Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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<strong>The</strong> <strong>True</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Evident</strong><br />
6. And <strong>the</strong> question arises: How does one arrive at <strong>the</strong> knowledge of <strong>the</strong> being of A, as<br />
distinguished from <strong>the</strong> knowledge simply of A itself? Is it something that is immediately<br />
perceived? Is <strong>the</strong> being of this being, etc., also perceived at <strong>the</strong> same time, or is it something<br />
that is inferred? No one would accept <strong>the</strong> first of <strong>the</strong>se alternatives, for <strong>the</strong> consequences<br />
are much too paradoxical. 4 But <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r alternative leads to <strong>the</strong> question: How does one<br />
arrive at such a conclusion <strong>and</strong> what premises does one use? And in this case <strong>the</strong> general<br />
rules of logic would also be of crucial importance.<br />
7. If we have an idea, not only of A, but also of <strong>the</strong> being of A, <strong>the</strong>n this idea is ei<strong>the</strong>r an idea<br />
that we have a priori, or it is an object of intuition, or it is acquired by means of abstraction<br />
from intuitions. But <strong>the</strong> whole doctrine of a priori ideas is to be rejected. 5 Intuition of <strong>the</strong><br />
being of A, alongside that of A, is out of <strong>the</strong> question. And <strong>the</strong> idea cannot be acquired by<br />
means of abstraction, for “<strong>the</strong> being of A”, in such a case, would have to be a more general<br />
concept than that of A (since, according to <strong>the</strong> view in question, “<strong>the</strong> being of A” is distinct<br />
from A itself).<br />
8. Strictly speaking, <strong>the</strong>n, it is obvious that <strong>the</strong>re is no thought of <strong>the</strong> being of A. We think<br />
only of <strong>the</strong> A itself. If we think of something else along with it, <strong>the</strong> something else must be<br />
a thing, once again. For example, it might be ourselves as that which is thinking of A, or<br />
accepting or affirming A. In giving up <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong>re is, in addition to <strong>the</strong> thought of<br />
A, <strong>the</strong> thought of <strong>the</strong> being of A, we <strong>the</strong>reby rule out any possibility of proceeding from <strong>the</strong><br />
knowledge of A to <strong>the</strong> knowledge of <strong>the</strong> being of A.<br />
9. We should follow Leibniz’s counsel with respect to nominibus abstractis. 6 <strong>The</strong> locution<br />
“<strong>The</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> impossibility of A”, which seems to be <strong>the</strong> expression of an affirmation, is<br />
identical in content with “A is impossible”, which is <strong>the</strong> expression of an apodictic denial;<br />
hence <strong>the</strong> former expression should be reduced to <strong>the</strong> latter. Similarly “<strong>The</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> being<br />
of A” <strong>and</strong> “<strong>The</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> non-being of A”, respectively, should be reduced to “A exists”<br />
<strong>and</strong> “A does not exist”. In this way we rid ourselves of a delusion which provides us with<br />
nothing but endless complications.<br />
10. Why would anyone suppose that, if A exists, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re is also <strong>the</strong> being of A, <strong>and</strong> that,<br />
if A does not exist, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re is in its place <strong>the</strong> non-being of A? Those who accept <strong>the</strong> view<br />
reason in <strong>the</strong> following way. Truth, <strong>the</strong>y say, consists in an agreement or correspondence<br />
between <strong>the</strong> intellect <strong>and</strong> a fact: Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus. Hence <strong>the</strong>re must<br />
be something for a true negative judgement to be in agreement with. But (<strong>the</strong> argument<br />
continues) this cannot be <strong>the</strong> thing which <strong>the</strong> negative judgement correctly rejects or denies.<br />
Hence it must be something else, <strong>and</strong> it may be said, in every case, that <strong>the</strong>re is nothing for<br />
this something else to be except <strong>the</strong> non-being of <strong>the</strong> thing which is denied.<br />
11. What is meant by <strong>the</strong> formula Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus? It is essential<br />
that we have an answer to this question, for we do not concede that, in <strong>the</strong> strict <strong>and</strong> proper<br />
sense of “is”, <strong>the</strong>re is truth. We cannot interpret <strong>the</strong> “is” of <strong>the</strong> formula as having <strong>the</strong><br />
function that it has in “A is” or “<strong>The</strong>re is an A”. Actually what <strong>the</strong> formula says is no more<br />
than this: if A is, <strong>the</strong>n whoever accepts or affirms A judges correctly; <strong>and</strong> if A is not, <strong>the</strong>n