Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR INTENTIONAL OBJECT” To Anton Marty 1 17 March, 1905 Dear Friend, I have your kind letter. I see that the Roman Congress has also upset you a little. I wasn’t disturbed myself, I must say, and I have tried to calm E. as well as K. in a letter sent today. Typographical errors are a nuisance, though, and because there were no offprints, I cannot even send a copy to you. 2 As for your account of Höfler’s comments, I was baffled by the reference to the “content and immanent object” of thought (“inhalt” und “immanentes Objekt” der Vorstellung). 3 When I spoke of “immanent object”, I used the qualification “immanent” in order to avoid misunderstandings, since many use the unqualified term “object” to refer to that which is outside the mind. 4 But by an object of a thought I meant what it is that the thought is about, whether or not there is anything outside the mind corresponding to the thought. It has never been my view that the immanent object is identical with “object of thought” (vorgestelltes Objekt). What we think about is the object or thing and not the “object of thought”. If, in our thought, we contemplate a horse, our thought has as its immanent object—not a “contemplated horse”, but a horse. And strictly speaking only the horse—not the “contemplated horse”—can be called an object. But the object need not exist. The person thinking may have something as the object of his thought even though that thing does not exist. Of course it has long been customary to say that universals, qua universals, “exist in the mind” and not in reality, and such like. But this is incorrect if what is thus called “immanent” is taken to be the “contemplated horse” (gedachtes Pferd) or “the universal as object of thought” (gedachtes Universale). For “horse contemplated in general by me here and now” would then be the object of a general thought about a horse; it would be the correlate of me as an individually thinking person, as having this individual object of thought as object of thought. 5 . One could not say that universals as universals are in the mind, if one of the characteristics of the “things existing in the mind” is that they are “objects of my thought”. When Aristotle said the is in one’s experience, he was also speaking of what you call simply “object”. But because we do use the word “in” here, I allowed myself the term “immanent object”, in order to say, not that the object exists, but that it is an object whether or not there is anything that corresponds to it. Its being an object, however, is merely the linguistic correlate of the person experiencing having it as object, i.e., his thinking of it in his experience. 6 Aristotle also says that the receives the without the just as the intellect, of course, takes up the in abstraction from the matter. Wasn’t his thinking
On the So-Called “Immanent or Intentional Object” 53 essentially the same as ours? The “contemplated horse” considered as object would be the object of inner perception, which the thinker perceives whenever he forms a correlative pair consisting of this “contemplated horse” along with his thinking about the horse; for correlatives are such that one cannot be perceived or apprehended without the other. 7 But what are experienced as primary objects, or what are thought universally as primary objects of reason, are never themselves the objects of inner perception. Had I equated “object” with “object of thought”, then I would have had to say that the primary thought relation has no object or content at all. 8 So I protest against this foolishness that has been dreamed up and attributed to me. Just what statement of my views is it that Höfler is attacking? Certain passages in my Psychologie?—Or perhaps something I am supposed to have said in my lectures? But where? When? Before what audience? I would indeed like to know. I haven’t looked at the Psychologie or my notebooks for a long time, but, as I remember, I put the matter in the way I have just described. I would like to have it made clear that, unless something incorrect was said, which I do not believe, I have always held (in agreement with Aristotle) that “horse” and not “contemplated horse” is the immanent object of those thoughts that pertain to horses. Naturally, however, I did say that “horse” is thought or contemplated by us, and that insofar as we do think of it (N.B., insofar as we think of the horse and not of the “contemplated horse”) we have “horse” as (immanent) object. But enough for now… 9 F.B.
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Routledge Revivals The True and the
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Translated from the German WAHREIT
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x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
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xii Preface fortune to be able to c
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INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
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xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
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xviii Introduction of view—just a
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xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
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xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
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xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
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xxvi Introduction The motivation be
Page 24 and 25: I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
Page 26 and 27: 4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
Page 28 and 29: 6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
Page 30 and 31: 8 The True and the Evident No furth
Page 32 and 33: 10 The True and the Evident of cert
Page 34 and 35: 12 The True and the Evident this ex
Page 36 and 37: 14 The True and the Evident be give
Page 38 and 39: 16 The True and the Evident referen
Page 40 and 41: II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
Page 42 and 43: III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
Page 44 and 45: 22 The True and the Evident somethi
Page 46 and 47: 24 The True and the Evident Psychol
Page 48 and 49: 26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
Page 50 and 51: 28 The True and the Evident logicia
Page 52 and 53: 30 The True and the Evident which i
Page 54 and 55: 32 The True and the Evident There i
Page 56 and 57: 34 The True and the Evident Are we
Page 58 and 59: 36 The True and the Evident way. On
Page 60 and 61: 38 The True and the Evident It is c
Page 62 and 63: 40 The True and the Evident is basi
Page 64 and 65: Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
Page 66 and 67: 44 The True and the Evident concept
Page 68 and 69: 46 The True and the Evident 13. But
Page 70 and 71: 48 The True and the Evident each of
Page 72 and 73: 50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
Page 76 and 77: II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
Page 78 and 79: III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
Page 80 and 81: 58 The True and the Evident When do
Page 82 and 83: 60 The True and the Evident I have
Page 84 and 85: 62 The True and the Evident the con
Page 86 and 87: 64 The True and the Evident to supp
Page 88 and 89: 66 The True and the Evident degree
Page 90 and 91: 68 The True and the Evident concept
Page 92 and 93: 70 The True and the Evident non-exi
Page 94 and 95: Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
Page 96 and 97: 74 The True and the Evident 6. And
Page 98 and 99: 76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
Page 100 and 101: II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
Page 102 and 103: 80 The True and the Evident that re
Page 104 and 105: 82 The True and the Evident in whic
Page 106 and 107: 84 The True and the Evident would s
Page 108 and 109: 86 The True and the Evident 6. If e
Page 110 and 111: VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
Page 112 and 113: APPENDICES
Page 114 and 115: 92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 116 and 117: 94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 118 and 119: 2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
Page 120 and 121: NOTES by Oskar Kraus
Page 122 and 123: 100 Notes between saying (i) that i
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102 Notes and futural thinking are
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104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
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106 Notes he held instead that the
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108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
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110 Notes given in some way or othe
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112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
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114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
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116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
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118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
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120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
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122 Notes these consequences, which
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124 Notes someone who is judging wi
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126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
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INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
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130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
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132 Index propositions; see content
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