Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

I
ON THE EXISTENCE OF
CONTENTS AND THE DOCTRINE
OF THE ADAEQUATIO
REI ET INTELLECTUS
(20 November, 1914)
1. In our ordinary language we use such expressions as “to be” and “to exist” in application
to what cannot be called things. For example, we say “There is the possibility…”, or “There
is the impossibility”. We also say that there is something that is the object of a thought, or
that there is something that is wanted, and we say that there is a law, etc. There are even
those who would say that, if a certain thing does not exist, then there is the non-being of
that thing, and that, if a certain thing does exist, then there is, not only the thing, but also
the being of the thing, as well as the being of the being of the thing. And some say that there
are truths which are eternal and necessary.
2. The question arises, then, whether in cases such as these, the word “is” is being used in
the same strict sense as it is used when one says that there is a certain thing. Some of those
who have answered this question affirmatively have noted, quite correctly, that even when
we say, of something, that “the thing is” we are not using the word “is” as the expression of
a predication. We are using it, rather, as the expression of an affirmation. They then go on
to note that the same thing holds for the other cases: the “is” performs a similar function in
such cases, since there, too, it is not being used as a predicate. 1
3. But this is a hasty conclusion. A word that is synsemantic may still have a variety of uses.
The essential question in the present cases is whether the phrase that is being used with “is”
really designates something that can be made an object of thought.
4. The expression “to think” (vorstellen) is univocal. To think is always to think of
something. Since “to think” is univocal, the term “something” must also be univocal. But
there is no generic concept that can be common both to things and to non-things. 2 Hence
if “something” denotes a thing at one time, it cannot denote a non-thing—an impossibility,
say—at another time.
5. If, when something A may be said to exist, there may also be said to exist, in the strict
or proper sense of the term “exist”,the being of A, and the being of the being of A, these as
things distinct from A itself, then the infinitude of complications and multiplications would
be extraordinarily baffling. For some, the difficulties involved in assuming an actual infinite
manifold would be sufficient reason for rejecting the view. 3