and corrupting them to stir up civil strife within their cities. This stasis sprang
from a partisan, self-interested desire by otherwise trusted citizens to gratify Philip by
handing the city over to him (Dem. 19.259-67). 19 Corrupted under the guise of friendship
(philia) with Philip, these traitors sought to satisfy their philos even if that meant
destroying their polis (Dem. 19.259; cf. 18.51-2). 20 And if the destruction across the rest
of Greece was any sort of guide, Demosthenes suggests, Athens was in trouble. Within
her walls were veritable traitors: Philocrates (only just in exile), Aeschines, Phrynon,
Pythocles—associates of Philip, all, and they were not alone. 21 Anybody who spoke in
Aeschines’ defense, even if he were otherwise considered trustworthy, was implicitly
acting in Philip’s, not Athens’ interests (Dem. 19.289). Demosthenes is unequivocal
about the real source of danger to the polis: in Olynthus, Megara, or Elis, he claims,
though doubtless numerous men pocketed public monies, they were not the ones who
19 The image of stasis as a disease or nosos was commonplace: see Brock (2000), Kalimtzis (2000: esp. 1-
31) for further treatments of this motif. Just to get a feel for how novel was Demosthenes’ picture of
dōrodokia leading to stasis, it is worth comparing this passage with two others: the near-contemporary
Third Philippic of Demosthenes himself (341) and Thucydides’ Histories, written some sixty years prior.
In both Demosthenic texts, dōrodokia is seen as the root cause of stasis: because of dōrodokia, patriotic
citizens turn traitorous (Dem. 9.36-40, 19.259), slavery is dressed in the garb of friendship (Dem. 9.36,
19.259), while concord and virtue are traded for vice and faction (Dem. 9.39-40). Under the corrupting
influence of dōrodokia, Demosthenes suggests, things have been turned into their opposites.
It is precisely this alarming trend—where values are turned on their head—that is the hallmark of
Thucydides’ description of the stasis that spread from Corcyra through all of Greece (Thuc. 3.82-4): “At
their own will,” the historian writes, “men changed the customary meaning of words in relation to deeds”
(Thuc. 3.82.4), for a brilliant explication of which see Loraux (1986b). Yet Thucydides attributes the stasis
at Corcyra not to bribery, but to a greedy desire for power (archē) and an ardor for fighting once engaged in
civil conflict (Thuc. 3.82.8). By contrast, Demosthenes underscores how people wanted to befriend Philip
and thereby to win dōra from him—power is never mentioned, and it is altogether unclear that
Demosthenes’ crop of traitors was interested more in power, which most did not obtain, than simply in
dōra. In fact, Athenian bribery was rarely attributed to some excessive desire for power: von Reden
(1995: 95, 103n.76). Thus, although the orator and historian paint the same terrifying picture of stasis,
they differ greatly in illuminating its cause.
20 Note how Aeschines’ corrupt counsel led the dēmos to vote for the Peace of Philocrates, which
Demosthenes outright calls “dangerous, perilous and not to be trusted” (e0piki/ndunoj de\ kai\ sfalera_ kai\
a1pistoj, Dem. 19.97).
21 Phrynon: Dem. 19.189, 229-30. Pythocles: Dem. 19.225, 314; cf. 18.285. That there were still more
traitors in Athens is suggested at Dem. 9.29, 9.39, 18.296-7.
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