Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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62 The True and the Evident the concept “correct” signifies the agreement of the judgement with an entity which is not the object of the judgement. 33 If you tell me now that everyone accepts such a view, I feel I would be justified in making a solemn protest, not only in my name but also in that of everyone else. Once again, I would urgently warn my young friends in Prague not to become lost in vain fictions, but to return to the long-established psychology. May I also remind them that the two arguments I have appealed to just now are by no means the only relevant considerations. Still a third is the argument of the promise to marry an ens rationis, and this is but one of a long series of arguments. 34 If you say that my present point of view may well change in a number of respects, I am quite ready to agree, but with one reservation. So far as my positive assertions are concerned, various amplifications and modifications may be possible; yet I do not hesitate to say that the criterion of evidence itself assures us for all time in rejecting the theory we have been discussing. 35 And now friendly greetings. Yours, F.B. IV To Oskar Kraus 25 September, 1909 Dear Friend, You refuse to understand my reason for saying that there cannot be any thought or idea of the non-being of a cow. You don’t see the point of saying that, if there were such an idea, it would include the non-being of cows of all sizes and colours, of every age, and of whatever state of health you like, and that it would also include the non-being of a collection consisting of a cow, an ox, a herdsman, and a meadow. The explanation is very simple. These various non-beings would have to belong to the very content of the idea of the “non-being of a cow”, and not merely to its range or extension. They would be a part of the content: if the supposed concept of “the non-being of a cow” were thought in its full distinctness, it would include—also with full clarity and distinctness—the thought of the non-being of a white cow, of a two-year-old cow, of the collection of a cow, a herdsman, and a meadow. This would be necessary, just as it is necessary that in the distinct idea of a white horse there would also appear in full distinctness the idea of its white colour, its head, its eyes, its species as horse, its genus as hoofed animal, as well as the higher genera of mammal, vertebrate, animal, living organism, physical substance, and the like—for all these belong to the content of the thought or idea of such a horse. But what belongs to the range or extension—for example, the individual white horse which Napoleon rode—need not be thought as such in order for the thought or idea of the horse to be completely distinct. Perhaps these remarks are enough to clarify what I had said earlier and to make you see that your reply was not to the point. 36
Contents of Judgement, Propositions, Objectives, States of Affairs 63 Another observation in your letter shows how my words are sometimes misinterpreted. I had been concerned with the question whether all general ideas are derived by means of abstraction from individual ideas, or whether all or some of our intuitions show a certain indeterminateness, and I had decided in favour of the latter alternative. But this is quite different from supposing that we have ideas which are not intuitions and which are not acquired by means of abstraction from intuitions. There is a view about the nature of intuition, handed down from Aristotle, which must be set right in this regard. Actually Aristotle himself takes sensible intuition to be a kind of abstraction, for he says that the senses grasp the form without the matter. And if you consider that, according to him, accidents are given individuality by means of substance, and if you compare what he refers to as common sensibles you will find that the principle of individuation does not appear to be contained in the content of sensation. 37 … V To Oskar Kraus Schönbühel, 11 October, 1909 Dear Friend, You suggest that my view about the content of ideas must recently have been revised in essential respects. But I am not aware of having revised it since I introduced the theory of temporal modes, and the latter theory has nothing to do with the present question. 38 I have never doubted that every thought or idea has a content and (with the exception of absurd ideas) a range or extension. Nor have I doubted that the affirmative judgement applies to the total content of the thought or idea, whereas the negative judgement applies to its total extension. What I wanted to do was to draw your attention to this question: in the supposed thought or idea of the non-being of a horse, what is it that is to be considered as the content and as belonging to the content? Certainly not the non-being of everything that belongs to the content of the concept “horse”; for otherwise all this non-being (for example, the nonbeing of an animal and of a substance) would also be implicitly accepted. After all, what is thought of is judged according to its entire content. What would be the alternative? Obviously nothing but a non-being. So which one? Shall we say the non-being of a stallion? Or the non-being of a mare? This sort of answer is contradicted by the fact that a clear analysis of the content in question reveals nothing like the non-being of a horse. To make fully clear what this supposed idea really is, we need only the concept of horse and of its falsehood; both of these must be given if I am to reject the distinctly conceived universal, horse. 39 Hence, there is no justification for saying that the non-being of a white horse or of a black horse belong to the content of the idea of the non-being of a horse. So what does belong to it, if I may ask? Anyone who reflects on the question will see that the supposed idea of the non-being of a horse would have to include such characteristics as: animal, vertebrate, mammal, living being, body, not to mention head, heart, and other parts. I hope all this makes it obvious to you just how fantastic it is
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Routledge Revivals The True and the
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Translated from the German WAHREIT
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x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
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xii Preface fortune to be able to c
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INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
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xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
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xviii Introduction of view—just a
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xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
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xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
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xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
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xxvi Introduction The motivation be
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I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
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4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
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6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
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8 The True and the Evident No furth
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10 The True and the Evident of cert
Page 34 and 35: 12 The True and the Evident this ex
Page 36 and 37: 14 The True and the Evident be give
Page 38 and 39: 16 The True and the Evident referen
Page 40 and 41: II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
Page 42 and 43: III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
Page 44 and 45: 22 The True and the Evident somethi
Page 46 and 47: 24 The True and the Evident Psychol
Page 48 and 49: 26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
Page 50 and 51: 28 The True and the Evident logicia
Page 52 and 53: 30 The True and the Evident which i
Page 54 and 55: 32 The True and the Evident There i
Page 56 and 57: 34 The True and the Evident Are we
Page 58 and 59: 36 The True and the Evident way. On
Page 60 and 61: 38 The True and the Evident It is c
Page 62 and 63: 40 The True and the Evident is basi
Page 64 and 65: Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
Page 66 and 67: 44 The True and the Evident concept
Page 68 and 69: 46 The True and the Evident 13. But
Page 70 and 71: 48 The True and the Evident each of
Page 72 and 73: 50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
Page 74 and 75: I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
Page 76 and 77: II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
Page 78 and 79: III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
Page 80 and 81: 58 The True and the Evident When do
Page 82 and 83: 60 The True and the Evident I have
Page 86 and 87: 64 The True and the Evident to supp
Page 88 and 89: 66 The True and the Evident degree
Page 90 and 91: 68 The True and the Evident concept
Page 92 and 93: 70 The True and the Evident non-exi
Page 94 and 95: Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
Page 96 and 97: 74 The True and the Evident 6. And
Page 98 and 99: 76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
Page 100 and 101: II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
Page 102 and 103: 80 The True and the Evident that re
Page 104 and 105: 82 The True and the Evident in whic
Page 106 and 107: 84 The True and the Evident would s
Page 108 and 109: 86 The True and the Evident 6. If e
Page 110 and 111: VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
Page 112 and 113: APPENDICES
Page 114 and 115: 92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 116 and 117: 94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 118 and 119: 2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
Page 120 and 121: NOTES by Oskar Kraus
Page 122 and 123: 100 Notes between saying (i) that i
Page 124 and 125: 102 Notes and futural thinking are
Page 126 and 127: 104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
Page 128 and 129: 106 Notes he held instead that the
Page 130 and 131: 108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
Page 132 and 133: 110 Notes given in some way or othe
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112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
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114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
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116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
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118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
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120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
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122 Notes these consequences, which
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124 Notes someone who is judging wi
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126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
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INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
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130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
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132 Index propositions; see content
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