Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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62<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>True</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Evident</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> concept “correct” signifies <strong>the</strong> agreement of <strong>the</strong> judgement with an entity which is not<br />
<strong>the</strong> object of <strong>the</strong> judgement. 33<br />
If you tell me now that everyone accepts such a view, I feel I would be justified in<br />
making a solemn protest, not only in my name but also in that of everyone else.<br />
Once again, I would urgently warn my young friends in Prague not to become lost in<br />
vain fictions, but to return to <strong>the</strong> long-established psychology.<br />
May I also remind <strong>the</strong>m that <strong>the</strong> two arguments I have appealed to just now are by no<br />
means <strong>the</strong> only relevant considerations. Still a third is <strong>the</strong> argument of <strong>the</strong> promise to marry<br />
an ens rationis, <strong>and</strong> this is but one of a long series of arguments. 34 If you say that my present<br />
point of view may well change in a number of respects, I am quite ready to agree, but with<br />
one reservation. So far as my positive assertions are concerned, various amplifications <strong>and</strong><br />
modifications may be possible; yet I do not hesitate to say that <strong>the</strong> criterion of evidence<br />
itself assures us for all time in rejecting <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory we have been discussing. 35<br />
And now friendly greetings.<br />
Yours,<br />
F.B.<br />
IV<br />
To Oskar Kraus<br />
25 September, 1909<br />
Dear Friend,<br />
You refuse to underst<strong>and</strong> my reason for saying that <strong>the</strong>re cannot be any thought or idea<br />
of <strong>the</strong> non-being of a cow. You don’t see <strong>the</strong> point of saying that, if <strong>the</strong>re were such an<br />
idea, it would include <strong>the</strong> non-being of cows of all sizes <strong>and</strong> colours, of every age, <strong>and</strong><br />
of whatever state of health you like, <strong>and</strong> that it would also include <strong>the</strong> non-being of a<br />
collection consisting of a cow, an ox, a herdsman, <strong>and</strong> a meadow.<br />
<strong>The</strong> explanation is very simple. <strong>The</strong>se various non-beings would have to belong to<br />
<strong>the</strong> very content of <strong>the</strong> idea of <strong>the</strong> “non-being of a cow”, <strong>and</strong> not merely to its range or<br />
extension. <strong>The</strong>y would be a part of <strong>the</strong> content: if <strong>the</strong> supposed concept of “<strong>the</strong> non-being<br />
of a cow” were thought in its full distinctness, it would include—also with full clarity<br />
<strong>and</strong> distinctness—<strong>the</strong> thought of <strong>the</strong> non-being of a white cow, of a two-year-old cow,<br />
of <strong>the</strong> collection of a cow, a herdsman, <strong>and</strong> a meadow. This would be necessary, just as<br />
it is necessary that in <strong>the</strong> distinct idea of a white horse <strong>the</strong>re would also appear in full<br />
distinctness <strong>the</strong> idea of its white colour, its head, its eyes, its species as horse, its genus as<br />
hoofed animal, as well as <strong>the</strong> higher genera of mammal, vertebrate, animal, living organism,<br />
physical substance, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> like—for all <strong>the</strong>se belong to <strong>the</strong> content of <strong>the</strong> thought or idea<br />
of such a horse. But what belongs to <strong>the</strong> range or extension—for example, <strong>the</strong> individual<br />
white horse which Napoleon rode—need not be thought as such in order for <strong>the</strong> thought or<br />
idea of <strong>the</strong> horse to be completely distinct.<br />
Perhaps <strong>the</strong>se remarks are enough to clarify what I had said earlier <strong>and</strong> to make you see<br />
that your reply was not to <strong>the</strong> point. 36