Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

50
The True and the Evident
8. Such essential determinations overlap. Determination is pluriserial. 22
9. There are also determinations which may be lost and replaced by others without changing
the essential individuality of the thing.
These are called accidental. 23
10. These, too, are often pluriserial with respect to that which gives them individual
determination.
11. And these accidental determinations themselves may often have accidental
determinations of the second order, and so on. In such cases, the accidental determinations
of the second order will be essential in relation to those of the first order (they will be
essential determinations of what is an accident of the first order). 24
12. If a determination is an accident of anything, then that thing is its substratum; the ultimate
substratum, which is not an accident in relation to anything else, is called substance.
13. The combination of specifying and individuating determinations is of a purely logical
nature. None of these determinations can disappear or change without causing each of the
others to become something different. 25
The combination of that which serves as a substratum and that which is only accidental
is partly logical, partly real. That is to say, the former part may continue in its individuality
when the latter ceases or falls away; the converse, however, is not possible. 26
14. But there are also combinations of accidents as well as of substances which are such
that any of the parts may continue after the other parts cease to exist. Such combinations of
parts make up collectives and whatever is continuous.
In these cases the combination of the parts is real with respect to both aspects. 27
15. A group of minds or an extended body would exemplify combined realities of this sort;
indeed both of these are substances.
A multiplicity of accidents of one and the same substance (or of one and the same
accident) and a continuous accident of an unextended substance would be examples of
real combinations which are themselves accidental. 28 In the latter case, since the same
substance underlies all the parts of the accident, no part of the accident can wholly fall
away if the others are to be preserved.