Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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58 The True and the Evident When does one person believe that another judges correctly?— When the other person judges in the way in which he judges himself. If a man judges “A is not”, for example, and notes that someone else rejects A, then he believes that the other person judges correctly. Everyone who believes or rejects something, believes of himself that he believes or rejects correctly; if he did not believe this of himself, he would not be judging at all. Of course, believing is not the same as knowing; one may believe without knowing that the judgement in question is correct. To know that a judgement is correct, whether the judgement is mine or that of someone else, I must be able to see that it corresponds, in object, form, tense, and perhaps also modality, to a judgement which is directly or indirectly evident to me. 19 Doubtless a judgement may change from correct to incorrect by virtue of some change that occurs in reality. But the latter change is a real occurrence and not a matter of an ens rationis coming into being or passing away. That is to say, the being of A need not be produced in order for the judgement “A is” to be transformed from one that is incorrect to one that is correct; all that is needed is A. And the non-being of A need not come into being in order for the judgement “A is not” to be transformed from one that is incorrect to one that is correct; all that is required is that A cease to be. If A were thus to cease (note that we are concerned here only with things), nothing further would be needed for my judgement to be correct; there would be no point in dreaming up other processes, involving ostensible entia rationis. After all, it is admitted that, in the cessation of the thing which is A, we have the equivalent of the supposed coming into being of that non-thing which is the non-being of A. 20 4. The doctrine that such non-things exist, therefore, has nothing whatever in its favour. Moreover, it doesn’t even have the authority of Aristotle and the others in his tradition who defined truth as the correspondence of intellect and res. They did not consider res as an ens rationis corresponding to the content of the judgement; they considered res as the thing which is the object of the judgement. 5. The case against the view in question becomes even clearer when we consider the absurdity of some of the consequences. Consider, above all, the regressus ad infinitum which would be involved if a man wished to know, or to judge with evidence, that “A is”. He could not affirm or acknowledge A with evidence unless he could also affirm or acknowledge the “being” of A with evidence. For if he could not convince himself of the existence of this second object, he would be unable to know whether his original judgement corresponds with it. Did he affirm “the being of A” before he affirmed A with evidence? Surely not. Hence the affirmations were simultaneous. And therefore he had “the being of A” as content and as object at one and the same time. In which case there must also have been a content of the second judgement. And he must have affirmed this second content either at the same time or prior to affirming the being of A. This second content would be the being of the being of A. And this, too, must have been thought, not merely as content, but also as object, and so on and so forth, ad infinitum. 21 This infinite regress, or rather this infinite multiplication of simultaneous affirmations—“There is A”, “There is the being of A”, etc., etc.—cannot possibly be avoided. Bergmann writes to me that this infinite multiplication seems to him to be avoidable, just as it is in the case of our apprehension of secondary objects He does not see the dissimilarity of the two cases. The inner
Contents of Judgement, Propositions, Objectives, States of Affairs 59 consciousness is itself included in the act which is the secondary object. 22 The being of the being of A, however, could not be included in the being of A. Each must differ from the other, just as the being of A differs from A. 6. The absurdity of this infinite multiplication may be seen just as easily in still another way. We must suppose that innumerable entia rationis have existed throughout eternity, just as God has existed throughout eternity; these include, in particular, an infinity of impossibilities, the beings of these impossibilities, and the non-beings of the beings of these impossibilities, and the non-beings of the non-beings of other impossibilities, as well as of the non-beings of realia, or things. All the arguments against the infinite multiplication of entities will apply to the present doctrine—a doctrine which renders no service whatever (after all, we can describe all the facts without it) and which obviously creates nothing but insoluble problems and confusion. Direct observation and logical analysis thus join forces in showing that it is entirely unacceptable. And let us rejoice in the result! We have complications enough if we accept things as our sole objects. The appeal to Plato’s theory of ideas will not help. For, as Aristotle remarked, if we have trouble computing with a small sum, we are not likely to solve our problem by adding one that is incomparably greater. And this is what we are doing when we bring in the being of A, the non-being of B, the non-being of the non being of A, and all the other “entia rationis”. 23 II To Oskar Kraus 6 September, 1909 Dear Friend: The fact that you take Marty’s side in our scientific controversy will not affect our friendly relations. But when you write that the old theory can be defended in every respect, I do feel that all the things I have said to you have been in vain…. There is, to begin with, the absurdity of an infinite multiplication. 24 And then there is the point that I have made again and again (the last time very recently)—namely, that the theory is contradicted by a universal law. For it is a universal law that, when any given thing is thought about, then everything belonging to its content is thought about as well. 25 Whoever thinks about the non-being of a living body would also have to think about the non-being of a plant, of an animal, of a man, of a man who is black, of a frog, etc. It is conceded on all sides that we cannot think about the non-being of a frog without thinking about a frog. Consider, then, what a monstrous precondition there would be for the supposed idea of the non-being of a body. I tried to point out to you earlier just what it is that we do, strictly speaking, when we perform that act of thinking in which the thought of the non-being of a body is supposed to be given. 26 And so it is incorrect to say that I have not clearly presented the new theory to you. F.B.
