Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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70<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>True</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Evident</strong><br />
non-existence of a carnivorous horse. I had asked, <strong>the</strong>n, whe<strong>the</strong>r this non-existence of a<br />
carnivorous horse is a universal having exemplifications in different places—say, one of<br />
<strong>the</strong>m in Prague <strong>and</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r in Zurich—or whe<strong>the</strong>r it is itself an individual. I received<br />
no definite answer, but I ga<strong>the</strong>r that <strong>the</strong>re was some inclination towards <strong>the</strong> latter view. I<br />
was <strong>the</strong>n led to ask whe<strong>the</strong>r that individual which is <strong>the</strong> non-being of a carnivorous horse<br />
includes among its parts <strong>the</strong> non-being of a carnivorous stallion, <strong>and</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> latter<br />
individual, in turn, includes <strong>the</strong> non-being of a carnivorous Arab stallion. <strong>The</strong>se questions<br />
could be answered only in <strong>the</strong> affirmative. <strong>The</strong>n I asked about <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong>se parts. Are<br />
<strong>the</strong>y to be thought of as a part of a continuum, or as parts of a definition pertaining to an<br />
individual, or as marks which, belonging to a complicated idea, are included in <strong>the</strong> thought<br />
of <strong>the</strong> whole? Each of <strong>the</strong>se alternatives was patently absurd, <strong>and</strong> it turned out that one<br />
had to appeal to still more fictions, making it obvious that <strong>the</strong> whole thing is a monstrous<br />
confusion. And <strong>the</strong>re are still o<strong>the</strong>r difficulties: if <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> non-being of a carnivorous<br />
horse, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re is also <strong>the</strong> non-being of a winged horse, in which case <strong>the</strong> non-being of a<br />
winged, carnivorous horse would have to be a part of each of <strong>the</strong>se two individuals. But it<br />
would be childish to press this dialectic any fur<strong>the</strong>r; half of what has been said is enough<br />
to show that one has become lost in a realm of chimeras.<br />
As for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r point you touch upon, I continue to feel that we have not yet understood<br />
each o<strong>the</strong>r. Nei<strong>the</strong>r you nor any o<strong>the</strong>r sound thinker would say that, because someone<br />
happens to think about a thing, <strong>the</strong> thing <strong>the</strong>refore may be said to exist, in <strong>the</strong> strict or<br />
proper sense of “exist”. Gorgias refuted <strong>the</strong> view by saying that, if it were true, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re<br />
would be a chariot battle at sea as soon as he thought about one. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, Marty<br />
certainly did not want to deny that <strong>the</strong>re is one ordinary linguistic usage in which we may<br />
say that, if a person thinks about something, <strong>the</strong>n that thing exists “as thought by him” or<br />
“in his mind”. But he felt it necessary to warn against confusing <strong>the</strong> “being” that a thing is<br />
supposed to have “in <strong>the</strong> mind”, with “being” in <strong>the</strong> primary sense. “Being in <strong>the</strong> mind” is<br />
simply “being thought”, <strong>and</strong> what does not exist in <strong>the</strong> strict or proper sense is capable of<br />
being thought, provided that <strong>the</strong>re is someone who thinks about it.<br />
As for relations <strong>and</strong> relative determinations, Aristotle paved <strong>the</strong> way for <strong>the</strong> distinction<br />
by means of still ano<strong>the</strong>r distinction he had made in his <strong>the</strong>ory of relations. He divided<br />
relations into three classes: comparative, causal, <strong>and</strong> intentional. He said of <strong>the</strong> first two<br />
that a real relation corresponds to a real correlative. If Caius is taller than Titus, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re<br />
exists not only <strong>the</strong> taller, but also <strong>the</strong> shorter; if one thing causes something else, <strong>the</strong>n<br />
<strong>the</strong>re exists—in <strong>the</strong> primary sense—not only that which is causing, but also that which is<br />
affected. But when something is merely thought of, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> thinker exists in <strong>the</strong> strict sense<br />
but that which is thought does not. When Aristotle made <strong>the</strong>se distinctions, however, he<br />
did not take note of <strong>the</strong> following: not only do we compare things in <strong>the</strong> present with o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
things in <strong>the</strong> present; we can also compare things which exist in <strong>the</strong> present with things<br />
which have existed in <strong>the</strong> past or with things which will exist in <strong>the</strong> future. I can say, not<br />
only that Caius is taller than Titus is now, but also that Caius is taller than Titus was a year<br />
ago, <strong>and</strong> that he is taller than Titus will be a year from now. It is only when I compare Caius<br />
now with Titus now that <strong>the</strong> language allows me to say simply, Caius is taller than Titus.<br />
Only in this case does <strong>the</strong> correlative exist as well as <strong>the</strong> relative. When we say that Titus<br />
was smaller than Caius now is, <strong>the</strong> correlative is something which formerly existed; when<br />
we say that, in a year from now, Titus will be smaller than Caius is now, <strong>the</strong> correlative