Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

Contents of Judgement, Propositions, Objectives, States of Affairs 57
the ens rationis, i.e. it becomes a fiction cum fundamento in re, a fiction which, although
erroneous, is so firmly related to truth that it may be of help in leading us to the truth.
The difference between our views is considerable. Let us see what seem to be clear and
decisive considerations in favour of mine.
1. It is impossible to have an idea without having an idea of something. The term
“something” here signifies what is a thing. If the thinking is a compound thought, then
things are what one has compounded. 14
It is because of this fact that the concept of an idea—of having something before the
mind—is a simple, unequivocal concept.
Every observation confirms the point. No one can be said to think of the being of a tree,
of the non-being of a tree, or of the impossibility of a round square, in the way in which
one can be said to think of a tree. A careful psychological analysis shows that the former
cases involve not only ideas but judgements. Suppose, for example, I reject a apodictically
and that I think of a as identical with b (merely thinking, but not judging, I predicate a of
b). In such a case, language may mislead one into supposing that the impossibility of that b
is here the object of our thought. 15
To say that, in the strict sense of the term “thinking”, one may think of an impossibility,
or the like, is just as much of a mistake as to say that an impossibility may be the object of
a correct affirmative judgement, or that there is such an impossibility.
2. Confirmation of what I have said may be found in this fact: even you must admit that
every assertion affirming your entia rationis has its equivalent in an assertion having only
realia as objects. Thus “There is the impossibility of a” is equivalent to the judgement “a is
impossible”, which rejects a apodictically. What I have shown, with respect to the temporal
modes of thinking, indicates that the temporal entia rationis are also no exception. 16
Not only are judgements about things equivalent to your judgements about entia rationis;
wherever there is an instance of the latter there is also an instance of the former. Hence the
entia rationis are entirely superfluous and not in accord with the economy of nature. 17
But all this fits in neatly with my conception of entia linguae—that they are fictions
resulting from an improper understanding of the multiplicity of linguistic forms which we
happen to have.
3. Perhaps you will say: The entia rationis corresponding to the contents of correct
judgements do have their use. For they render the important service of distinguishing
judgements which are correct from judgements which are incorrect. And the correctness
of a judgement (you may continue) consists in the agreement of the judgement with such
entities and not with any thing: a correct affirmative judgement will agree with the real
being of the thing and a correct negative judgement with the real non-being of the thing.
I reply: the distinction between correct and incorrect judgements, so far as I can see,
does not provide us with the slightest justification for conjuring up these entia rationis.
Where some might say, “In case there is the being of A, and someone says that A is, then
he is judging correctly”, I would say, “In case A is and someone says that A is, he judges
correctly”. Similarly instead of “If there is the non-being of A and someone rejects A, he
judges correctly”, I would say “If A is not and someone rejects A, he judges correctly”, and
so on. 18