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Routledge Revivals The True and the
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Translated from the German WAHREIT
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x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
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xii Preface fortune to be able to c
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INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
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xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
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xviii Introduction of view—just a
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xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
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xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
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xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
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xxvi Introduction The motivation be
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I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
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4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
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6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
Page 30 and 31: 8 The True and the Evident No furth
Page 32 and 33: 10 The True and the Evident of cert
Page 34 and 35: 12 The True and the Evident this ex
Page 36 and 37: 14 The True and the Evident be give
Page 38 and 39: 16 The True and the Evident referen
Page 40 and 41: II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
Page 42 and 43: III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
Page 44 and 45: 22 The True and the Evident somethi
Page 46 and 47: 24 The True and the Evident Psychol
Page 48 and 49: 26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
Page 50 and 51: 28 The True and the Evident logicia
Page 52 and 53: 30 The True and the Evident which i
Page 54 and 55: 32 The True and the Evident There i
Page 56 and 57: 34 The True and the Evident Are we
Page 58 and 59: 36 The True and the Evident way. On
Page 60 and 61: 38 The True and the Evident It is c
Page 62 and 63: 40 The True and the Evident is basi
Page 64 and 65: Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
Page 66 and 67: 44 The True and the Evident concept
Page 68 and 69: 46 The True and the Evident 13. But
Page 70 and 71: 48 The True and the Evident each of
Page 72 and 73: 50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
Page 74 and 75: I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
Page 76 and 77: II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
Page 78 and 79: III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
Page 82 and 83: 60 The True and the Evident I have
Page 84 and 85: 62 The True and the Evident the con
Page 86 and 87: 64 The True and the Evident to supp
Page 88 and 89: 66 The True and the Evident degree
Page 90 and 91: 68 The True and the Evident concept
Page 92 and 93: 70 The True and the Evident non-exi
Page 94 and 95: Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
Page 96 and 97: 74 The True and the Evident 6. And
Page 98 and 99: 76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
Page 100 and 101: II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
Page 102 and 103: 80 The True and the Evident that re
Page 104 and 105: 82 The True and the Evident in whic
Page 106 and 107: 84 The True and the Evident would s
Page 108 and 109: 86 The True and the Evident 6. If e
Page 110 and 111: VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
Page 112 and 113: APPENDICES
Page 114 and 115: 92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 116 and 117: 94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 118 and 119: 2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
Page 120 and 121: NOTES by Oskar Kraus
Page 122 and 123: 100 Notes between saying (i) that i
Page 124 and 125: 102 Notes and futural thinking are
Page 126 and 127: 104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
Page 128 and 129: 106 Notes he held instead that the
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108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
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110 Notes given in some way or othe
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112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
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114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
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116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
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118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
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120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
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122 Notes these consequences, which
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124 Notes someone who is judging wi
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126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
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INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
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130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
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132 Index propositions; see content
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