Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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The True and the Evident
14. Anyone who says that, in addition to things, there is the being of the things, as well
as the non-being of things, is also committed to this: in addition to the individual dog,
there exists the being of that dog, and the being of each of its parts, however small, as
well as the being of the limits which belong to it as a body; and these, in analogy with
the dog itself, form a continuum of existences which are located in the existence of space,
just as the dog is located in space. And then the being of the being of the dog, in turn,
would require analogous assumptions. An infinity of complications which has no use at
all! But the adventures one encounters with the non-being of the individual dog—whether
one denies or affirms the dog itself—would be even more bizarre. If one rejects or denies
the dog itself, then its non-being would be located, not merely in one place in the being of
space, but in each and every place in the being of space, thus overlapping and intersecting
itself in its manifold existence. If one accepts or affirms the dog, then there would be one
place in the being of space where the non-being of the dog would not be located; but it
would be found in every other place in the being of space, reaching from all sides and in
every possible way into that place where the being of the dog would be. And the non-being
of a dog-in-general, or of an animal-in-general, would be even more extraordinary. The
non-being of a dog-in-general would not include the non-being of any of its parts, for a part
may well exist even though the whole does not. This non-being of a dog-in-general would
be composed of the non-being of every type of dog—spitz, poodle, pointer—and indeed
of the non-being of each and every conceivable type of individual dog. And the non-being
of an animal-in-general would be more complex, since every conceivable species would
have to be taken into consideration. What are we supposed to say now? Are we really to
believe that, whoever thinks of the non-being of an animal-in-general, really thinks of
such a compound? And that this really subsisting non-being, compounded from such an
over-abundance of parts, is to be found somewhere in the “existence of a somewhere”, and
indeed in every place in space or in every “existence of a place in the existence of space”,
and so on, ad infinitum? And wouldn’t we have to say, of this complicated something, which
makes one’s head so dizzy, that it also exists in four-dimensional and multi-dimensional
topoids? For no animal or any other three-dimensional body is to be found there. If all this
doesn’t bring our philosopher back to his senses, then nothing will.
15. Some of those who accept, not only things, but also non-things and the existences of
things and the non-existences of things, would want to say, not that these objects exist,
but only that there are such objects, though in the strictest sense of the term. 13 But this
distinction between what exists and what is is empty; the words in which it is formulated
cannot be understood as expressing any thought at all. I will touch upon this curious
deviation of the theory only to note that considerations we have just set forth apply as well
to those who try to distinguish being and existence as to those who do not. What we have
said about the compounds of the being of a thing, and of the non-being of a thing, whether
the thing be thought of as an individual or in general, holds also in the present case. These
compounds remain the same, and in all their multiplicity, whether one says that they exist,
or whether one says that, instead of existing, they simply are.
16. It scarcely needs to be added that what I have said about the non-being of things (any
thoughtful reader will be convinced that non-being can never be the object of a thought)