The Oil Industry in Nazi Germany, 1936-1945

266 BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW
oline or aviation fuel that was directly useable. In practice, however,
aviation fuel was rarely produced directly since the yield was low.
Rather, the high-grade gasoline was refined further through other hy-
drogenation processes. The result was a "high grade aviation base stock
with a high aromatic base. "34
Pioneering work in the hydrogenation process for making synthetic
fuels started much earlier than did work on the Fischer-Tropsch pro-
cess. Friedrich Bergius performed initial research on the development
of the process before and during World War I. The rights to the process
were then bought by Badische Anilin- und Sodafabrik (BASF), a Ger-
man chemical firm. After the war, BASF had to find a use for both the
hydrogenation facilities developed during the war for the production
of synthetic ammonia and a staff of engineers experienced in the tech-
nology. The company was lured by the prospect of enormous profits
because the booming auto industry had increased consumption of gas-
oline while a shortage in world petroleum supplies was projected. An
additional spur toward development was the support for the project-
moral at first, but soon financial--offered by Standard Oil of New Jer-
sey. On this basis, BASF's Carl Bosch pushed first the firm, and then
the enormous chemical combine I. G. Farbenindustrie, AG (formed in
1925 with BASF as a leading member), to develop the Bergius process
for industrial application. The first large-scale Bergius plant opened at
Leuna in 1927.35
The Nazi seizure of power in 1933 proved a boon for I. G. Farben
and its Bergius process. The discovery of large petroleum reserves in
Texas and Oklahoma, combined with the world economic crisis of
1929, had sent oil prices spiraling downward and threatened I. G. with
disaster. Even the influx of capital from Standard Oil of New Jersey
after 1928 did not help much. The Nazi policy of continuing, and even-
tually increasing, tariffs on imported petroleum products made mate-
rials produced by the Bergius process profitable. Huge allocations to
support construction of plants under the four-year plan and forced con-
tributions from other industries toward financing this construction
made enormous expansion possible. By the outbreak of the war in
1939, hydrogenation plants with a completed annual capacity of well
over one million metric tons were in operation. By the start of the
34 Ibid., 9-10.
:3. Ibid.; Hughes, "Technological Momentum," 108-20. Gottfried Plumpe, in a recent article, takes
issue with Hughes and stresses business strategic factors rather than technological momentum in explain-
ing the I.G. decision to develop synthetic rubber. Plumpe's article actually complements rather than
disproves Hughes's argument, however. See Plumpe, "Industrie, technischer Fortschritt und Staat: Die
Kautschuksynthese in Deutschland 1906-1944/45," Geschichte und Gesellschaft 9 (1983): 564-97, esp.
572-73. For the role of Standard Oil of New Jersey, see Joseph Borkin's engaged but well-documented
book, The Crime and Punishment ofl. G. Farben (New York, 1978; Pocket Books ed., 1979), 60-61, 64-
65; see also Tammen, I. G. Farbenindustrie, 102-3.