Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

More documents

Recommendations

Info

III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED CONTENTS OF JUDGEMENT, PROPOSITIONS, OBJECTIVES, STATES OF AFFAIRS I To Anton Marty 2 September, 1906 Dear Friend: I have spoken at length with Bergmann about your view that what there is includes not only things, but also the being, or the non-being, of things, as well as a legion—indeed an infinity—of impossibilities. He writes that he has taken up the problem with you again, finding you intransigent as before, and that he has now made some concessions with respect to my own arguments. And so, once again, I will try to undeceive you, for I cannot help but regard your theory as a serious mistake. First let us make sure that I understood it correctly. We are not considering the question whether there are contents of judgement qua contents of judgement. We want to consider rather whether there is something subsisting in and for itself, which, under certain conditions, may become the content of a judgement, and indeed of a correct judgement. Since one can judge with correctness that there is a tree, then (according to the theory) that there is a tree may become the content of a correct judgement. 12 And this being of the tree is itself something which is. Similarly there would have to be the non-being of a golden mountain, the impossibility of a round square, and such like, where this little word “to be” is taken in an entirely strict sense. But, according to my view, we are here confronted only with a figure of speech, which leads to the fiction of new beings and which so deceives us with respect to our psychological activities that we believe we are judging affirmatively when in fact we are denying something. Of course, a person may say that, in imagining, he has had “the impossibility of a round square”, or the like, as an object of his thought. But he is not thinking about it; he is thinking only of signs which are meant to be surrogates. He is counting on there being no errors in the final result, as does the mathematician who makes use of absurd fictions—for example, negative quantities, unities divided by multiplicities, irrational and imaginary numbers, polygons with an infinite number of sides, etc., etc. 13 In this way the ens linguae becomes
Contents of Judgement, Propositions, Objectives, States of Affairs 57 the ens rationis, i.e. it becomes a fiction cum fundamento in re, a fiction which, although erroneous, is so firmly related to truth that it may be of help in leading us to the truth. The difference between our views is considerable. Let us see what seem to be clear and decisive considerations in favour of mine. 1. It is impossible to have an idea without having an idea of something. The term “something” here signifies what is a thing. If the thinking is a compound thought, then things are what one has compounded. 14 It is because of this fact that the concept of an idea—of having something before the mind—is a simple, unequivocal concept. Every observation confirms the point. No one can be said to think of the being of a tree, of the non-being of a tree, or of the impossibility of a round square, in the way in which one can be said to think of a tree. A careful psychological analysis shows that the former cases involve not only ideas but judgements. Suppose, for example, I reject a apodictically and that I think of a as identical with b (merely thinking, but not judging, I predicate a of b). In such a case, language may mislead one into supposing that the impossibility of that b is here the object of our thought. 15 To say that, in the strict sense of the term “thinking”, one may think of an impossibility, or the like, is just as much of a mistake as to say that an impossibility may be the object of a correct affirmative judgement, or that there is such an impossibility. 2. Confirmation of what I have said may be found in this fact: even you must admit that every assertion affirming your entia rationis has its equivalent in an assertion having only realia as objects. Thus “There is the impossibility of a” is equivalent to the judgement “a is impossible”, which rejects a apodictically. What I have shown, with respect to the temporal modes of thinking, indicates that the temporal entia rationis are also no exception. 16 Not only are judgements about things equivalent to your judgements about entia rationis; wherever there is an instance of the latter there is also an instance of the former. Hence the entia rationis are entirely superfluous and not in accord with the economy of nature. 17 But all this fits in neatly with my conception of entia linguae—that they are fictions resulting from an improper understanding of the multiplicity of linguistic forms which we happen to have. 3. Perhaps you will say: The entia rationis corresponding to the contents of correct judgements do have their use. For they render the important service of distinguishing judgements which are correct from judgements which are incorrect. And the correctness of a judgement (you may continue) consists in the agreement of the judgement with such entities and not with any thing: a correct affirmative judgement will agree with the real being of the thing and a correct negative judgement with the real non-being of the thing. I reply: the distinction between correct and incorrect judgements, so far as I can see, does not provide us with the slightest justification for conjuring up these entia rationis. Where some might say, “In case there is the being of A, and someone says that A is, then he is judging correctly”, I would say, “In case A is and someone says that A is, he judges correctly”. Similarly instead of “If there is the non-being of A and someone rejects A, he judges correctly”, I would say “If A is not and someone rejects A, he judges correctly”, and so on. 18
