Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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<strong>The</strong> Equivocal Use of <strong>the</strong> Term “Existent” 47<br />
23. Since only things—in <strong>the</strong> strict sense of this term—can be thought (I have in mind<br />
whatever is such that, if it exists, it is a substance, an accident, or a collective of both), it<br />
often happens that words which are names in <strong>the</strong> grammatical sense are not names in <strong>the</strong><br />
logical sense. When a word is a name only in <strong>the</strong> grammatical sense, it does not denote<br />
anything in <strong>the</strong> way in which <strong>the</strong> word “man” can be said to denote something <strong>and</strong> to<br />
indicate that <strong>the</strong> speaker is thinking about a man. But a word which is a name only in <strong>the</strong><br />
grammatical sense does indicate a thought to which some o<strong>the</strong>r word corresponds as a<br />
name. “Necessary”, for example, indicates that <strong>the</strong> speaker is thinking of someone who is<br />
judging apodictically (it also indicates in a certain way that <strong>the</strong> speaker himself is judging<br />
apodictically). “Empty” indicates that he is thinking in a negative way of what is filled.<br />
24. But if not all grammatical names are logical names, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> expression “<strong>the</strong>re is”,<br />
which may be used with ei<strong>the</strong>r type of name, is equivocal. It is synsemantic in all of its<br />
uses, though each time in quite a different sense. Similarly <strong>the</strong> word “von” in German may<br />
be used, like “of ”, to indicate possession, or to indicate something having been brought<br />
forth from something else, <strong>and</strong> also to indicate aristocracy or nobility.<br />
25. “<strong>The</strong>re is” has its strict or proper meaning when used in connection with genuine logical<br />
names, as in “<strong>The</strong>re is a God” or “<strong>The</strong>re is a man”. In its o<strong>the</strong>r uses, “<strong>the</strong>re is” must not<br />
be taken in its strict sense. “<strong>The</strong>re is an empty space” may be equated with “<strong>The</strong>re are no<br />
physical bodies located in such <strong>and</strong> such a way”; “<strong>The</strong>re is something which is <strong>the</strong> object of<br />
thought” (es gibt ein Gedachtes) may be equated with “<strong>The</strong>re is something which thinks”<br />
(es gibt ein Denkendes). 14 It would be a complete mistake to interpret “<strong>the</strong>re is” when used<br />
with mere grammatical names in <strong>the</strong> way in which we interpret it in “<strong>The</strong>re is a God” <strong>and</strong><br />
“<strong>The</strong>re is a man”. For <strong>the</strong>re is nothing o<strong>the</strong>r than things, <strong>and</strong> “empty space” <strong>and</strong> “object of<br />
thought” do not name things.<br />
26. What holds of “<strong>the</strong>re is” also holds of “<strong>the</strong>re exists” <strong>and</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re subsists”; <strong>the</strong>se expressions<br />
are also equivocal <strong>and</strong> have precisely <strong>the</strong> different meanings just distinguished. 15<br />
27. Shall we now say that <strong>the</strong> concept of “<strong>the</strong> existent”, or “that which exists”, in its strict<br />
or proper sense, is <strong>the</strong> same as <strong>the</strong> concept of thing or that of substance?<br />
28. Not at all. If “<strong>the</strong> existent”, in its strict sense, is a name, it cannot be said to name<br />
anything directly. It comes to <strong>the</strong> same thing as “something which is <strong>the</strong> object of a<br />
correct affirmative judgement” or “something which is correctly accepted or affirmed”.<br />
If “existent” is a name in <strong>the</strong> logical sense, i.e. a word which names a thing, a thing that is<br />
judged affirmatively, it is a relational word. I use it to indicate that I am thinking of some<br />
thing as corresponding to my thinking (<strong>and</strong> also, naturally, that I am thinking of myself as<br />
thinking correctly). 16 But thing—compare <strong>and</strong> not a concept of anything<br />
which, as such, is relative to someone thinking.<br />
[“Substance” <strong>and</strong> “accident” do not denote that which is relative to someone thinking. If<br />
<strong>the</strong> expression “an existent”, in its logical sense, could be thought of as a logical name, <strong>the</strong>n<br />
it would designate something relative to a thinking. For it indicates that <strong>the</strong>re is something<br />
which is objectively related to <strong>the</strong> person addressed, as well as to <strong>the</strong> speaker, in so far as