Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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On <strong>the</strong> <strong>Evident</strong> 41<br />
Despite his polemic against conceiving apodictic judgements as a special class of<br />
judgement, Sigwart occasionally bears witness to <strong>the</strong> contrary view, as is clear from what<br />
was discussed under (4) above. <strong>The</strong> knowledge expressed by “I exist”, according to him<br />
(see p. 312), is to be contrasted with our knowledge of axioms in that it pertains to a simple<br />
factual truth. Here he speaks more soundly than his general <strong>the</strong>ory would allow.<br />
Sigwart’s <strong>the</strong>ory of <strong>the</strong> evident, <strong>the</strong>n, is essentially wrong. Like Descartes, he certainly<br />
took note of <strong>the</strong> phenomenon; <strong>and</strong> it must be said to his credit that he exercised great zeal<br />
in trying to analyse it. But like many o<strong>the</strong>rs who have been concerned with <strong>the</strong> analysis of<br />
psychological phenomena, he seems not to have stopped at <strong>the</strong> right place in his eagerness<br />
to complete <strong>the</strong> analysis; <strong>the</strong> result was that he attempted to reduce one set of phenomena<br />
to ano<strong>the</strong>r set of entirely different phenomena.<br />
Obviously any mistake about <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> evident can be disastrous for <strong>the</strong> logician.<br />
We could say that Sigwart’s <strong>the</strong>ory of <strong>the</strong> evident is <strong>the</strong> basic defect of his logic—were it<br />
not for his misconception of <strong>the</strong> nature of judgement in general. Again <strong>and</strong> again we find<br />
<strong>the</strong> unhappy results of his <strong>the</strong>ory; an example is his inability to underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> general<br />
causes of error. <strong>The</strong> principal cause, he says in his Logik (Vol. I, 2nd edn., p. 103n.), is <strong>the</strong><br />
imperfection of our language; <strong>and</strong> this, surely, is a one-sided account. 59<br />
Many o<strong>the</strong>r prominent logicians, of recent years, have fared no better than Sigwart with<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory of <strong>the</strong> evident. <strong>The</strong> views of <strong>the</strong> excellent John Stuart Mill—to cite only one<br />
example—are discussed in note 73 of Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis.<br />
<strong>The</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> evident is almost universally misunderstood explains<br />
why it is that we often hear <strong>the</strong> expression “more or less evident”. Even Descartes <strong>and</strong><br />
Pascal spoke in this way; but <strong>the</strong> expression is completely inappropriate. What is evident<br />
is certain; <strong>and</strong> certainty in <strong>the</strong> strict sense of <strong>the</strong> term knows no distinctions of degree. In a<br />
recent issue of <strong>the</strong> Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, we are even told<br />
(<strong>the</strong> author is serious) that here are evident presumptions which, despite <strong>the</strong>ir evidence,<br />
may well be false. Needless to say, I regard this as nonsense. I regret that my own lectures,<br />
given at a time when I took degrees of conviction to be a matter of intensity of judgement,<br />
seem to have been <strong>the</strong> occasion for such confusions. 60