Page 2 and 3:
Routledge Revivals The True and the
Page 4 and 5:
Translated from the German WAHREIT
Page 6 and 7:
x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
Page 8 and 9:
xii Preface fortune to be able to c
Page 10 and 11:
INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
Page 12 and 13:
xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
Page 14 and 15:
xviii Introduction of view—just a
Page 16 and 17:
xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
Page 18 and 19:
xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
Page 20 and 21:
xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
Page 22 and 23:
xxvi Introduction The motivation be
Page 24 and 25:
I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
Page 26 and 27:
4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
Page 28 and 29: 6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
Page 30 and 31: 8 The True and the Evident No furth
Page 32 and 33: 10 The True and the Evident of cert
Page 34 and 35: 12 The True and the Evident this ex
Page 36 and 37: 14 The True and the Evident be give
Page 38 and 39: 16 The True and the Evident referen
Page 40 and 41: II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
Page 42 and 43: III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
Page 44 and 45: 22 The True and the Evident somethi
Page 46 and 47: 24 The True and the Evident Psychol
Page 48 and 49: 26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
Page 50 and 51: 28 The True and the Evident logicia
Page 52 and 53: 30 The True and the Evident which i
Page 54 and 55: 32 The True and the Evident There i
Page 56 and 57: 34 The True and the Evident Are we
Page 58 and 59: 36 The True and the Evident way. On
Page 60 and 61: 38 The True and the Evident It is c
Page 62 and 63: 40 The True and the Evident is basi
Page 64 and 65: Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
Page 66 and 67: 44 The True and the Evident concept
Page 68 and 69: 46 The True and the Evident 13. But
Page 70 and 71: 48 The True and the Evident each of
Page 72 and 73: 50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
Page 74 and 75: I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
Page 76 and 77: II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
Page 80 and 81: 58 The True and the Evident When do
Page 82 and 83: 60 The True and the Evident I have
Page 84 and 85: 62 The True and the Evident the con
Page 86 and 87: 64 The True and the Evident to supp
Page 88 and 89: 66 The True and the Evident degree
Page 90 and 91: 68 The True and the Evident concept
Page 92 and 93: 70 The True and the Evident non-exi
Page 94 and 95: Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
Page 96 and 97: 74 The True and the Evident 6. And
Page 98 and 99: 76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
Page 100 and 101: II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
Page 102 and 103: 80 The True and the Evident that re
Page 104 and 105: 82 The True and the Evident in whic
Page 106 and 107: 84 The True and the Evident would s
Page 108 and 109: 86 The True and the Evident 6. If e
Page 110 and 111: VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
Page 112 and 113: APPENDICES
Page 114 and 115: 92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 116 and 117: 94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 118 and 119: 2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
Page 120 and 121: NOTES by Oskar Kraus
Page 122 and 123: 100 Notes between saying (i) that i
Page 124 and 125: 102 Notes and futural thinking are
Page 126 and 127: 104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
Page 128 and 129:
106 Notes he held instead that the
Page 130 and 131:
108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
Page 132 and 133:
110 Notes given in some way or othe
Page 134 and 135:
112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
Page 136 and 137:
114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
Page 138 and 139:
116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
Page 140 and 141:
118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
Page 142 and 143:
120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
Page 144 and 145:
122 Notes these consequences, which
Page 146 and 147:
124 Notes someone who is judging wi
Page 148 and 149:
126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
Page 150 and 151:
INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
Page 152 and 153:
130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
Page 154 and 155:
132 Index propositions; see content
show all

Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?