Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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64 The True and the Evident to suppose that, in the strict sense, there are ideas of the non-being of a horse and of other non-beings and impossibilities. What Aristotle said remains true: we know privation, so to speak, “by means of its contrary” I hope this is enough to make my own position clear, even if you cannot feel that it settles the whole question once and for all…. 40 VI To Oskar Kraus 31 October, 1914 … Both of us esteemed Marty incomparably more than anyone else—as a person and as a thinker of the first importance.* Let us keep this point in mind when we discuss his criticism of my views, a critique in which Marty’s free spirit is so clearly manifest. He was quite right in not sparing the views of his former teacher, for that would not have been consistent with his love of truth, and he would want us to treat his own views in a similar way. Those of my opinions to which he took exception had developed gradually and only after repeated attempts at self-criticism. It could be, therefore, that it was I who prejudiced Marty against what I had said, for he heard me criticize my own opinions. But perhaps he would have done better had he told himself that only very important considerations could have led to such a deviation from my earlier opinions. One thing was obvious—namely, that I am not infallible—and this very fact might have suggested that my later opinions could also be wrong. It would be worthwhile to keep this possibility in mind and to decide these questions on purely objective grounds and not by any appeal to authority. I shall try to set forth these grounds for you in letters. I shall begin at once, today, by giving you what I believe to be a simple and rigorous proof of the fact that only things can be objects of our ideas and therefore that only things can be objects of any type of mental activity at all. The proof is based upon the fact that the concept of having an idea—of having something before the mind—is one that is uniform; the term “thought”, therefore, is univocal and not equivocal. But it is essential to this concept that thinking be always a matter of thinking of something. If the term “something” were ambiguous, then the term “thought” would also be ambiguous. And therefore it is not possible to interpret this “something” as being at one time a thing and at another time a non-thing; for there is no concept which could be common to things and non-things. I would say that this proof is absolutely decisive. One may verify the result, again and again, by analysing those cases in which a non-thing appears to be the object of a person’s thought. If you feel that there is any such case that we haven’t yet touched upon, please let me know and I will be glad to carry out the analysis. Let us recognize that there are * Anton Marty died on 2 October, 1914.—R.M.C.
Contents of Judgement, Propositions, Objectives, States of Affairs 65 linguistic factors which may mislead us here. And also this: that whenever we do seem to be concerned with a non-thing, we will find—if we are attentive enough—that there is in fact some thing with which our thought is also concerned. Our analyses must take these facts into account, and there are many closely connected considerations which must be explicated and clarified, if our thread is to lead us out of this labyrinth. Here too, as before, it is good to remind ourselves of Leibniz’s pertinent observation: whenever we put anything into abstract terms, we should be prepared to translate it back into concrete terms, in order to be sure that we have not altered the sense. VII To Oskar Kraus 8 November, 1914 … As for our philosophical question, I am most grateful to you for letting me know the way in which Marty himself attempted to answer my objection. It is regrettable that he never told me of this reply, for otherwise I might have been able to persuade him that it is untenable. I note with satisfaction that he and I agree on one point: that if the term “something” has no unambiguous meaning in the expression “to think of something”, then the term “thought” itself cannot be univocal. The fact that the term is univocal cannot be denied; Marty now believes he can preserve this fact by holding that the “something”, as that which is thought, is simply the correlate of the thinking. But it would be easy to show him that this is a mistake. The “something” is the object of our thoughts—in the one case, horse; in another, that which is coloured; in another, the soul; and so on. But the term “horse” does not signify “contemplated horse”, or “horse which is thought about”, the term “coloured” does not signify “coloured thing which is thought about”, and the term “soul” does not signify “soul which is thought about”. For otherwise one who affirmed or accepted a horse would be affirming or accepting, not a horse, but a “contemplated horse”; or, more precisely, he would be accepting or affirming a person thinking about a horse; and this is certainly false. To see the matter even more clearly, you might want to consider the following. If the “something” in the expression “to think about something” really meant only “something thought about”, then the “something” in “to reject or deny something” would mean no more nor less than “something rejected or denied”. But nothing could be more obvious than the fact that, if a man rejects or denies a thing, he does not reject or deny it as something rejected or denied; on the contrary, he knows it is something which he himself does reject or deny. If a man denies God, for example, he does not deny a denied God, for this would be to deny that anyone denies God. So the uniform concept which relates to “something” in the expression “to think about something” is not the concept of “something thought about”; rather, it is a concept which is common to God and horse and that which is coloured, and so on and so forth. With this I have said everything I need to say in order to show that Marty’s answer is untenable. It doesn’t matter at all what word we use to refer to the concept which is common to the things that are thought about. Whether we speak of “thing” or “entity”, the essential point is that the highest universal to which we can attain by means of the supreme
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Routledge Revivals The True and the
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Translated from the German WAHREIT
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x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
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xii Preface fortune to be able to c
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INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
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xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
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xviii Introduction of view—just a
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xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
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xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
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xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
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xxvi Introduction The motivation be
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I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
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4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
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6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
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8 The True and the Evident No furth
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10 The True and the Evident of cert
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12 The True and the Evident this ex
Page 36 and 37: 14 The True and the Evident be give
Page 38 and 39: 16 The True and the Evident referen
Page 40 and 41: II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
Page 42 and 43: III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
Page 44 and 45: 22 The True and the Evident somethi
Page 46 and 47: 24 The True and the Evident Psychol
Page 48 and 49: 26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
Page 50 and 51: 28 The True and the Evident logicia
Page 52 and 53: 30 The True and the Evident which i
Page 54 and 55: 32 The True and the Evident There i
Page 56 and 57: 34 The True and the Evident Are we
Page 58 and 59: 36 The True and the Evident way. On
Page 60 and 61: 38 The True and the Evident It is c
Page 62 and 63: 40 The True and the Evident is basi
Page 64 and 65: Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
Page 66 and 67: 44 The True and the Evident concept
Page 68 and 69: 46 The True and the Evident 13. But
Page 70 and 71: 48 The True and the Evident each of
Page 72 and 73: 50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
Page 74 and 75: I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
Page 76 and 77: II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
Page 78 and 79: III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
Page 80 and 81: 58 The True and the Evident When do
Page 82 and 83: 60 The True and the Evident I have
Page 84 and 85: 62 The True and the Evident the con
Page 88 and 89: 66 The True and the Evident degree
Page 90 and 91: 68 The True and the Evident concept
Page 92 and 93: 70 The True and the Evident non-exi
Page 94 and 95: Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
Page 96 and 97: 74 The True and the Evident 6. And
Page 98 and 99: 76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
Page 100 and 101: II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
Page 102 and 103: 80 The True and the Evident that re
Page 104 and 105: 82 The True and the Evident in whic
Page 106 and 107: 84 The True and the Evident would s
Page 108 and 109: 86 The True and the Evident 6. If e
Page 110 and 111: VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
Page 112 and 113: APPENDICES
Page 114 and 115: 92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 116 and 117: 94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 118 and 119: 2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
Page 120 and 121: NOTES by Oskar Kraus
Page 122 and 123: 100 Notes between saying (i) that i
Page 124 and 125: 102 Notes and futural thinking are
Page 126 and 127: 104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
Page 128 and 129: 106 Notes he held instead that the
Page 130 and 131: 108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
Page 132 and 133: 110 Notes given in some way or othe
Page 134 and 135: 112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
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114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
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116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
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118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
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120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
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122 Notes these consequences, which
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124 Notes someone who is judging wi
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126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
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INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
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130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
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132 Index propositions; see content
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