II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To Anton Marty 1 March, 1906 Dear Friend, … You say that by “ens rationis” you underst<strong>and</strong> whatever is not strictly a thing. Examples would be: an empty space, <strong>the</strong> impossibility of a square circle; a colour (in contrast to something coloured). And from what you say later, it would seem that you also include such determinations as “brighter than what is red”, “smaller than <strong>the</strong> size of a cubic foot”, <strong>and</strong> so on. All <strong>the</strong>se, in your opinion, could be said to exist, in <strong>the</strong> strict sense of <strong>the</strong> term, <strong>and</strong> even when no one is thinking. 10 But in this case, what justification would <strong>the</strong>re be for <strong>the</strong> expression “ens rationis”? <strong>The</strong> expression is justified only in reference to “objects of thought”, for “ratio” has <strong>the</strong> same comprehension as Descartes’ “cogitatio”. It is not enough to note that if <strong>the</strong>re were no reason, <strong>the</strong>n such entities would not be grasped in <strong>the</strong>ir individuality. This would be to commit <strong>the</strong> mistake of those “who prove too much”. <strong>The</strong> point is that <strong>the</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>ing does not produce such entities. But if one must speak about such entities, <strong>the</strong>n one should be consistent <strong>and</strong> affirm that in addition to whatever is a thing, <strong>the</strong>re is a second set of entities, subsisting quite independently of reason, <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong>se might be called entia non realia, but not entia rationis. However, I am not prepared to do this, as you are aware. I would say that relations <strong>and</strong> concepts such as shape, extension, position (I am speaking of <strong>the</strong> concreta in question) are included among things. <strong>The</strong> mode of conception of <strong>the</strong>se things is a special one, given only in cases of complicated apperception where parts are distinguished within a whole. As for <strong>the</strong> so-called abstract names, such as “colour”, I would say that psychologically <strong>the</strong>y are not true names but are quite different parts of speech. Similarly for “<strong>the</strong> being of A”, “<strong>the</strong> non-being of A”, “<strong>the</strong> impossibility of A”. <strong>The</strong>se ostensible names are actually equivalent to such expressions as “that A is”, “that A is not”, <strong>and</strong> “that A is impossible”. Obviously <strong>the</strong> latter are rudimentary locutions which need to be completed, as in “I believe that A is”, “I wish that A were not”, “I deny that A is impossible”, <strong>and</strong> so on. I am convinced that <strong>the</strong> doctrine of “reflection upon <strong>the</strong> content of a judgement” is a complete delusion: <strong>the</strong>re is no ground for saying that <strong>the</strong> so-called content of judgement might be presented merely as an idea <strong>and</strong> without involving any kind of judgement. To be sure, one can conceive of a person judging without judging in <strong>the</strong> same way oneself. But <strong>the</strong> rest is an absurd fiction. What goes on in <strong>the</strong> mind when one says “I am supposing (ich stelle mir vor) that A is, that it is not, that it is impossible” must be ascertained by means of an exact psychological analysis. Once this is accomplished, <strong>the</strong>n we shall also have some inkling as to what happens when one “supposes that A is good”, “supposes that A is bad”, <strong>and</strong> so on. What leads to <strong>the</strong> entia rationis is best recognized in those cases where this term is most appropriate—i.e. in “A as object of thought”. If I say “I
Ens Rationis <strong>and</strong> Ens Irreale 55 am thinking of A, who is clever”, I am connecting <strong>the</strong> thought of myself as someone thinking in a specific manner with <strong>the</strong> thought “A is clever”; that is to say, I am related to “clever” in a wholly different way than I am when, thus thinking, I call myself clever. 11 Possibly <strong>the</strong> expression “colour” can be equated with “<strong>the</strong> coloured qua coloured”, or “<strong>the</strong> coloured as such”, but this “as such”, as Aristotle well knew, is also equivocal….
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Routledge Revivals The True and the
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Translated from the German WAHREIT
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x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
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xii Preface fortune to be able to c
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INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
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xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
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xviii Introduction of view—just a
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xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
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xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
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xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
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xxvi Introduction The motivation be
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I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
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104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
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106 Notes he held instead that the
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108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
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110 Notes given in some way or othe
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112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
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114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
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116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
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118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
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120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
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122 Notes these consequences, which
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124 Notes someone who is judging wi
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126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
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INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
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130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
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132 Index propositions; see content