The Oil Industry in Nazi Germany, 1936-1945

The Oil Industry in Nazi Germany,
1936-1945
RAYMOND G. STOKES
? The oil industry in Nazi Germany provides an excellent focus for
studying the interplay between economics, politics, and government
policy in the Third Reich. In this article, Mr. Stokes brings to this sub-
ject a comparative approach, making comparisons both within the oil
industry and with the industry's major industrial counterparts. He con-
cludes that a variety of factors-including the degree of shared interest
between individual firms and the government, the size and concentra-
tion of a firm's production facilities, and the political position of key
firm personnel-explain the success as well as the eventual collapse of
a given industrial sector.
With the oil crises of 1973-74 and 1979, Americans have become
very much aware of the importance of a national energy policy. Among
the many issues discussed in this context are energy self-sufficiency,
the role of energy in national security, synthetic fuels development,
and the extent to which government and industry should cooperate in
energy matters. All these issues were discussed and acted upon during
the National Socialist period in Germany. Thus it may be instructive
to examine that regime's disposition of these issues.1
In terms of energy consumption patterns, the world of 1936-45 was
a very different place from today's. European nations as a whole de-
pended on coal for over three-fourths of their energy needs in 1938,
for instance, while oil is by far the preferred fuel today. The German
economy relied on coal for 90 percent of its energy in 1938, using oil
for only 3 percent of its needs.2 Nonetheless, it is clear that petroleum
products played a special and irreplaceable role in the German econ-
omy. No other fuel source was suitable for motorized vehicles, whose
RAYMOND G. STOKES is a doctoral candidate at Ohio State University. He wishes to thank Alan Be-
yerchen and Business History Review referees for their numerous helpful comments and suggestions.
' Aside from the obvious political differences between the Nazi regime and that in the United States,
there have been great changes in economic structure since 1945. The two cases differ in capital structure
and in the amount of labor available; moreover, the German economy of 1945 depended largely on coal
rather than oil. One set of figures puts this difference into clear perspective. Total world production of
petroleum in 1945 was just over seven million barrels a day. In contrast, the United States alone, im-
ported close to eight million barrels of oil a day until the oil shock of 1979, a figure that closely approxi-
mated daily gasoline consumption in the United States.
2 Figures are drawn from Ferdinand Friedensburg, Die Rohstoffe und Energiequellen im neuen Eu-
ropa (Oldenburg/Berlin, 1943), 299. German figures exclude Austria. Synthetic fuel production figures
are not included; they would increase oil's share to about 5 percent of total energy consumption.
Business History Review 59 (summer 1985). C 1985 by The President and Fellows of Harvard College.