Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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40<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>True</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Evident</strong><br />
is basic <strong>and</strong> fundamental, <strong>the</strong> condition of all thought <strong>and</strong> of all certainty. Here one can<br />
speak only of direct evidence; one cannot even say that <strong>the</strong> thought is necessary, for it is<br />
prior to all necessity. Equally direct <strong>and</strong> evident is <strong>the</strong> conscious certainty that I think this<br />
or that; it is inextricably interwoven with my self-conscious in such a way that <strong>the</strong> one is<br />
given with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r.”) Given <strong>the</strong> doctrines previously considered, this would seem to be a<br />
contradictio in adjecto <strong>and</strong> thus incapable of defence.<br />
(5) Still more contradictions are to be found in Sigwart’s extraordinary—<strong>and</strong><br />
unacceptable—<strong>the</strong>ory of “postulates”, which he contrasts with axioms. <strong>The</strong> certainty of<br />
axioms is said to lie in <strong>the</strong> compulsion we have to think in a certain way. But <strong>the</strong> certainty of<br />
postulates, according to Sigwart, is based upon our practical needs <strong>and</strong> not upon any purely<br />
intellectual motive (op. cit., pp. 412 ff.). Thus <strong>the</strong> law of causality, on his view, is a mere<br />
postulate <strong>and</strong> not an axiom; we take it to be certain because we find that, if we were not to<br />
accept it, we would be unable to investigate nature. But consider now <strong>the</strong> consequences, for<br />
Sigwart, of his accepting <strong>the</strong> law of causality in this way: out of sheer good will, he decrees<br />
that like conditions produce like effects; thus he is taking something to be true without any<br />
consciousness of being compelled to do so; but to say this is to contradict Sigwart’s <strong>the</strong>ory<br />
of judgement—unless, of course, taking something to be true is not <strong>the</strong> same as making a<br />
judgement. So far as I can see, Sigwart has only one way out: he ought to say that he does<br />
not believe any of <strong>the</strong> postulates, such as that of causation in nature, which he assumes to<br />
be “certain”. But in such a case, he could no longer be serious.<br />
(6) <strong>The</strong> doctrine of postulates becomes even more questionable if we consider it along<br />
with what we have discussed under (2) above. <strong>The</strong> consciousness of a universal necessity<br />
to think in a certain way, according to Sigwart, is an axiom <strong>and</strong> not a postulate. But this<br />
universal necessity to think in a given way is obvious to us only if we apply <strong>the</strong> law of<br />
causality to our own compulsion to think in that way. Now <strong>the</strong> law of causality is said to<br />
be a mere postulate <strong>and</strong> hence to be without evidence. <strong>The</strong> mark of axioms, according to<br />
Sigwart, is that <strong>the</strong>y involve a universal compulsion or necessity to believe; hence it is<br />
only a postulate that <strong>the</strong>re are such axioms. And <strong>the</strong>refore what Sigwart calls axioms are<br />
deprived of what <strong>the</strong>y must have, according to him, if <strong>the</strong>y are to be distinguished from<br />
his postulates. All this accords with Sigwart’s remark (section 3) that <strong>the</strong> belief in <strong>the</strong><br />
reliability of evidence is a “postulate”. But given his interpretation of “postulate”, I cannot<br />
imagine how such a remark is to fit in with <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory.<br />
(7) Sigwart denies that <strong>the</strong>re is any distinction between assertoric <strong>and</strong> apodictic<br />
judgements (section 31); for, he says, every judgement involves <strong>the</strong> feeling of necessity.<br />
This assertion must also be attributed to his erroneous conception of judgement; he would<br />
seem to identify <strong>the</strong> feeling, which he sometimes calls <strong>the</strong> feeling of evidence, with <strong>the</strong><br />
nature of apodicticity. But this is to overlook <strong>the</strong> modal characteristic which distinguishes<br />
some evident judgements from <strong>the</strong> evident judgements of self-awareness; <strong>the</strong> law of<br />
contradiction would be an instance of <strong>the</strong> former, <strong>the</strong> judgement that I exist an instance of<br />
<strong>the</strong> latter. <strong>The</strong> former exemplifies what is “necessarily true or necessarily false”, <strong>the</strong> latter<br />
what is only “actually true or false”. Both are evident, however, <strong>and</strong> in <strong>the</strong> same sense of<br />
<strong>the</strong> word, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y do not differ with respect to certainty. It is only from judgements of <strong>the</strong><br />
former sort, not from those of <strong>the</strong> latter sort, that we acquire <strong>the</strong> concepts of impossibility<br />
<strong>and</strong> necessity.