BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS Kellam ... - Historia Antigua
Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Two control the disobedient dōrodokoi. 73 First, in 424 BCE the stratēgoi Pythodorus and Sophocles were sentenced to exile, while their colleague Eurymedon was fined, because they had all purportedly been bribed to withdraw from Sicily according to the terms of a pact with the Sicilian king Hermocrates (Thuc. 4.65.2-3; Philochorus FGrH 328 F127). In his account of these events, Thucydides ascribes the trial to the arrogance of the dēmos, which he claims expected to succeed militarily even in the most adverse circumstances (Thuc. 4.65.4). And again, on the disastrous Sicilian expedition in 413 BCE the stratēgos Nicias counseled against withdrawing from Sicily, in part out of the fear that upon his return to Athens the soldiers would accuse him of withdrawing because he had taken dōra (Thuc. 7.48.4; cf. Thuc. 3.98.5). As Thucydides suggests, the dēmos controlled its generals; for them to have acted without explicit approval from the dēmos would have been an unjust arrogation of authority, a sure sign of disobedience. 74 To recap the argument so far, just as Athens assumed first economic control over allied possessions and then political and economic control over the allies themselves, the Athenian dēmos asserted its control over monies within the polis and then over people within the polis. As a result, political monies that had operated simultaneously within the economies of empire and patronage gradually took on the valence of political control and subordination. This new meaning was particularly problematic within the space of domestic politics because it signaled a subordination of the dēmos to an individual 73 Stratēgoi were responsible for everything, good and bad, that happened on their expedition: Din. 1.74; Pritchett (1974: 74). Even an autokratōr general like Nicias, one who had been given complete authority to do as he pleased, could suffer tremendous penalties if he did not do certain things: cf. IG i² 98/99=ML 78. 74 Explicit when the dēmos blames its stratēgoi for the terms reached at the surrender of Potidaea (Thuc. 2.70.4); cf. [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 2.17. Reading dōrodokia through the lens of obedience in Thucydides follows straightforwardly from the historians’ trope of the inversion of leaders and led, a motif closely connected to the insubordination of troops in the field: Rood (1998: 28-31, 142-5). Crucially, for Thucydides the analogy between a stratēgos’ command of his troops and the dēmos’ control of stratēgoi was clear. 111
Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Two citizen. While elite citizens might still acquire political authority through their contributions to the polis, the means by which they acquired this authority needed to be kept distinct from monies of empire so imbued with the valence of kratos. New modes of politics arose, as the next section will trace, but the legitimacy of these modes was constantly contested. In what should be by now a familiar move, the terms of this debate focused on the dōrodokos, as the Athenians used him to think through what legitimate politics really looked like. The New Politicians as dōrodokoi: In the previous section we saw how, around the time of Pericles, the dēmos began to compete with elites for the authority to be the patron of the dēmos. This idea was considered briefly in conjunction with public buildings and the Springhouse Decree, but it seems to underlie two other shifts that occurred in the second half of the fifth century. First, there was a proliferation of political monies: cleruchies, colonies, and pay for various groups of people, including soldiers, jurors, artisans and laborers, public officials and many, many others. These monies have rightly been understood as ways for the dēmos to enjoy a share of the empire, and doubtless, too, they at least fostered greater participation in the democracy, as scholars frequently emphasize. 75 But these monies also played a crucial role, as we will see, in legitimating the dēmos’ position as patron of the community. These monies helped forge a ‘new politics’: like patronage, only redistributing the dēmos’ own money back to itself. 76 As this section will trace, these two 75 Rhodes (1981: 339-40 ad AP27.4), Markle (1985), Ostwald (1986: 182), Ober (1989: 143), Stadter (1989: 117 ad Per. 9.3). 76 Connor (1971) is essential on this shift. See also Ostwald (1986: 175-91), Whitehead (1986: 305-10), Schmitt Pantel (1992: 179-208). 112
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Conover Bribery in Classical Athens Chapter Two<br />
citizen. While elite citizens might still acquire political authority through their<br />
contributions to the polis, the means by which they acquired this authority needed to be<br />
kept distinct from monies of empire so imbued with the valence of kratos. New modes of<br />
politics arose, as the next section will trace, but the legitimacy of these modes was<br />
constantly contested. In what should be by now a familiar move, the terms of this debate<br />
focused on the dōrodokos, as the Athenians used him to think through what legitimate<br />
politics really looked like.<br />
The New Politicians as dōrodokoi:<br />
In the previous section we saw how, around the time of Pericles, the dēmos began<br />
to compete with elites for the authority to be the patron of the dēmos. This idea was<br />
considered briefly in conjunction with public buildings and the Springhouse Decree, but<br />
it seems to underlie two other shifts that occurred in the second half of the fifth century.<br />
First, there was a proliferation of political monies: cleruchies, colonies, and pay for<br />
various groups of people, including soldiers, jurors, artisans and laborers, public officials<br />
and many, many others. These monies have rightly been understood as ways for the<br />
dēmos to enjoy a share of the empire, and doubtless, too, they at least fostered greater<br />
participation in the democracy, as scholars frequently emphasize. 75 But these monies<br />
also played a crucial role, as we will see, in legitimating the dēmos’ position as patron of<br />
the community. These monies helped forge a ‘new politics’: like patronage, only<br />
redistributing the dēmos’ own money back to itself. 76 As this section will trace, these two<br />
75<br />
Rhodes (1981: 339-40 ad AP27.4), Markle (1985), Ostwald (1986: 182), Ober (1989: 143), Stadter<br />
(1989: 117 ad Per. 9.3).<br />
76<br />
Connor (1971) is essential on this shift. See also Ostwald (1986: 175-91), Whitehead (1986: 305-10),<br />
Schmitt Pantel (1992: 179-208).<br />
112