Criminal Liability of Partnerships: Constitutional and Practical ...

Criminal Liability of Partnerships: Constitutional and Practical ... Criminal Liability of Partnerships: Constitutional and Practical ...

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person. As discussed earlier, this raises constitutional issues with respect to the presumption of innocence. 181 Therefore, it is unlikely to be constitutional to demand that the partners at the time of the offence contribute to the assets of the partnership. The answer remains the same for forcing the new partners to use their personal assets to pay the fine. On the facts presented, neither of the people who are the partners at the time of the verdict – and the imposition of sentence – were members of the partnership at the time of the offence. Clearly, just as Brian has done nothing wrong on the original facts, Derek and Ethan have done nothing wrong on the additional facts set out in this Part. To ask them to pay the fine levied against the partnership raises (and exacerbates) the same constitutional issues referred in Part V. The new partners were not members of the partnership when the offence took place. Therefore, the case in favour of not requiring the new partners to contribute personal assets to ensure that the partnership has at least as much property as on the date of the offence to pay the fine is even stronger on these facts than it is when the original partners remain involved in the business of the partnership. 2. The time of sentencing If Bill C-45 attaches separate legal personality to a partnership as of the date of sentencing, different issues arise. Clearly, this avoids issues of forcing partners to provide their personal assets to the partnership to make up any difference between the assets at the date of the offence and the date of sentencing. Whatever partnership property exists at the time of sentence would be exigible to pay the fine levied against the partnership. Thus, the assets in the partnership as at the date of the offence would be irrelevant for the purposes of the criminal law. Take the facts of our example. At the time of sentencing, the partnership is comprised of partners who had nothing to do with the wrongdoing being punished. Yet, it is the assets with which those people (in our example, Derek and Ethan) seek to make their livelihood that are being removed on account of wrongdoing that occurred before they became involved in the partnership. Nonetheless, in civil law, the incoming partner is not personally liable for obligations arising prior to his or her becoming a partner. 182 Notwithstanding this fact, the value of the interest purchased by the incoming partner may be reduced by the need to pay the debt out of partnership property. 183 Thus, it is unclear whether Derek and Ethan have any reason to think that the assets given by them will be used to pay debts arising prior to their arrival. As Manzer puts it: The admission of a new partner to a partnership may result in the creation of a new partnership and the dissolution of the old one. 184 Whether this occurs will depend upon the relevant provincial legislation and the terms of the specific partnership agreement. Thus, whether the admission of a new partner (or the retirement of a current one) will dissolve the partnership is highly fact-dependent. Anything fact-dependent creates uncertainty. This uncertainty could in turn generate a desire to manage the risk that it creates. The tax system already creates a significant incentive for partners to remove profit from the partnership on an ongoing basis, because it forces partners to pay tax on earnings, even if those earnings remain in the business, and are not used for the personal purposes of the individual partner. Therefore, the tax system causes the individual partner to take money from the common fund of the partnership, if only to pay the 185 tax on the earnings. The provisions of Bill C-45 may increase this incentive to remove profit from the partnership. Bill C-45 creates the possibility that the partners may have property of the business taken away to pay criminal fines resulting from events occurring prior to when they became partners. This seems likely to increase the perceived need to engage in activities that lower the amount of partnership property that is exigible to pay debts at any given time. The civil law 186 allows such techniques to be employed. For reasons mentioned earlier, differences between the purposes of the 181 See the discussion of the importance of “true penal consequences”, Part V(B), above. 182 See Partnership Act (Manitoba), supra note 17, s. 20(1). 183 See VanDuzer, supra note 8 at 58, Figure 2.4. 184 Supra note 8 at para. 6.480. 185 The taxpayer is the individual partner. The amount of income or loss is calculated at the level of the partnership (see Income Tax Act, supra note 18, s. 96(1)), and then each partner must pay tax on his or her share of the income so calculated, or to deduct the loss so calculated from the partner’s other income, if any. See Backman, supra note 18. 186 See Part VII(B), above.

