BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Four The Democracy in Danger: Dōrodokia and the Rise of the “Crop of Traitors” 378-322 BCE As Athens tried to move out of the shadow of the Thirty, she faced an increasingly unstable Greek world, one dominated by inter-state alliances and warfare. Indeed, as leading city-states rose to relative prominence—first Sparta, then Athens in the 370’s, followed by Thebes in the 360’s—much of the rest of the Greek world allied against them in order to control any potentially new threat. The Second Athenian League was one such alliance, directed against Sparta upon its initial formation in 378 but later counterpoised against Thebes after Sparta’s defeat at Leuctra. Yet by 355, the League was in shambles after the conclusion of the two-year Social War, in which a number of Athens’ allies had revolted. With these shifts in international alliances frequently came civil conflict, or stasis, as cities changed regimes to signal changed allegiances. Even with such inter-state alliances, no area in Greece was stable for long, for tensions were high both inside and outside the city. 1 Stasis, then, was an enduring feature of the fourth century Greek polis. 2 Importantly for this chapter, the fear of stasis lay at the heart of the dominant image of 1 On these developments, see Seager (1974), Davies (1978: 168-70), Cargill (1981), Cawkwell (1981), Jehne (1994), Dreher (1995). The fourth century was rife with stasis: just a cursory overview encounters violent revolutions in Corcyra (Xen. Hell. 6.2.3-15; Diod. 15.46-7, 15.95.3; Aen. Tact. 11.13-15), Corinth (Xen. Hell. 4.4.1-13) and the Peloponnese (Isoc. 6.64-7, Diod. 15.40). Cf. Tod 144.25-6, 147.28-9 for examples of explicit clauses against constitutional subversion in interstate alliances. 2 An overview of stasis in the fourth century can be found in Fuks (1972, 1977, 1979) on social tensions in Isocrates and Plato’s Republic and Laws, respectively; de Ste. Croix (1981: 292-9); Lintott (1982: 222- 38); Gehrke (1985) catalogues and analyzes instances of stasis in the fifth and fourth centuries. It should be noted that, while stasis has been interpreted as a primarily political phenomenon instigated by a foreign power—so Ruschenbusch (1978b), Lintott and Gehrke—Fuks and de Ste. Croix (1981: esp. 293-5) rightly 169

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Four the dōrodokos that emerged in the second half of the fourth century. In the ‘amnesia’ following the stasis of the late fifth century the dōrodokos had become thoroughly financialized, but, as the century progressed, he was increasingly viewed in starkly political terms. As this chapter examines, the thief soon gave way to the traitor. The image of a traitorous dōrodokos was closely connected to the rise of Philip II of Macedon, an enormously wealthy king with an impressively large army. 3 Philip’s progressive gaining of the helm of Greek affairs dominated the political landscape from the 350’s until his death in 336. Looking back at this period, in 330 in his most famous speech On the Crown the orator Demosthenes links Philip’s rise to both dōrodokia and the stasis it bred: In all the Greek states—not in some but in every one of them—it chanced that there had sprung up the most abundant crop of traitorous, venal, and profligate politicians ever known within the memory of mankind. These persons Philip adopted as his satellites and accomplices. The disposition of Greeks towards one another was already vicious and quarrelsome; and he made it worse. Some he cajoled; some he bribed; some he corrupted in every possible way. He split them into many factions, although all had one common interest—to thwart his aggrandizement. 4 remind that there were significant social and economic factors augmenting these political tensions within poleis. 3 Under Philip’s guidance, Macedonia developed from a rugged, pastoral society into a cultured and prosperous, agricultural-based community (Arrian, An. 7.9.2-3). Macedonia was rich in gold and silver mines (Hdt. 5.17, Thuc. 4.108.1, Diod. 16.8.6) as well as in timber (Dem. 19.89), and Philip developed both industries to a remarkable degree. During Philip’s heyday from 348 to 336, his coinage was actually the strongest currency in Europe, and Macedon’s resources were numerous times greater than those of Athens even during her revival under Lycurgus. With such enormous resources, Diodorus writes, Philip employed a considerable army which also proved vital to Macedonian expansion (Diod. 16.8.7). On Philip’s wealth and the success of the Macedonian army, see further Cawkwell (1978: 47-8) and especially Hammond in Hammond and Griffith (1979: 2.651-71). 4 Dem. 18.61, which I reproduce in full to highlight the tight sequence of dōrodokia, betrayal and stasis (in bold): para_ ga_r toi=j 3Ellhsin, ou) tisi/n, a)ll' a3pasin o(moi/wj, fora_n fora_n prodotw~n prodotw~n kai kai\ kai kai\\ \ dwrodo&kwn dwrodo&kwn kai\ qeoi=j e0xqrw~n a)nqrw&pwn sune/bh gene/sqai tosau&thn o3shn ou)dei/j pw pro&teron me/mnhtai gegonui=an: ou4j sunagwnista_j kai\ sunergou_j labw_n kai\ pro&teron kakw~j tou_j 3Ellhnaj e1xontaj pro_j e9autou_j kai\ stasiastikw~j stasiastikw~j stasiastikw~j e1ti xei=ron die/qhke, tou_j me\n e0capatw~n, toi=j de\ didou&j didou&j, didou&j tou_j de\ pa&nta tro&pon dia diafqei/rwn dia diafqei/rwn fqei/rwn, fqei/rwn kai\ die/sthsen ei0j me/rh polla&, e9no_j tou~ sumfe/rontoj a3pasin o1ntoj, kwlu&ein e0kei=non me/gan gi/gnesqai. For other references to this ‘crop of traitors’ cf. Aeschin. 3.234, Diod. 16.54.2, 16.85.4 and, generally, Cargill (1985). 170

