Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

II
ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE
To Anton Marty
1 March, 1906
Dear Friend,
… You say that by “ens rationis” you understand whatever is not strictly a thing.
Examples would be: an empty space, the impossibility of a square circle; a colour (in
contrast to something coloured). And from what you say later, it would seem that you also
include such determinations as “brighter than what is red”, “smaller than the size of a cubic
foot”, and so on. All these, in your opinion, could be said to exist, in the strict sense of the
term, and even when no one is thinking. 10 But in this case, what justification would there be
for the expression “ens rationis”? The expression is justified only in reference to “objects
of thought”, for “ratio” has the same comprehension as Descartes’ “cogitatio”. It is not
enough to note that if there were no reason, then such entities would not be grasped in their
individuality. This would be to commit the mistake of those “who prove too much”. The
point is that the understanding does not produce such entities.
But if one must speak about such entities, then one should be consistent and affirm
that in addition to whatever is a thing, there is a second set of entities, subsisting quite
independently of reason, and that these might be called entia non realia, but not entia
rationis. However, I am not prepared to do this, as you are aware. I would say that relations
and concepts such as shape, extension, position (I am speaking of the concreta in question)
are included among things. The mode of conception of these things is a special one, given
only in cases of complicated apperception where parts are distinguished within a whole.
As for the so-called abstract names, such as “colour”, I would say that psychologically
they are not true names but are quite different parts of speech. Similarly for “the being of
A”, “the non-being of A”, “the impossibility of A”. These ostensible names are actually
equivalent to such expressions as “that A is”, “that A is not”, and “that A is impossible”.
Obviously the latter are rudimentary locutions which need to be completed, as in “I
believe that A is”, “I wish that A were not”, “I deny that A is impossible”, and so on.
I am convinced that the doctrine of “reflection upon the content of a judgement” is a
complete delusion: there is no ground for saying that the so-called content of judgement
might be presented merely as an idea and without involving any kind of judgement. To be
sure, one can conceive of a person judging without judging in the same way oneself. But
the rest is an absurd fiction. What goes on in the mind when one says “I am supposing
(ich stelle mir vor) that A is, that it is not, that it is impossible” must be ascertained by
means of an exact psychological analysis. Once this is accomplished, then we shall also
have some inkling as to what happens when one “supposes that A is good”, “supposes
that A is bad”, and so on. What leads to the entia rationis is best recognized in those
cases where this term is most appropriate—i.e. in “A as object of thought”. If I say “I