Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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On <strong>the</strong> So-Called “Immanent or Intentional Object” 53<br />
essentially <strong>the</strong> same as ours? <strong>The</strong> “contemplated horse” considered as object would be <strong>the</strong><br />
object of inner perception, which <strong>the</strong> thinker perceives whenever he forms a correlative<br />
pair consisting of this “contemplated horse” along with his thinking about <strong>the</strong> horse; for<br />
correlatives are such that one cannot be perceived or apprehended without <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. 7 But<br />
what are experienced as primary objects, or what are thought universally as primary objects<br />
of reason, are never <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>the</strong> objects of inner perception. Had I equated “object”<br />
with “object of thought”, <strong>the</strong>n I would have had to say that <strong>the</strong> primary thought relation has<br />
no object or content at all. 8 So I protest against this foolishness that has been dreamed up<br />
<strong>and</strong> attributed to me. Just what statement of my views is it that Höfler is attacking? Certain<br />
passages in my Psychologie?—Or perhaps something I am supposed to have said in my<br />
lectures? But where? When? Before what audience? I would indeed like to know. I haven’t<br />
looked at <strong>the</strong> Psychologie or my notebooks for a long time, but, as I remember, I put <strong>the</strong><br />
matter in <strong>the</strong> way I have just described. I would like to have it made clear that, unless<br />
something incorrect was said, which I do not believe, I have always held (in agreement<br />
with Aristotle) that “horse” <strong>and</strong> not “contemplated horse” is <strong>the</strong> immanent object of those<br />
thoughts that pertain to horses. Naturally, however, I did say that “horse” is thought or<br />
contemplated by us, <strong>and</strong> that insofar as we do think of it (N.B., insofar as we think of <strong>the</strong><br />
horse <strong>and</strong> not of <strong>the</strong> “contemplated horse”) we have “horse” as (immanent) object.<br />
But enough for now… 9<br />
F.B.