criminal and the civil law (morality v. compensation) may mandate a different approach in criminal cases than that taken in the civil law. Perhaps even more important are the purposes of sentencing. This leads me to question what is just about holding the partnership liable for the action of a former partner, when the current partners are completely different from those in place at the time of the offence. In fact, one could claim that once all the people who were partners at the time of the offence have left the partnership, the partnership that existed at the time of the offence no longer exists. In other words, since a partnership is a relationship amongst people, if none of the people in the relationship were the original parties to it, does the original relationship continue to exist? 187 If not, then the partnership does not exist at the time of the sentence, and this makes fining the partnership exceptionally problematic. Even if the Partnership Acts do not specifically provide that the partnership is terminated by a change of partners, it is clear that the partners may, by agreement, choose to terminate the partnership on the retirement of any partner. The remaining partners can then reform the partnership with the remaining partners only, while 188 informing creditors of the firm that the retired partner is no longer part of the firm. This may provide some protection for innocent partners. This is not to suggest that there are no negative consequences to this approach. The tax consequences may be bad for the partners. In her discussion of tax, Manzer explains, As previously mentioned, a properly drafted partnership agreement will provide that the admission of a new partner does not terminate the old partnership but continues the existing one. … Generally, one would want to ensure that the partnership is not dissolved on the admission of a new partner. 189 However, under the right circumstances, the innocent partners may be willing to accept the potentially negative tax consequences of dissolution to ensure that the wrongdoing of the former partners of the firm are not visited upon the assets from which the current partners intend to make their livelihood. The partners can choose the events that will cause dissolution in advance of their occurrence. The partners are free to choose that the partnership be dissolved by any activity by any partner that could subject the partnership to criminal liability. How the courts might choose to deal with this possibility is at best unclear. The dissolution of partnerships is different from that of corporations. First, if the shareholders of a corporation choose dissolution, there is a significant procedure that must be followed to dissolve the corporation. 190 Also, the government official in charge of administering the incorporating statute must issue a document before the corporation may dissolve. According to the CBCA, it is clear that: (i) the existence of the corporation continues notwithstanding a stated intent of the shareholders to dissolve it; (ii) public notification of the intent to dissolve must be provided; and (iii) the Director can ask for court supervision of a corporate dissolution. Thus, the Crown in the province where criminal charges may be laid could potentially ask the Director to seek court supervision if charges have been, or are soon to be, laid against the corporation. The Court could then manage the risk that the corporation will be dissolved prior to the verdict in the criminal case. There is a second difference between the partnerships and corporations that is also relevant here. Shareholders know before buying shares that there is a continuity of existence of the corporation by virtue of its separate legal personality. In other words, shareholders should know that whomever else holds shares in the corporation does not affect the liability of the business. The shares are separate property from the business itself. 187 It is clear that any partner may terminate the partnership on notice to his or her partners, unless this right is removed by the unanimous agreement of the partners. The Partnership Act (Manitoba), supra note 17, s. 29 is representative. It reads as follows: 29(1) Where no fixed term has been agreed upon for the duration of the partnership, any partner may determine the partnership at any time on giving notice of his intention to do to all the other partners; 29(2) For the purpose of subsection (1) where the partnership was originally constituted by deed, a notice in writing, signed by the partner giving it, is sufficient. 188 Partnership Act (Manitoba), ibid., s. 40. 189 Manzer, supra note 8 at para. 6.490. 190 CBCA, supra note 172, Part XVII

person. As discussed earlier, this raises constitutional issues with respect to the presumption <strong>of</strong> innocence. 181<br />

Therefore, it is unlikely to be constitutional to dem<strong>and</strong> that the partners at the time <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence contribute to the<br />

assets <strong>of</strong> the partnership.<br />

The answer remains the same for forcing the new partners to use their personal assets to pay the fine. On the<br />

facts presented, neither <strong>of</strong> the people who are the partners at the time <strong>of</strong> the verdict – <strong>and</strong> the imposition <strong>of</strong><br />

sentence – were members <strong>of</strong> the partnership at the time <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence. Clearly, just as Brian has done nothing wrong<br />

on the original facts, Derek <strong>and</strong> Ethan have done nothing wrong on the additional facts set out in this Part. To ask<br />

them to pay the fine levied against the partnership raises (<strong>and</strong> exacerbates) the same constitutional issues referred in<br />

