Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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The True and the Evident
6. And the question arises: How does one arrive at the knowledge of the being of A, as
distinguished from the knowledge simply of A itself? Is it something that is immediately
perceived? Is the being of this being, etc., also perceived at the same time, or is it something
that is inferred? No one would accept the first of these alternatives, for the consequences
are much too paradoxical. 4 But the other alternative leads to the question: How does one
arrive at such a conclusion and what premises does one use? And in this case the general
rules of logic would also be of crucial importance.
7. If we have an idea, not only of A, but also of the being of A, then this idea is either an idea
that we have a priori, or it is an object of intuition, or it is acquired by means of abstraction
from intuitions. But the whole doctrine of a priori ideas is to be rejected. 5 Intuition of the
being of A, alongside that of A, is out of the question. And the idea cannot be acquired by
means of abstraction, for “the being of A”, in such a case, would have to be a more general
concept than that of A (since, according to the view in question, “the being of A” is distinct
from A itself).
8. Strictly speaking, then, it is obvious that there is no thought of the being of A. We think
only of the A itself. If we think of something else along with it, the something else must be
a thing, once again. For example, it might be ourselves as that which is thinking of A, or
accepting or affirming A. In giving up the view that there is, in addition to the thought of
A, the thought of the being of A, we thereby rule out any possibility of proceeding from the
knowledge of A to the knowledge of the being of A.
9. We should follow Leibniz’s counsel with respect to nominibus abstractis. 6 The locution
“There is the impossibility of A”, which seems to be the expression of an affirmation, is
identical in content with “A is impossible”, which is the expression of an apodictic denial;
hence the former expression should be reduced to the latter. Similarly “There is the being
of A” and “There is the non-being of A”, respectively, should be reduced to “A exists”
and “A does not exist”. In this way we rid ourselves of a delusion which provides us with
nothing but endless complications.
10. Why would anyone suppose that, if A exists, then there is also the being of A, and that,
if A does not exist, then there is in its place the non-being of A? Those who accept the view
reason in the following way. Truth, they say, consists in an agreement or correspondence
between the intellect and a fact: Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus. Hence there must
be something for a true negative judgement to be in agreement with. But (the argument
continues) this cannot be the thing which the negative judgement correctly rejects or denies.
Hence it must be something else, and it may be said, in every case, that there is nothing for
this something else to be except the non-being of the thing which is denied.
11. What is meant by the formula Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus? It is essential
that we have an answer to this question, for we do not concede that, in the strict and proper
sense of “is”, there is truth. We cannot interpret the “is” of the formula as having the
function that it has in “A is” or “There is an A”. Actually what the formula says is no more
than this: if A is, then whoever accepts or affirms A judges correctly; and if A is not, then