Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

On the Existence of Contents and the Doctrine 75
whoever rejects or denies A judges correctly. The formula does not at all require that, if
there is no A, then there has to be something else— the non-being of A—to function in its
place. A itself is the thing with which our judgement is concerned.
If A is to be affirmed, then the affirming judgement may be said to be true and the negative
judgement false, and the one who accepts or affirms A may be said to judge correctly and
the one who rejects or denies it to judge incorrectly. Similarly for the case where A is not:
the judgement affirming A may be said to be false and the judgement denying it may be
said to be true; the one who affirms A judges incorrectly and the one who denies A judges
correctly. 7 There is not the slightest justification for supposing that the term “adaequatio”,
or “correspondence”, designates a relation which, in order to hold, requires the existence of
two terms. The object of a correct denial or rejection is not something which exists, except
in the sense in which one says, improperly, that whatever is thought “exists in the mind”.
The principle of the adaequatio rei et intellectus does not require that a negative judgement
correspond to an object (viz., the non-being of something) which exists. The adaequatio
consists precisely in the fact that the object of the judgement does not exist and that the one
who judges denies its existence. 8
12. Some have even gone so far as to say that, whoever thus rejects the existence of a nonbeing,
is guilty of subjectivism and psychologism. 9 Nothing could be less justified. For the
subjectivist, there is no “A is” or “A is not”; one says only, “A is for me (or for someone
or other)”. Neither acceptance nor rejection of the doctrine that there is the being of A, or
the non-being of A, commits anyone to subjectivism. The proponent of psychologism, on
the other hand, goes wrong in confusing a judgement’s being evident with the fact that it
is natural for all, or almost all, of the members of a certain species to judge in a certain
way. 10 He does not distinguish what one “ought” to do from what one is “compelled” to
do, and in consequence he plays into the hands of subjectivism. But nothing of this sort is
implied when we say that the objects of affirmation and denial are always only things and
never the being or the non-being of things. We say, of those who affirm or deny a thing,
that some do it, not blindly, but with evidence. Judging with evidence excludes not only the
possibility of error, but also the possibility that there be anyone judging to the contrary who
is not in error. 11 There is no being of A and no non-being of A, but either A is or A is not;
and therefore, of two people who judge that A is, it is not possible that the one is judging
correctly and the other incorrectly. And similarly for any two people who judge that A is
not.
So the entire objection is based upon a misunderstanding.
13. We have said that those who oppose our view have misinterpreted the statement,
“Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus”. If their interpretation were correct, then in order
to know that a certain thing exists, one would have to know that there is a certain equality
or similarity holding between something that is in the mind and something that is outside
it. Knowledge of this equality or similarity would then presuppose that one had compared
the two. But how does one compare something that is in the mind with something that is
not in the mind? Our knowledge of what is not in the mind is certainly not acquired as a
result of making a comparison. Where such knowledge is immediately given, it is a matter
of a simple and evident apprehension. 12