GEORGIA LAW REVIEW - StephanKinsella.com

WHAT IS A RIGHT?
took as his model a supposed discovery of the new science of Galileo
and Newton, the supposed discovery that secondary qualities are
not really qualities of things in themselves, but are instead reactions
in our own minds, reactions which, by a false projection, we com-
monly but mistakenly attribute to those things. Guided or mis-
guided by this seductive model Hume hoped to demonstrate that
the same applies to much else which we might uninstructedly have
believed to be characteristic of the Cartesian external world; in
particular, causal connection, the necessity of descriptive laws of
nature, and moral and aesthetic valued
In this Humean perspective it becomes almost impossible to
admit as objective anything but straightforward, unspooky matters
of fact about that external world; while the norms and values which
are somehow projected functions of individual or collective human
desire appear as correspondingly subjective. It is easy then to pro-
ceed, although Hume himself would never have dreamed of so pro-
ceeding, to the demoralizing conclusion that as such they are to be
despised and dismissed as merely human creations. It is upon philo-
sophical assumptions of this kind, and in the same sort of under-
standing of the findings of the social sciences, that today so many
of the and of the not so young, believe that the slightest
tincture of anthropology or sociology is enough to expose all value
judgements as inherently and essentially arbitrary, relative, and
subjective.
If we are to succeed in showing how (moral) rights are possible,
by providing for them a kind of objectivity, then we have either to
circumvent or to overcome the particular subjective/objective di-
chotomy which is the form of representation in the previous para-
graph. We have to find a way in which something can be objective,
in the rather different but sufficient sense of being independent of
our self-interested and capricious wills, while at the same time in
some way authoritative over those wills; without that something's
being just a matter of brute fact about either non-human or human
nature. Here it should be encouraging to ponder again the last words
quoted earlier from Grotius. For logically necessary truths are objec-
tive in precisely the sense just explained, and they neither are nor
state facts about either human or non-human nature. It is a matter
of individual or collective human choice - though certainly not by
For a development and defense of this not very controversial interpretation of Hume, see
Flew, Hurne, in D. J. .O'CONNOR (ed.), A CRITICAL HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 253 (1964).