70 <strong>The</strong> <strong>True</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Evident</strong> non-existence of a carnivorous horse. I had asked, <strong>the</strong>n, whe<strong>the</strong>r this non-existence of a carnivorous horse is a universal having exemplifications in different places—say, one of <strong>the</strong>m in Prague <strong>and</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r in Zurich—or whe<strong>the</strong>r it is itself an individual. I received no definite answer, but I ga<strong>the</strong>r that <strong>the</strong>re was some inclination towards <strong>the</strong> latter view. I was <strong>the</strong>n led to ask whe<strong>the</strong>r that individual which is <strong>the</strong> non-being of a carnivorous horse includes among its parts <strong>the</strong> non-being of a carnivorous stallion, <strong>and</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> latter individual, in turn, includes <strong>the</strong> non-being of a carnivorous Arab stallion. <strong>The</strong>se questions could be answered only in <strong>the</strong> affirmative. <strong>The</strong>n I asked about <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong>se parts. Are <strong>the</strong>y to be thought of as a part of a continuum, or as parts of a definition pertaining to an individual, or as marks which, belonging to a complicated idea, are included in <strong>the</strong> thought of <strong>the</strong> whole? Each of <strong>the</strong>se alternatives was patently absurd, <strong>and</strong> it turned out that one had to appeal to still more fictions, making it obvious that <strong>the</strong> whole thing is a monstrous confusion. And <strong>the</strong>re are still o<strong>the</strong>r difficulties: if <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> non-being of a carnivorous horse, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re is also <strong>the</strong> non-being of a winged horse, in which case <strong>the</strong> non-being of a winged, carnivorous horse would have to be a part of each of <strong>the</strong>se two individuals. But it would be childish to press this dialectic any fur<strong>the</strong>r; half of what has been said is enough to show that one has become lost in a realm of chimeras. As for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r point you touch upon, I continue to feel that we have not yet understood each o<strong>the</strong>r. Nei<strong>the</strong>r you nor any o<strong>the</strong>r sound thinker would say that, because someone happens to think about a thing, <strong>the</strong> thing <strong>the</strong>refore may be said to exist, in <strong>the</strong> strict or proper sense of “exist”. Gorgias refuted <strong>the</strong> view by saying that, if it were true, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re would be a chariot battle at sea as soon as he thought about one. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, Marty certainly did not want to deny that <strong>the</strong>re is one ordinary linguistic usage in which we may say that, if a person thinks about something, <strong>the</strong>n that thing exists “as thought by him” or “in his mind”. But he felt it necessary to warn against confusing <strong>the</strong> “being” that a thing is supposed to have “in <strong>the</strong> mind”, with “being” in <strong>the</strong> primary sense. “Being in <strong>the</strong> mind” is simply “being thought”, <strong>and</strong> what does not exist in <strong>the</strong> strict or proper sense is capable of being thought, provided that <strong>the</strong>re is someone who thinks about it. As for relations <strong>and</strong> relative determinations, Aristotle paved <strong>the</strong> way for <strong>the</strong> distinction by means of still ano<strong>the</strong>r distinction he had made in his <strong>the</strong>ory of relations. He divided relations into three classes: comparative, causal, <strong>and</strong> intentional. He said of <strong>the</strong> first two that a real relation corresponds to a real correlative. If Caius is taller than Titus, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re exists not only <strong>the</strong> taller, but also <strong>the</strong> shorter; if one thing causes something else, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re exists—in <strong>the</strong> primary sense—not only that which is causing, but also that which is affected. But when something is merely thought of, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> thinker exists in <strong>the</strong> strict sense but that which is thought does not. When Aristotle made <strong>the</strong>se distinctions, however, he did not take note of <strong>the</strong> following: not only do we compare things in <strong>the</strong> present with o<strong>the</strong>r things in <strong>the</strong> present; we can also compare things which exist in <strong>the</strong> present with things which have existed in <strong>the</strong> past or with things which will exist in <strong>the</strong> future. I can say, not only that Caius is taller than Titus is now, but also that Caius is taller than Titus was a year ago, <strong>and</strong> that he is taller than Titus will be a year from now. It is only when I compare Caius now with Titus now that <strong>the</strong> language allows me to say simply, Caius is taller than Titus. Only in this case does <strong>the</strong> correlative exist as well as <strong>the</strong> relative. When we say that Titus was smaller than Caius now is, <strong>the</strong> correlative is something which formerly existed; when we say that, in a year from now, Titus will be smaller than Caius is now, <strong>the</strong> correlative
Contents of Judgement, Propositions, Objectives, States of Affairs 71 is something which will exist. Let us note, moreover, that a thing may be compared with something that is merely thought about, or with something that is judged about, whe<strong>the</strong>r truly or falsely, or with something that is hoped or feared. For example: “<strong>The</strong> damage is less than I thought it was”. We have a similar situation when one says that <strong>the</strong> number of discernible stars is less than a million: here one is thinking, not of a million real things but of a concept which has a familiar place in <strong>the</strong> decimal system. If <strong>the</strong> Aristotelian <strong>the</strong>ory of relations is developed in this way, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> difficulty which gave rise to <strong>the</strong> distinction between relations <strong>and</strong> relative determinations disappears completely. In Friendship, Yours, F.B.
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Routledge Revivals The True and the
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Translated from the German WAHREIT
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x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
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xii Preface fortune to be able to c
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INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
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xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
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xviii Introduction of view—just a
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xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
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xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
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xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
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xxvi Introduction The motivation be
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I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
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4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
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6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
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8 The True and the Evident No furth
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10 The True and the Evident of cert
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12 The True and the Evident this ex
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14 The True and the Evident be give
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16 The True and the Evident referen
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II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
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120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
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122 Notes these consequences, which
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124 Notes someone who is judging wi
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126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
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INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
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130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
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132 Index propositions; see content