BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Three of this character corruption (diafqei/rei) as wealth and poverty (Pl. Rep. 4.421d1-4). 1 He consequently devotes considerable attention in the dialogue to how to separate the guardians from wealth, poverty, and commerce lest they be corrupted by the taint of money. 2 In many respects, the dōrodokos of the Republic is strikingly familiar to a modern audience used to pictures of venal politicians who seek rents out of a desire for money or power. Although Monoson (2000: 127) astutely points out that the Republic’s policy recommendations—essentially separating the public and private spheres completely so that they can never mix—mark a considerable departure from democratic policy reforms, like the institution of accountability or rotation of office, it should be noted that Plato’s vision of a complete separation of private and public actually represents the logical, though radical, extension of contemporary anti-corruption reforms. The philosopher comes off as one of the first advocates of completely removing the market from politics. But if in Plato’s dōrodokos we can detect the seed of modern depictions of venal politicians, it is striking just how far removed the greedy, money-loving dōrodokos of the Republic is from the disobedient figure we encountered in the previous chapter. Certainly, when Creon asserts that money perverts men’s minds so that they take to evil actions (Soph. An. 297-301), we can detect some affinity to Plato’s sentiment. Yet for Creon, as we saw, money serves as an explanation for only a single incident; he may lambaste the power of money to achieve discrete aims, but nowhere does he suggest that 1 Along the same lines, elsewhere in Plato wealth is contrasted with virtue (aretē): cf. Pl. Rep. 421d, 591d, Leg.742e, 705b, 893c, 836a, 919b; Arist. Pol.1273a37-38. 2 Pl. Leg. 9.875a-e similarly posits that self-interest can corrupt even the most just of characters; cf. Pl. Leg. 3.691c-d, 4.713c-d, 9.875a. This point comes out most forcefully in Socrates’ discussion of the Hesiodic races and their corruption over time (Pl. Rep. 8.547a-b, cf. 4.415a-b). There, the mixing of like and unlike metals—the races of gold, silver, bronze, and iron—constitutes a form of political degeneracy that leads to subsequent degradations in political constitution as individuals and society are increasingly ruled by desires, not reason (Pl. Rep. 8.547a-53e). See Irwin (1995: 281-97) and Balot (2001: 246-7). 127
Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Three the guard was inherently the type of person, the kind of character who was prone to take gifts. Indeed, the question of character or character types is largely absent from Creon’s discussion of bribery, and this marks a crucial difference between Plato’s and Sophocles’ presentation of the dōrodokos. 3 Plato’s distinct correlation of money and character types signals a broader shift in how the dōrodokos was conceptualized at Athens in the first few decades of the fourth century. Long before Plato, it had been thought that wealth or poverty could corrupt one’s character: greed was certainly a well-defined concept before the fourth century. 4 What changed around Plato’s time, however, was that wealth and poverty came to be heavily correlated with dōrodokia, as well. Dorodokia was conceived primarily as a kind of financial crime, the dōrodokos a character who had violated economically defined obligations. Again, to a modern audience this particular conceptualization of bribery may seem self-evident, but it emerged at Athens for very particular reasons. This chapter will uncover those reasons, examining what changed from the late fifth to the early fourth centuries, and then detail the period’s resultant picture of the dōrodokos. After sketching the political anti-type of the Thirty that pervaded Athenian political ideology in the decades after their bloody regime, we will examine how the dōrodokos was closely mapped onto this anti-type in two court cases dealing with dōrodokia (Lysias 28 and 29). The final section, focusing on Aristophanes’ Wealth and a 3 The distance between Sophocles and Plato is emblematic of the fundamental shift in politics brought on by Pericles and his successors. Recall that, through provision of jury pay and misthophoria for magistrates Pericles was similarly thought to have ‘bribed’ the dēmos (e.g. sundeka/saj, Plut. Per. 23.5). Plato later says that Pericles actively made the Athenians “money-loving” (filargu/rouj, Plat. Gorg. 515e), but already in Aristophanes we find reflection of whether Pericles improved or corrupted the dēmos. It was only in discussions of the shift to the New Politics, however, that issues of character corruption arose. 4 Balot (2001: 58-98) on greed (pleonexia) in the archaic period. On the relationship between wealth and civic character, Solon’s poetry provides particularly relevant comparanda for this chapter: see Sol. fr. 4.5- 6, 6.3-4, 13.11-13W. 128
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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Three<br />
of this character corruption (diafqei/rei) as wealth and poverty (Pl. Rep. 4.421d1-4). 1 He<br />
consequently devotes considerable attention in the dialogue to how to separate the<br />
guardians from wealth, poverty, and commerce lest they be corrupted by the taint of<br />
money. 2<br />
In many respects, the dōrodokos of the Republic is strikingly familiar to a modern<br />
audience used to pictures of venal politicians who seek rents out of a desire for money or<br />
power. Although Monoson (2000: 127) astutely points out that the Republic’s policy<br />
recommendations—essentially separating the public and private spheres completely so<br />
that they can never mix—mark a considerable departure from democratic policy reforms,<br />
like the institution of accountability or rotation of office, it should be noted that Plato’s<br />
vision of a complete separation of private and public actually represents the logical,<br />
though radical, extension of contemporary anti-corruption reforms. The philosopher<br />
comes off as one of the first advocates of completely removing the market from politics.<br />
But if in Plato’s dōrodokos we can detect the seed of modern depictions of venal<br />
politicians, it is striking just how far removed the greedy, money-loving dōrodokos of the<br />
Republic is from the disobedient figure we encountered in the previous chapter.<br />
Certainly, when Creon asserts that money perverts men’s minds so that they take to evil<br />
actions (Soph. An. 297-301), we can detect some affinity to Plato’s sentiment. Yet for<br />
Creon, as we saw, money serves as an explanation for only a single incident; he may<br />
lambaste the power of money to achieve discrete aims, but nowhere does he suggest that<br />
1 Along the same lines, elsewhere in Plato wealth is contrasted with virtue (aretē): cf. Pl. Rep. 421d, 591d,<br />
Leg.742e, 705b, 893c, 836a, 919b; Arist. Pol.1273a37-38.<br />
2 Pl. Leg. 9.875a-e similarly posits that self-interest can corrupt even the most just of characters; cf. Pl. Leg.<br />
3.691c-d, 4.713c-d, 9.875a. This point comes out most forcefully in Socrates’ discussion of the Hesiodic<br />
races and their corruption over time (Pl. Rep. 8.547a-b, cf. 4.415a-b). There, the mixing of like and unlike<br />
metals—the races of gold, silver, bronze, and iron—constitutes a form of political degeneracy that leads to<br />
subsequent degradations in political constitution as individuals and society are increasingly ruled by<br />
desires, not reason (Pl. Rep. 8.547a-53e). See Irwin (1995: 281-97) and Balot (2001: 246-7).<br />
127