Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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The True and the Evident
the concept “correct” signifies the agreement of the judgement with an entity which is not
the object of the judgement. 33
If you tell me now that everyone accepts such a view, I feel I would be justified in
making a solemn protest, not only in my name but also in that of everyone else.
Once again, I would urgently warn my young friends in Prague not to become lost in
vain fictions, but to return to the long-established psychology.
May I also remind them that the two arguments I have appealed to just now are by no
means the only relevant considerations. Still a third is the argument of the promise to marry
an ens rationis, and this is but one of a long series of arguments. 34 If you say that my present
point of view may well change in a number of respects, I am quite ready to agree, but with
one reservation. So far as my positive assertions are concerned, various amplifications and
modifications may be possible; yet I do not hesitate to say that the criterion of evidence
itself assures us for all time in rejecting the theory we have been discussing. 35
And now friendly greetings.
Yours,
F.B.
IV
To Oskar Kraus
25 September, 1909
Dear Friend,
You refuse to understand my reason for saying that there cannot be any thought or idea
of the non-being of a cow. You don’t see the point of saying that, if there were such an
idea, it would include the non-being of cows of all sizes and colours, of every age, and
of whatever state of health you like, and that it would also include the non-being of a
collection consisting of a cow, an ox, a herdsman, and a meadow.
The explanation is very simple. These various non-beings would have to belong to
the very content of the idea of the “non-being of a cow”, and not merely to its range or
extension. They would be a part of the content: if the supposed concept of “the non-being
of a cow” were thought in its full distinctness, it would include—also with full clarity
and distinctness—the thought of the non-being of a white cow, of a two-year-old cow,
of the collection of a cow, a herdsman, and a meadow. This would be necessary, just as
it is necessary that in the distinct idea of a white horse there would also appear in full
distinctness the idea of its white colour, its head, its eyes, its species as horse, its genus as
hoofed animal, as well as the higher genera of mammal, vertebrate, animal, living organism,
physical substance, and the like—for all these belong to the content of the thought or idea
of such a horse. But what belongs to the range or extension—for example, the individual
white horse which Napoleon rode—need not be thought as such in order for the thought or
idea of the horse to be completely distinct.
Perhaps these remarks are enough to clarify what I had said earlier and to make you see
that your reply was not to the point. 36