BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua

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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Three Indeed, Ergocles’ actions align himself and his philoi against the polis as they assume a relationship of negative reciprocity with the community precisely as the Thirty had done. As financial crimes conceptualized as ‘taking’, both embezzlement and dōrodokia reveal this relationship. No longer are Ergocles and his men considered philoi of the city (Lys. 28.17), for, by acquiring their wealth, they effectively demonstrate ill- will towards the people (cf. a3ma ga\r ploutou=si kai\ u(ma\j misou=si, Lys. 28.7; cf. e1xqran, Lys. 28.16). As a result, the only charis they and others like them have is for the money they have given and taken. They show no charis to the people (Lys. 28.16). Thus, if the flow of money marks relations of goodwill, then embezzlement and dōrodokia equally signal how Ergocles only ‘takes’ from or ‘harms’ the people; there is no reciprocity, as he and his men treat the city even worse than do her enemies (Lys. 28.15). As in our analysis of the financial crimes of the Thirty, dōrodokia qua a kind of financial ‘taking’ here symbolizes the political injustice of Ergocles’ relation to the rest of the community. The imbalance of profiting ‘at the polis’ expense’ acts as a conceptual frame for understanding his purported oligarchic aspirations and particularly how he provides negative reciprocity—active harm—to the people. Because the defendants have but ‘taken’ from the city, they merit not the ‘giving’ of charis but the ‘taking’ of vengeance; one bad turn deserves another. 36 It was already noted that dōrodokia plays a prominent role throughout Lysias 29, too, but by now it should be clearer why this might be the case. With Philocrates’ guilt 36 A point forcefully made in the speaker’s last words: “by the same act you should give thanks to your friends and take vengeance on the guilty” (a3ma toi=j te fi/loij toi=j u(mete/roij a)podou=nai xa/rin kai\ para\ tw=n a)dikou/ntwn th\n di/khn labei=n, Lys. 28.17). The parallel structure of the clause strongly contrasts the city’s philoi with the defendants themselves. Moreover, by counterpoising a)podou=nai xa/rin and di/khn labei=n, the speaker effectively underscores how like merits like. 143

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Three quickly established, the speaker spends the remainder of the speech cataloguing all the various ways in which Philocrates bribed others. Like Ergocles, Philocrates apparently sought to avoid accountability specifically by bribing citizens, jurors, accusers, and witnesses. 37 Indeed, throughout the speech Philocrates is presented in tandem with Ergocles—essentially, he is considered guilty by association with his friend (esp. Lys. 29.3)—and the speaker of Lysias 29 underscores how the pair maintained the exact same sort of negative reciprocity with the people. Like Ergocles, who actively harmed the people (cf. kakw=j diaqei/j, Lys. 29.2; cf. 29.14), Philocrates becomes an enemy of the people by withholding public property (e)xqrou/j, Lys. 29.9). 38 In short, Ergocles and Philocrates provide the same paradigm of bad citizens who choose to pursue profit even at the risk of becoming outsiders to the moral community of the city. 39 Unlike in Lysias 28, however, Philocrates’ negative reciprocity is weighed against the regular, reciprocal exchanges of performing a liturgy for the community, like paying the eisphora (Lys. 29.9). And again, the speaker contrasts the liturgists’ regular reservations about the trierarchy with Philocrates’ willingness to undertake the service, the implication being that Philocrates volunteered so that he could profit (Lys. 29.4). The speaker reinterprets the motivation of Ergocles, too, in the same light, as Ergocles is thought to have pursued personal gain, not public honor, in becoming stratēgos (0Ergoklh=j xrhmatiou/menoj a)ll’ ou) pro\j u(ma=j filotimhso/menoj e)ce/pleuse, Lys. 37 Both men are thought to have paid off their accusers (Lys. 29.1, 6) and potentially their juries (Lys. 29.12, 13); additionally, the speaker insinuates that Philocrates bribed his witnesses (cf. pepo/ristai, Lys. 29.7). 38 Note how the speaker balances the people’s refusal to ‘give’ immunity to Ergocles with Ergocles’ own negative reciprocity—plundering and embezzling public funds (cf. dw/sete…diarpa/zousi kai\ kle/tousin, Lys. 29.13). The lack of return given to Ergocles reflects the negative return he provided the city. 39 In fact, the speaker effectively elides any difference between the two when he remarks that with a guilty vote at Philocrates’ trial the jurors would send the same message as they had in convicting Ergocles (29.13). 144

Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Three<br />

quickly established, the speaker spends the remainder of the speech cataloguing all the<br />

various ways in which Philocrates bribed others. Like Ergocles, Philocrates apparently<br />

sought to avoid accountability specifically by bribing citizens, jurors, accusers, and<br />

witnesses. 37 Indeed, throughout the speech Philocrates is presented in tandem with<br />

Ergocles—essentially, he is considered guilty by association with his friend (esp. Lys.<br />

29.3)—and the speaker of Lysias 29 underscores how the pair maintained the exact same<br />

sort of negative reciprocity with the people. Like Ergocles, who actively harmed the<br />

people (cf. kakw=j diaqei/j, Lys. 29.2; cf. 29.14), Philocrates becomes an enemy of the<br />

people by withholding public property (e)xqrou/j, Lys. 29.9). 38 In short, Ergocles and<br />

Philocrates provide the same paradigm of bad citizens who choose to pursue profit even<br />

at the risk of becoming outsiders to the moral community of the city. 39<br />

Unlike in Lysias 28, however, Philocrates’ negative reciprocity is weighed against<br />

the regular, reciprocal exchanges of performing a liturgy for the community, like paying<br />

the eisphora (Lys. 29.9). And again, the speaker contrasts the liturgists’ regular<br />

reservations about the trierarchy with Philocrates’ willingness to undertake the service,<br />

the implication being that Philocrates volunteered so that he could profit (Lys. 29.4). The<br />

speaker reinterprets the motivation of Ergocles, too, in the same light, as Ergocles is<br />

thought to have pursued personal gain, not public honor, in becoming stratēgos<br />

(0Ergoklh=j xrhmatiou/menoj a)ll’ ou) pro\j u(ma=j filotimhso/menoj e)ce/pleuse, Lys.<br />

37 Both men are thought to have paid off their accusers (Lys. 29.1, 6) and potentially their juries (Lys.<br />

29.12, 13); additionally, the speaker insinuates that Philocrates bribed his witnesses (cf. pepo/ristai, Lys.<br />

29.7).<br />

38 Note how the speaker balances the people’s refusal to ‘give’ immunity to Ergocles with Ergocles’ own<br />

negative reciprocity—plundering and embezzling public funds (cf. dw/sete…diarpa/zousi kai\ kle/tousin,<br />

Lys. 29.13). The lack of return given to Ergocles reflects the negative return he provided the city.<br />

39 In fact, the speaker effectively elides any difference between the two when he remarks that with a guilty<br />

vote at Philocrates’ trial the jurors would send the same message as they had in convicting Ergocles<br />

(29.13).<br />

144

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