BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Three 29.14). The difference is a subtle yet crucial one, for both men are now presented less as potential oligarchs who might defect from the polity, than as elites defecting on their explicitly financial obligations to the city. In other words, the conceit of profiting ‘at the city’s expense’ signals a different kind of failed political reciprocity, one focused on profiteering elites more generally, not necessarily oligarchic public officials specifically. From Financial Obligations to Financialized Obligations: The shift from Ergocles’ oligarchic negative reciprocity to Philocrates’ failure to make good on his financial obligations to the community—both framed in terms of dōrodokia ‘at the city’s expense’—suggests a precarious relationship between the Athenian community and its elite members in the decades after the Thirty. Even if the possibility of oligarchy—that is, complete elite defection—was a dead issue after the stain left by the Thirty, the Athenians nevertheless had anxieties that elites might defect on their financial obligations to the community, precisely the area where their participation was needed most. Although Athens’ elite citizens might not have wished to become outsiders to the moral community of the dēmos, as the Thirty had done, they nevertheless might have wished to keep their money in a sense ‘outside’ the reach of the community. This anxiety was particularly acute in the early fourth century, for contemporary sources frequently insinuate that the wealthy were not giving back to the community as much as they should. 40 Irrespective of how elites like Ergocles or Philocrates had acquired their fortunes, they were condemned for not spending it in the proper way, that 40 Cf. Ar. Pl. 352-90, Isoc. 8.125, 127; Lys. 18.18, 22.14, 25.26, 25.30, 26.22, 27.9, 27.21, 28.1, 30.28; Ober (1989: 233-6) provides a helpful discussion. On the problem of liturgy evasion, see especially Gabrielsen (1986), Christ (1990; 2006: 143-204). 145
Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Three is, for not providing a sufficient financial return to the city. In part, this anxiety stemmed from Athens’ economic reality in the early fourth century. With the loss of empire, she had lost a tremendous source of revenue in the allied tribute, and she consequently had to rely heavily on the war-time tax, or eisphora, levied exclusively on her richest citizens. During and after the Corinthian War in the 390’s and 380’s, the eisphora was levied with considerably greater frequency than it had been during the Peloponnesian War, and this increased burden supposedly led many elites to skip out on their duties to the polis. 41 Yet after the Thirty the Athenians were acutely aware, as well, that elites might make them poorer, just as the Thirty had done. Athenians readily assumed, therefore, that the wealthy as a whole really did have more money than they claimed. Tax and liturgical evasion were thought to be rampant at this time, as elites were suspected of ‘hiding’ their wealth, usually by converting it into credit at banks or by refusing to rent out property which they had not publicly declared. 42 The more elites refused to make their property ‘visible’—that is, ‘publicly recognized’—the greater the city’s difficulty in collecting the eisphora and finding trierarchs. As Xenophon attests, such a refusal to give back to the community, especially in its state of need, was punished as if one had actively stolen from the public purse (Xen. Oec. 2.6-7). 41 On the eisphora, see generally de Ste. Croix (1953), Ruschenbusch (1978a), Mossé (1979b), Rhodes (1982), Brun (1983: 3-73). During the Peloponnesian War, the eisphora was levied in 428 (Thuc. 3.19.1) and perhaps only two more times between 410 and 404 (Lys. 21.3; Diod. 13.47.7, 52.5, 64.4). During the ten years of the Corinthian War, by contrast, it was levied at least four times, as Brun (1983: 27) notes, including twice during the period 395-2 (Isoc. 17.41), once in 388 (Xen. Hell. 5.1.5), and once more in 387/6 (cf. Is. 10.20). Burden of the eisphora: Lys. 28.3-4, 29.5, cf. Ar. Ec. 197-8; Christ (2006: 161-2, 165). 42 Given the central financial importance of the liturgical system in the democracy—on which, see Davies (1971), Lauffer (1974)—the alleged explosion of liturgy evasion was an especially problematic development. Cohen (1992: 201-7) is foundational for how the rise of banking in the early fourth century correlated with elites’ purportedly ever greater efforts to avoid liturgical duties. The elites employed various methods to ‘hide’ their wealth or make it ‘unseen’ (aphanēs): Andreyev (1974: 20), Gabrielsen (1986: 105), Christ (1990: 158-60), and, for the distinction between ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ wealth, Gabrielsen (1986). 146
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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Three<br />
is, for not providing a sufficient financial return to the city. In part, this anxiety stemmed<br />
from Athens’ economic reality in the early fourth century. With the loss of empire, she<br />
had lost a tremendous source of revenue in the allied tribute, and she consequently had to<br />
rely heavily on the war-time tax, or eisphora, levied exclusively on her richest citizens.<br />
During and after the Corinthian War in the 390’s and 380’s, the eisphora was levied with<br />
considerably greater frequency than it had been during the Peloponnesian War, and this<br />
increased burden supposedly led many elites to skip out on their duties to the polis. 41<br />
Yet after the Thirty the Athenians were acutely aware, as well, that elites might<br />
make them poorer, just as the Thirty had done. Athenians readily assumed, therefore, that<br />
the wealthy as a whole really did have more money than they claimed. Tax and<br />
liturgical evasion were thought to be rampant at this time, as elites were suspected of<br />
‘hiding’ their wealth, usually by converting it into credit at banks or by refusing to rent<br />
out property which they had not publicly declared. 42 The more elites refused to make<br />
their property ‘visible’—that is, ‘publicly recognized’—the greater the city’s difficulty in<br />
collecting the eisphora and finding trierarchs. As Xenophon attests, such a refusal to<br />
give back to the community, especially in its state of need, was punished as if one had<br />
actively stolen from the public purse (Xen. Oec. 2.6-7).<br />
41 On the eisphora, see generally de Ste. Croix (1953), Ruschenbusch (1978a), Mossé (1979b), Rhodes<br />
(1982), Brun (1983: 3-73). During the Peloponnesian War, the eisphora was levied in 428 (Thuc. 3.19.1)<br />
and perhaps only two more times between 410 and 404 (Lys. 21.3; Diod. 13.47.7, 52.5, 64.4). During the<br />
ten years of the Corinthian War, by contrast, it was levied at least four times, as Brun (1983: 27) notes,<br />
including twice during the period 395-2 (Isoc. 17.41), once in 388 (Xen. Hell. 5.1.5), and once more in<br />
387/6 (cf. Is. 10.20). Burden of the eisphora: Lys. 28.3-4, 29.5, cf. Ar. Ec. 197-8; Christ (2006: 161-2,<br />
165).<br />
42 Given the central financial importance of the liturgical system in the democracy—on which, see Davies<br />
(1971), Lauffer (1974)—the alleged explosion of liturgy evasion was an especially problematic<br />
development. Cohen (1992: 201-7) is foundational for how the rise of banking in the early fourth century<br />
correlated with elites’ purportedly ever greater efforts to avoid liturgical duties. The elites employed<br />
various methods to ‘hide’ their wealth or make it ‘unseen’ (aphanēs): Andreyev (1974: 20), Gabrielsen<br />
(1986: 105), Christ (1990: 158-60), and, for the distinction between ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ wealth,<br />
Gabrielsen (1986).<br />
146