Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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Contents of Judgement, Propositions, Objectives, States of Affairs 65<br />
linguistic factors which may mislead us here. And also this: that whenever we do seem<br />
to be concerned with a non-thing, we will find—if we are attentive enough—that <strong>the</strong>re<br />
is in fact some thing with which our thought is also concerned. Our analyses must take<br />
<strong>the</strong>se facts into account, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>re are many closely connected considerations which must<br />
be explicated <strong>and</strong> clarified, if our thread is to lead us out of this labyrinth. Here too, as<br />
before, it is good to remind ourselves of Leibniz’s pertinent observation: whenever we put<br />
anything into abstract terms, we should be prepared to translate it back into concrete terms,<br />
in order to be sure that we have not altered <strong>the</strong> sense.<br />
VII<br />
To Oskar Kraus<br />
8 November, 1914<br />
… As for our philosophical question, I am most grateful to you for letting me know <strong>the</strong><br />
way in which Marty himself attempted to answer my objection. It is regrettable that he<br />
never told me of this reply, for o<strong>the</strong>rwise I might have been able to persuade him that<br />
it is untenable. I note with satisfaction that he <strong>and</strong> I agree on one point: that if <strong>the</strong> term<br />
“something” has no unambiguous meaning in <strong>the</strong> expression “to think of something”, <strong>the</strong>n<br />
<strong>the</strong> term “thought” itself cannot be univocal. <strong>The</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> term is univocal cannot be<br />
denied; Marty now believes he can preserve this fact by holding that <strong>the</strong> “something”, as<br />
that which is thought, is simply <strong>the</strong> correlate of <strong>the</strong> thinking. But it would be easy to show<br />
him that this is a mistake. <strong>The</strong> “something” is <strong>the</strong> object of our thoughts—in <strong>the</strong> one case,<br />
horse; in ano<strong>the</strong>r, that which is coloured; in ano<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> soul; <strong>and</strong> so on. But <strong>the</strong> term<br />
“horse” does not signify “contemplated horse”, or “horse which is thought about”, <strong>the</strong><br />
term “coloured” does not signify “coloured thing which is thought about”, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> term<br />
“soul” does not signify “soul which is thought about”. For o<strong>the</strong>rwise one who affirmed or<br />
accepted a horse would be affirming or accepting, not a horse, but a “contemplated horse”;<br />
or, more precisely, he would be accepting or affirming a person thinking about a horse; <strong>and</strong><br />
this is certainly false. To see <strong>the</strong> matter even more clearly, you might want to consider <strong>the</strong><br />
following. If <strong>the</strong> “something” in <strong>the</strong> expression “to think about something” really meant<br />
only “something thought about”, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> “something” in “to reject or deny something”<br />
would mean no more nor less than “something rejected or denied”. But nothing could be<br />
more obvious than <strong>the</strong> fact that, if a man rejects or denies a thing, he does not reject or<br />
deny it as something rejected or denied; on <strong>the</strong> contrary, he knows it is something which he<br />
himself does reject or deny. If a man denies God, for example, he does not deny a denied<br />
God, for this would be to deny that anyone denies God. So <strong>the</strong> uniform concept which<br />
relates to “something” in <strong>the</strong> expression “to think about something” is not <strong>the</strong> concept of<br />
“something thought about”; ra<strong>the</strong>r, it is a concept which is common to God <strong>and</strong> horse <strong>and</strong><br />
that which is coloured, <strong>and</strong> so on <strong>and</strong> so forth.<br />
With this I have said everything I need to say in order to show that Marty’s answer<br />
is untenable. It doesn’t matter at all what word we use to refer to <strong>the</strong> concept which is<br />
common to <strong>the</strong> things that are thought about. Whe<strong>the</strong>r we speak of “thing” or “entity”, <strong>the</strong><br />
essential point is that <strong>the</strong> highest universal to which we can attain by means of <strong>the</strong> supreme