Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To Anton Marty 1 March, 1906 Dear Friend, … You say that by “ens rationis” you understand whatever is not strictly a thing. Examples would be: an empty space, the impossibility of a square circle; a colour (in contrast to something coloured). And from what you say later, it would seem that you also include such determinations as “brighter than what is red”, “smaller than the size of a cubic foot”, and so on. All these, in your opinion, could be said to exist, in the strict sense of the term, and even when no one is thinking. 10 But in this case, what justification would there be for the expression “ens rationis”? The expression is justified only in reference to “objects of thought”, for “ratio” has the same comprehension as Descartes’ “cogitatio”. It is not enough to note that if there were no reason, then such entities would not be grasped in their individuality. This would be to commit the mistake of those “who prove too much”. The point is that the understanding does not produce such entities. But if one must speak about such entities, then one should be consistent and affirm that in addition to whatever is a thing, there is a second set of entities, subsisting quite independently of reason, and that these might be called entia non realia, but not entia rationis. However, I am not prepared to do this, as you are aware. I would say that relations and concepts such as shape, extension, position (I am speaking of the concreta in question) are included among things. The mode of conception of these things is a special one, given only in cases of complicated apperception where parts are distinguished within a whole. As for the so-called abstract names, such as “colour”, I would say that psychologically they are not true names but are quite different parts of speech. Similarly for “the being of A”, “the non-being of A”, “the impossibility of A”. These ostensible names are actually equivalent to such expressions as “that A is”, “that A is not”, and “that A is impossible”. Obviously the latter are rudimentary locutions which need to be completed, as in “I believe that A is”, “I wish that A were not”, “I deny that A is impossible”, and so on. I am convinced that the doctrine of “reflection upon the content of a judgement” is a complete delusion: there is no ground for saying that the so-called content of judgement might be presented merely as an idea and without involving any kind of judgement. To be sure, one can conceive of a person judging without judging in the same way oneself. But the rest is an absurd fiction. What goes on in the mind when one says “I am supposing (ich stelle mir vor) that A is, that it is not, that it is impossible” must be ascertained by means of an exact psychological analysis. Once this is accomplished, then we shall also have some inkling as to what happens when one “supposes that A is good”, “supposes that A is bad”, and so on. What leads to the entia rationis is best recognized in those cases where this term is most appropriate—i.e. in “A as object of thought”. If I say “I
Ens Rationis and Ens Irreale 55 am thinking of A, who is clever”, I am connecting the thought of myself as someone thinking in a specific manner with the thought “A is clever”; that is to say, I am related to “clever” in a wholly different way than I am when, thus thinking, I call myself clever. 11 Possibly the expression “colour” can be equated with “the coloured qua coloured”, or “the coloured as such”, but this “as such”, as Aristotle well knew, is also equivocal….
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Routledge Revivals The True and the
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Translated from the German WAHREIT
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x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
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xii Preface fortune to be able to c
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INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
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xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
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xviii Introduction of view—just a
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xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
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xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
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xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
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xxvi Introduction The motivation be
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I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
Page 26 and 27: 4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
Page 28 and 29: 6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
Page 30 and 31: 8 The True and the Evident No furth
Page 32 and 33: 10 The True and the Evident of cert
Page 34 and 35: 12 The True and the Evident this ex
Page 36 and 37: 14 The True and the Evident be give
Page 38 and 39: 16 The True and the Evident referen
Page 40 and 41: II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
Page 42 and 43: III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
Page 44 and 45: 22 The True and the Evident somethi
Page 46 and 47: 24 The True and the Evident Psychol
Page 48 and 49: 26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
Page 50 and 51: 28 The True and the Evident logicia
Page 52 and 53: 30 The True and the Evident which i
Page 54 and 55: 32 The True and the Evident There i
Page 56 and 57: 34 The True and the Evident Are we
Page 58 and 59: 36 The True and the Evident way. On
Page 60 and 61: 38 The True and the Evident It is c
Page 62 and 63: 40 The True and the Evident is basi
Page 64 and 65: Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
Page 66 and 67: 44 The True and the Evident concept
Page 68 and 69: 46 The True and the Evident 13. But
Page 70 and 71: 48 The True and the Evident each of
Page 72 and 73: 50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
Page 74 and 75: I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
Page 78 and 79: III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
Page 80 and 81: 58 The True and the Evident When do
Page 82 and 83: 60 The True and the Evident I have
Page 84 and 85: 62 The True and the Evident the con
Page 86 and 87: 64 The True and the Evident to supp
Page 88 and 89: 66 The True and the Evident degree
Page 90 and 91: 68 The True and the Evident concept
Page 92 and 93: 70 The True and the Evident non-exi
Page 94 and 95: Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
Page 96 and 97: 74 The True and the Evident 6. And
Page 98 and 99: 76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
Page 100 and 101: II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
Page 102 and 103: 80 The True and the Evident that re
Page 104 and 105: 82 The True and the Evident in whic
Page 106 and 107: 84 The True and the Evident would s
Page 108 and 109: 86 The True and the Evident 6. If e
Page 110 and 111: VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
Page 112 and 113: APPENDICES
Page 114 and 115: 92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 116 and 117: 94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 118 and 119: 2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
Page 120 and 121: NOTES by Oskar Kraus
Page 122 and 123: 100 Notes between saying (i) that i
Page 124 and 125: 102 Notes and futural thinking are
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104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
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106 Notes he held instead that the
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108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
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110 Notes given in some way or othe
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112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
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114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
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116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
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118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
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120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
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122 Notes these consequences, which
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124 Notes someone who is judging wi
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126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
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INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
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130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
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132 Index propositions; see content
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