BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Three<br />
Lysias’ speech On the Property of Aristophanes first lists his father’s benefactions—<br />
including chorēgiai, trierarchies, and eisphorai—and then details that his benefactions<br />
totaled 9 talents and 2,000 drachmas, plus additional minor expenses spent on poorer<br />
citizens (Lys. 19.57-9; cf. 19.29). 52 Further, that elites were using banks or ‘hiding’ their<br />
wealth through property markers (horoi) could have cut both ways, as they could have<br />
done so in order to acquire wealth to pay liturgies. On this view, the negative evaluation<br />
of such ‘hidden’ wealth might reflect, too, that there was growing social distance between<br />
people and the land they owned and worked: the commodification of new things (like<br />
land) signaled new ways in which people related to the world. 53 In a sense, therefore,<br />
Wealth opens up the tantalizing suggestion that these were not so much financial<br />
obligations as obligations that had been financialized. 54<br />
As with Plato’s seemingly proto-modern conception of the dōrodokos,<br />
Aristophanes’ thoroughly financialized perspective might sound oddly familiar to a<br />
52<br />
Similarly, Lys. 19.25 with 19.42-3 and 19.9, 26.3. Cf. Ant. 2.2.12, Is. 6.60. Christ (2006: 172-3) on the<br />
‘cost-consciousness’ of Athenians at this time. Conversely, a typical accusation that a citizen had shirked<br />
his financial obligation often entailed an assessment of the economic outlay that was due the polis. By<br />
insisting that an individual was ‘hiding’ his wealth, that he really had more money than he had let on and<br />
could therefore give more money to the polis than he had already done, such accusations were explicit<br />
claims that an individual had denied the polis a specific economic return: e.g. Ar. Ec. 601-3; Lys. 3.24,<br />
20.23; Isoc. 7.35; Is. 5.35-7, 7.39-40, 11.47-9.<br />
53<br />
This is, admittedly, a contentious claim, one that I le ave only as a suggestion, but see Andreyev (1974:<br />
20), French (1991: 27-30).<br />
54 2<br />
Around this time, in fact, we begin to find honorary crowns of specific monetary amounts: IG i 110.11-<br />
12 (1000 drachmas; 409 BCE), IG ii 2 1 .69-71 (1000 drachmas; 403/2 BCE), IG ii 2 2b.6-8 (300 drachmas;<br />
403/2 BCE; restored, but see Henry [1983: 22]), IG ii 2 103.29-30 (1000 drachmas; 369/8 BCE). As Henry<br />
(1983: 22-5) details, by mid-century this practice had become commonplace: e.g. IG ii 2 223 (500<br />
drachmas; 343/2 BCE), IG ii 2 338.19-21 (1000 drachmas; 333/2 BCE), IG ii/iii 2 1252.7 (500 drachmas, cf.<br />
a)pod]w/sousi toi=j eu)ergetou=[sin a)ci/aj tw=n/ eu)ergethma/twn], 1252.15-16; ca. 350-300 BCE); cf.<br />
Whitehead (1986: 163).<br />
Certainly, this focus on the precise cost of the crown might reflect the community’s desire to<br />
budget expenses better in the wake of its financial problems. Yet undoubtedly one by-product of assessing<br />
the cost ahead of time and publicly announcing it was that the ‘worth’ of deeds could be more readily<br />
calculated. In fact, in the earliest examples, the tamiai (or Hellēnotamiai) were to provide a cash award that<br />
was to be used expressly to create a crown: cf. IG i 2 110.11-12, IG ii 2 1.69-71. As a result, over time<br />
distinct crown ‘values’ came to be associated with different kinds of civic benefactions: typically only<br />
foreigners received 1000-drachma crowns, while Athenians most often were the ones to receive crowns of<br />
500 drachmas. See further Henry (1983: 22-6).<br />
151