Part V. The new partners were not members <strong>of</strong> the partnership when the <strong>of</strong>fence took place. Therefore, the case in<br />

favour <strong>of</strong> not requiring the new partners to contribute personal assets to ensure that the partnership has at least as<br />

much property as on the date <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence to pay the fine is even stronger on these facts than it is when the original<br />

partners remain involved in the business <strong>of</strong> the partnership.<br />

2. The time <strong>of</strong> sentencing<br />

If Bill C-45 attaches separate legal personality to a partnership as <strong>of</strong> the date <strong>of</strong> sentencing, different issues arise.<br />

Clearly, this avoids issues <strong>of</strong> forcing partners to provide their personal assets to the partnership to make up any<br />

difference between the assets at the date <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>and</strong> the date <strong>of</strong> sentencing. Whatever partnership property<br />

exists at the time <strong>of</strong> sentence would be exigible to pay the fine levied against the partnership. Thus, the assets in the<br />

partnership as at the date <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence would be irrelevant for the purposes <strong>of</strong> the criminal law.<br />

Take the facts <strong>of</strong> our example. At the time <strong>of</strong> sentencing, the partnership is comprised <strong>of</strong> partners who had<br />

nothing to do with the wrongdoing being punished. Yet, it is the assets with which those people (in our example,<br />

Derek <strong>and</strong> Ethan) seek to make their livelihood that are being removed on account <strong>of</strong> wrongdoing that occurred<br />

before they became involved in the partnership.<br />

Nonetheless, in civil law, the incoming partner is not personally liable for obligations arising prior to his or her<br />

becoming a partner. 182 Notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing this fact, the value <strong>of</strong> the interest purchased by the incoming partner may be<br />

reduced by the need to pay the debt out <strong>of</strong> partnership property. 183 Thus, it is unclear whether Derek <strong>and</strong> Ethan have<br />

any reason to think that the assets given by them will be used to pay debts arising prior to their arrival. As Manzer<br />

puts it:<br />

The admission <strong>of</strong> a new partner to a partnership may result in the creation <strong>of</strong> a new partnership <strong>and</strong> the dissolution <strong>of</strong> the old one.<br />

184<br />

Whether this occurs will depend upon the relevant provincial legislation <strong>and</strong> the terms <strong>of</strong> the specific partnership agreement.<br />

Thus, whether the admission <strong>of</strong> a new partner (or the retirement <strong>of</strong> a current one) will dissolve the partnership<br />

is highly fact-dependent. Anything fact-dependent creates uncertainty. This uncertainty could in turn generate a<br />

desire to manage the risk that it creates. The tax system already creates a significant incentive for partners to remove<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>it from the partnership on an ongoing basis, because it forces partners to pay tax on earnings, even if those<br />

earnings remain in the business, <strong>and</strong> are not used for the personal purposes <strong>of</strong> the individual partner. Therefore, the<br />

tax system causes the individual partner to take money from the common fund <strong>of</strong> the partnership, if only to pay the<br />

185<br />

tax on the earnings.<br />

The provisions <strong>of</strong> Bill C-45 may increase this incentive to remove pr<strong>of</strong>it from the partnership. Bill C-45 creates<br />

the possibility that the partners may have property <strong>of</strong> the business taken away to pay criminal fines resulting from<br />

events occurring prior to when they became partners. This seems likely to increase the perceived need to engage in<br />

activities that lower the amount <strong>of</strong> partnership property that is exigible to pay debts at any given time. The civil law<br />

186<br />

allows such techniques to be employed. For reasons mentioned earlier, differences between the purposes <strong>of</strong> the<br />

181<br />

See the discussion <strong>of</strong> the importance <strong>of</strong> “true penal consequences”, Part V(B), above.<br />

182<br />

See Partnership Act (Manitoba), supra note 17, s. 20(1).<br />

183<br />

See VanDuzer, supra note 8 at 58, Figure 2.4.<br />

184<br />

Supra note 8 at para. 6.480.<br />

185<br />

The taxpayer is the individual partner. The amount <strong>of</strong> income or loss is calculated at the level <strong>of</strong> the partnership (see Income Tax Act, supra<br />

note 18, s. 96(1)), <strong>and</strong> then each partner must pay tax on his or her share <strong>of</strong> the income so calculated, or to deduct the loss so calculated<br />

from the partner’s other income, if any. See Backman, supra note 18.<br />

186<br />

See Part VII(B), above.

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