BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Three defense speech on the charge of dōrodokia (Lysias 21), will illuminate why this conceptual convergence took place. As will be clear, primarily because of the Athenians’ political and economic efforts to get along as a democracy after the horrors of oligarchy, the dōrodokos became a thief of sorts, someone who sought actively to harm the dēmos. 5 The Thirty as Anti-type at Athens: That an Athenian like Plato might view the dōrodokos through an economic lens ostensibly reflected the dire financial situation Athens faced at the beginning of the fourth century. 6 Sparta’s occupation of the Attic countryside during the last decade of the Peloponnesian War had ravaged much of the land, including olive trees, grain, vines, and livestock and had consequently disrupted agricultural production and patterns of rural land tenure. 7 Sparta’s threatening position effectively shut down production at the Laureion silver mines, as well. 8 Moreover, a drop in commercial production and the loss of virtually all of Athens’ overseas possessions, not to mention the immense annual 5 It should be noted at the outset that the great majority of examples and evidence discussed in this chapter come from the 390’s and 380’s. Historical sources for the 370’s in Athens are notoriously scarce, while sources on dōrodokia in the 360’s are few and far between: Timagoras (367 BCE) was discussed in the Introduction; and our only other attested trial of dōrodokia, that of either Callistratus or Philon (361/0 BCE), receives only a passing reference in Hyperides and Lycurgus (Hyp. 4.1-2; Lyc. 1.93; cf. Dem 50.48). We simply do not have enough evidence for these two decades to make anything more than a tentative claim about how Athenians conceptualized bribery at this time. The limited extent to which we can discuss how the Second Athenian League (379/8-355 BCE) may have affected conceptions of bribery and politics is discussed below. 6 For general historical overviews to this time period, see Seager (1967), Funke (1980), David (1986), Strauss (1986), French (1991). On Athens’ economic conditions after the Peloponnesian War, see Andreyev (1974), Strauss (1986: 42-69), Ober (1985: 14-31), Burke (1990), French (1991). Politics in the post-war period: Cloché (1919, 1923), Sealey (1956), Bruce (1966), Seager (1967), Funke (1980: 1-26, 102-67), Krentz (1982), Strauss (1986: 11-41, 89-178). 7 Thuc. 7.27.3-4, Lys. 7.6, Aeschin. 2.147, 175. Andreyev (1974: 6-7, 18-25), Ober (1985: 113-14), Burke (1990: 3-4), French (1991: 24-7). Cf. Hanson (1983: 131-73). 8 Thuc. 6.91.7, 7.191.1, 7.27.5. Ober (1985: 14), Strauss (1986: 46), French (1991: 33). 129
Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Three tribute paid by the allies, had taken its toll on the Athenian treasury. 9 The result, as contemporary literary sources dramatically illustrate, was that Athenians were acutely aware that they did not have as much money as they used to. 10 While having less money surely might incline an Athenian to focus more intently on financial recovery, it is less clear how economic losses would by themselves shift how he thought about dōrodokia, economic obligations, public office and the like. Such a broad cultural shift suggests that the important factor here was the social meaning of the monies lost: how they had been lost, who had lost them, what they had signified and what, by contrast, their absence now signaled. Only by grasping this social meaning can we make sense of the fact that, elsewhere in the Republic, Plato groups dōrodokia together with crimes like theft, burglary, temple robbery, and blackmail (Pl. Rep. 9.575b- c), in other words, with outright stealing. Such crimes were financial (and sometimes violent) in nature, but for Plato they shared one additional feature: they were all also the crimes of a tyrant, a man of most evil character (cf. to\n ka/kiston, Pl. Rep. 576b3). The dōrodokos thus acquired distinct political significance, as well—he was a thief just like a tyrant—and tracing how this particular meaning came to be assigned to him requires that we examine not just Athens’ economic circumstances, but also her changed political and social environment in the early fourth century. Plato’s association of dōrodokia with tyrants was not by chance, for the image of a tyrant evoked the memory of oligarchs, specifically the oligarchic Thirty who had 9 Strauss (1986: 48-52), Burke (1990), French (1991: 31). 