Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FORTH IN ESSAYS
I ON THE EXISTENCE OF CONTENTS AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE ADAEQUATIO REI ET INTELLECTUS (20 November, 1914) 1. In our ordinary language we use such expressions as “to be” <strong>and</strong> “to exist” in application to what cannot be called things. For example, we say “<strong>The</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> possibility…”, or “<strong>The</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> impossibility”. We also say that <strong>the</strong>re is something that is <strong>the</strong> object of a thought, or that <strong>the</strong>re is something that is wanted, <strong>and</strong> we say that <strong>the</strong>re is a law, etc. <strong>The</strong>re are even those who would say that, if a certain thing does not exist, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> non-being of that thing, <strong>and</strong> that, if a certain thing does exist, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re is, not only <strong>the</strong> thing, but also <strong>the</strong> being of <strong>the</strong> thing, as well as <strong>the</strong> being of <strong>the</strong> being of <strong>the</strong> thing. And some say that <strong>the</strong>re are truths which are eternal <strong>and</strong> necessary. 2. <strong>The</strong> question arises, <strong>the</strong>n, whe<strong>the</strong>r in cases such as <strong>the</strong>se, <strong>the</strong> word “is” is being used in <strong>the</strong> same strict sense as it is used when one says that <strong>the</strong>re is a certain thing. Some of those who have answered this question affirmatively have noted, quite correctly, that even when we say, of something, that “<strong>the</strong> thing is” we are not using <strong>the</strong> word “is” as <strong>the</strong> expression of a predication. We are using it, ra<strong>the</strong>r, as <strong>the</strong> expression of an affirmation. <strong>The</strong>y <strong>the</strong>n go on to note that <strong>the</strong> same thing holds for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r cases: <strong>the</strong> “is” performs a similar function in such cases, since <strong>the</strong>re, too, it is not being used as a predicate. 1 3. But this is a hasty conclusion. A word that is synsemantic may still have a variety of uses. <strong>The</strong> essential question in <strong>the</strong> present cases is whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> phrase that is being used with “is” really designates something that can be made an object of thought. 4. <strong>The</strong> expression “to think” (vorstellen) is univocal. To think is always to think of something. Since “to think” is univocal, <strong>the</strong> term “something” must also be univocal. But <strong>the</strong>re is no generic concept that can be common both to things <strong>and</strong> to non-things. 2 Hence if “something” denotes a thing at one time, it cannot denote a non-thing—an impossibility, say—at ano<strong>the</strong>r time. 5. If, when something A may be said to exist, <strong>the</strong>re may also be said to exist, in <strong>the</strong> strict or proper sense of <strong>the</strong> term “exist”,<strong>the</strong> being of A, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> being of <strong>the</strong> being of A, <strong>the</strong>se as things distinct from A itself, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> infinitude of complications <strong>and</strong> multiplications would be extraordinarily baffling. For some, <strong>the</strong> difficulties involved in assuming an actual infinite manifold would be sufficient reason for rejecting <strong>the</strong> view. 3
- Page 2 and 3:
Routledge Revivals The True and the
- Page 4 and 5:
Translated from the German WAHREIT
- Page 6 and 7:
x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
- Page 8 and 9:
xii Preface fortune to be able to c
- Page 10 and 11:
INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
- Page 12 and 13:
xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
- Page 14 and 15:
xviii Introduction of view—just a
- Page 16 and 17:
xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
- Page 18 and 19:
xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
- Page 20 and 21:
xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
- Page 22 and 23:
xxvi Introduction The motivation be
- Page 24 and 25:
I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
- Page 26 and 27:
4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
- Page 28 and 29:
6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
- Page 30 and 31:
8 The True and the Evident No furth
- Page 32 and 33:
10 The True and the Evident of cert
- Page 34 and 35:
12 The True and the Evident this ex
- Page 36 and 37:
14 The True and the Evident be give
- Page 38 and 39:
16 The True and the Evident referen
- Page 40 and 41:
II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
- Page 42 and 43:
III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
- Page 44 and 45: 22 The True and the Evident somethi
- Page 46 and 47: 24 The True and the Evident Psychol
- Page 48 and 49: 26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
- Page 50 and 51: 28 The True and the Evident logicia
- Page 52 and 53: 30 The True and the Evident which i
- Page 54 and 55: 32 The True and the Evident There i
- Page 56 and 57: 34 The True and the Evident Are we
- Page 58 and 59: 36 The True and the Evident way. On
- Page 60 and 61: 38 The True and the Evident It is c
- Page 62 and 63: 40 The True and the Evident is basi
- Page 64 and 65: Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
- Page 66 and 67: 44 The True and the Evident concept
- Page 68 and 69: 46 The True and the Evident 13. But
- Page 70 and 71: 48 The True and the Evident each of
- Page 72 and 73: 50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
- Page 74 and 75: I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
- Page 76 and 77: II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
- Page 78 and 79: III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
- Page 80 and 81: 58 The True and the Evident When do
- Page 82 and 83: 60 The True and the Evident I have
- Page 84 and 85: 62 The True and the Evident the con
- Page 86 and 87: 64 The True and the Evident to supp
- Page 88 and 89: 66 The True and the Evident degree
- Page 90 and 91: 68 The True and the Evident concept
- Page 92 and 93: 70 The True and the Evident non-exi
- Page 96 and 97: 74 The True and the Evident 6. And
- Page 98 and 99: 76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
- Page 100 and 101: II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
- Page 102 and 103: 80 The True and the Evident that re
- Page 104 and 105: 82 The True and the Evident in whic
- Page 106 and 107: 84 The True and the Evident would s
- Page 108 and 109: 86 The True and the Evident 6. If e
- Page 110 and 111: VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
- Page 112 and 113: APPENDICES
- Page 114 and 115: 92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
- Page 116 and 117: 94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
- Page 118 and 119: 2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
- Page 120 and 121: NOTES by Oskar Kraus
- Page 122 and 123: 100 Notes between saying (i) that i
- Page 124 and 125: 102 Notes and futural thinking are
- Page 126 and 127: 104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
- Page 128 and 129: 106 Notes he held instead that the
- Page 130 and 131: 108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
- Page 132 and 133: 110 Notes given in some way or othe
- Page 134 and 135: 112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
- Page 136 and 137: 114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
- Page 138 and 139: 116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
- Page 140 and 141: 118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
- Page 142 and 143: 120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
- Page 144 and 145:
122 Notes these consequences, which
- Page 146 and 147:
124 Notes someone who is judging wi
- Page 148 and 149:
126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
- Page 150 and 151:
INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
- Page 152 and 153:
130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
- Page 154 and 155:
132 Index propositions; see content