Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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The True and the Evident
non-existence of a carnivorous horse. I had asked, then, whether this non-existence of a
carnivorous horse is a universal having exemplifications in different places—say, one of
them in Prague and another in Zurich—or whether it is itself an individual. I received
no definite answer, but I gather that there was some inclination towards the latter view. I
was then led to ask whether that individual which is the non-being of a carnivorous horse
includes among its parts the non-being of a carnivorous stallion, and whether the latter
individual, in turn, includes the non-being of a carnivorous Arab stallion. These questions
could be answered only in the affirmative. Then I asked about the nature of these parts. Are
they to be thought of as a part of a continuum, or as parts of a definition pertaining to an
individual, or as marks which, belonging to a complicated idea, are included in the thought
of the whole? Each of these alternatives was patently absurd, and it turned out that one
had to appeal to still more fictions, making it obvious that the whole thing is a monstrous
confusion. And there are still other difficulties: if there is the non-being of a carnivorous
horse, then there is also the non-being of a winged horse, in which case the non-being of a
winged, carnivorous horse would have to be a part of each of these two individuals. But it
would be childish to press this dialectic any further; half of what has been said is enough
to show that one has become lost in a realm of chimeras.
As for the other point you touch upon, I continue to feel that we have not yet understood
each other. Neither you nor any other sound thinker would say that, because someone
happens to think about a thing, the thing therefore may be said to exist, in the strict or
proper sense of “exist”. Gorgias refuted the view by saying that, if it were true, then there
would be a chariot battle at sea as soon as he thought about one. On the other hand, Marty
certainly did not want to deny that there is one ordinary linguistic usage in which we may
say that, if a person thinks about something, then that thing exists “as thought by him” or
“in his mind”. But he felt it necessary to warn against confusing the “being” that a thing is
supposed to have “in the mind”, with “being” in the primary sense. “Being in the mind” is
simply “being thought”, and what does not exist in the strict or proper sense is capable of
being thought, provided that there is someone who thinks about it.
As for relations and relative determinations, Aristotle paved the way for the distinction
by means of still another distinction he had made in his theory of relations. He divided
relations into three classes: comparative, causal, and intentional. He said of the first two
that a real relation corresponds to a real correlative. If Caius is taller than Titus, then there
exists not only the taller, but also the shorter; if one thing causes something else, then
there exists—in the primary sense—not only that which is causing, but also that which is
affected. But when something is merely thought of, then the thinker exists in the strict sense
but that which is thought does not. When Aristotle made these distinctions, however, he
did not take note of the following: not only do we compare things in the present with other
things in the present; we can also compare things which exist in the present with things
which have existed in the past or with things which will exist in the future. I can say, not
only that Caius is taller than Titus is now, but also that Caius is taller than Titus was a year
ago, and that he is taller than Titus will be a year from now. It is only when I compare Caius
now with Titus now that the language allows me to say simply, Caius is taller than Titus.
Only in this case does the correlative exist as well as the relative. When we say that Titus
was smaller than Caius now is, the correlative is something which formerly existed; when
we say that, in a year from now, Titus will be smaller than Caius is now, the correlative