10 To take but a single anecdote, in 399 BCE Athens had difficulty paying back a mere two talents to Boeotia (Lys. 30.22). Cf. Hell. Oxy. 17.4, Lys. 19.11, Ar. Pl. and Ec. passim. See Ober (1985: 17-19) and especially David (1984) on Aristophanes, Fuks (1972, 1977) on Isocrates and Plato, respectively. Although Athens was able to recover somewhat with the Second Athenian League in the 370’s and 360’s, this state of affairs continued at least through the end of the Social War in 355: in his Poroi, or Ways and Means (355 BCE), Xenophon remarks how contemporary politicians still blamed poverty for Athens’ imperialistic needs (Xen. Por. 1.1). 130
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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Three<br />
defense speech on the charge of dōrodokia (Lysias 21), will illuminate why this<br />
conceptual convergence took place. As will be clear, primarily because of the<br />
Athenians’ political and economic efforts to get along as a democracy after the horrors of<br />
oligarchy, the dōrodokos became a thief of sorts, someone who sought actively to harm<br />
the dēmos. 5<br />
The Thirty as Anti-type at Athens:<br />
That an Athenian like Plato might view the dōrodokos through an economic lens<br />
ostensibly reflected the dire financial situation Athens faced at the beginning of the fourth<br />
century. 6 Sparta’s occupation of the Attic countryside during the last decade of the<br />
Peloponnesian War had ravaged much of the land, including olive trees, grain, vines, and<br />
livestock and had consequently disrupted agricultural production and patterns of rural<br />
land tenure. 7 Sparta’s threatening position effectively shut down production at the<br />
Laureion silver mines, as well. 8 Moreover, a drop in commercial production and the loss<br />
of virtually all of Athens’ overseas possessions, not to mention the immense annual<br />
5 It should be noted at the outset that the great majority of examples and evidence discussed in this chapter<br />
come from the 390’s and 380’s. Historical sources for the 370’s in Athens are notoriously scarce, while<br />
sources on dōrodokia in the 360’s are few and far between: Timagoras (367 BCE) was discussed in the<br />
Introduction; and our only other attested trial of dōrodokia, that of either Callistratus or Philon (361/0<br />
BCE), receives only a passing reference in Hyperides and Lycurgus (Hyp. 4.1-2; Lyc. 1.93; cf. Dem 50.48).<br />
We simply do not have enough evidence for these two decades to make anything more than a tentative<br />
claim about how Athenians conceptualized bribery at this time. The limited extent to which we can discuss<br />
how the Second Athenian League (379/8-355 BCE) may have affected conceptions of bribery and politics<br />
is discussed below.<br />
6 For general historical overviews to this time period, see Seager (1967), Funke (1980), David (1986),<br />
Strauss (1986), French (1991). On Athens’ economic conditions after the Peloponnesian War, see<br />
Andreyev (1974), Strauss (1986: 42-69), Ober (1985: 14-31), Burke (1990), French (1991). Politics in the<br />
post-war period: Cloché (1919, 1923), Sealey (1956), Bruce (1966), Seager (1967), Funke (1980: 1-26,<br />
102-67), Krentz (1982), Strauss (1986: 11-41, 89-178).<br />
7 Thuc. 7.27.3-4, Lys. 7.6, Aeschin. 2.147, 175. Andreyev (1974: 6-7, 18-25), Ober (1985: 113-14),<br />
Burke (1990: 3-4), French (1991: 24-7). Cf. Hanson (1983: 131-73).<br />
8 Thuc. 6.91.7, 7.191.1, 7.27.5. Ober (1985: 14), Strauss (1986: 46), French (1991: 33).<br />
129