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Four<br />

The Democracy in Danger:<br />

Dōrodokia and the Rise of the “Crop of Traitors”<br />

378-322 BCE<br />

As Athens tried to move out of the shadow of the Thirty, she faced an<br />

increasingly unstable Greek world, one dominated by inter-state alliances and warfare.<br />

Indeed, as leading city-states rose to relative prominence—first Sparta, then Athens in the<br />

370’s, followed by Thebes in the 360’s—much of the rest of the Greek world allied<br />

against them in order to control any potentially new threat. The Second Athenian League<br />

was one such alliance, directed against Sparta upon its initial formation in 378 but later<br />

counterpoised against Thebes after Sparta’s defeat at Leuctra. Yet by 355, the League<br />

was in shambles after the conclusion of the two-year Social War, in which a number of<br />

Athens’ allies had revolted. With these shifts in international alliances frequently came<br />

civil conflict, or stasis, as cities changed regimes to signal changed allegiances. Even<br />

with such inter-state alliances, no area in Greece was stable for long, for tensions were<br />

high both inside and outside the city. 1<br />

Stasis, then, was an enduring feature of the fourth century Greek polis. 2<br />

Importantly for this chapter, the fear of stasis lay at the heart of the dominant image of<br />

1 On these developments, see Seager (1974), Davies (1978: 168-70), Cargill (1981), Cawkwell (1981),<br />

Jehne (1994), Dreher (1995). The fourth century was rife with stasis: just a cursory overview encounters<br />

violent revolutions in Corcyra (Xen. Hell. 6.2.3-15; Diod. 15.46-7, 15.95.3; Aen. Tact. 11.13-15), Corinth<br />

(Xen. Hell. 4.4.1-13) and the Peloponnese (Isoc. 6.64-7, Diod. 15.40). Cf. Tod 144.25-6, 147.28-9 for<br />

examples of explicit clauses against constitutional subversion in interstate alliances.<br />

2 An overview of stasis in the fourth century can be found in Fuks (1972, 1977, 1979) on social tensions in<br />

Isocrates and Plato’s Republic and Laws, respectively; de Ste. Croix (1981: 292-9); Lintott (1982: 222-<br />

38); Gehrke (1985) catalogues and analyzes instances of stasis in the fifth and fourth centuries. It should<br />

be noted that, while stasis has been interpreted as a primarily political phenomenon instigated by a foreign<br />

power—so Ruschenbusch (1978b), Lintott and Gehrke—Fuks and de Ste. Croix (1981: esp. 293-5) rightly<br />

169

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