Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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34 The True and the Evident Are we really supposed to believe, then, that the negative judgement shows up relatively late (as we are told on pp. 159 ff.) and that, on the basis of these and other considerations, the negative judgement should be thought unworthy of being placed on an equal footing with the positive judgement as being an independent species of judgement? The more one considers Sigwart’s views the clearer it becomes that they do involve the implications developed here; surely Sigwart would never have maintained such things had he thought them through. There are passages, of course, in which he contradicts one or another of these theses which I have shown his views to imply. But what else are we to expect when everything is in such great confusion and when the attempt to clear up things serves only to uncover a multiplicity of contradictions? (3) We have, then, a highly respected logician, misconceiving the nature of judgement, and then becoming entangled in hopeless confusion with respect to a relatively simple question. What is the origin of the error? The proton pseudos consists of a mistake which has been handed down from the older logic; it is the mistake of supposing that a relation between two ideas is essentially involved in the nature of judgement. Aristotle had described the relation as being one of combining or separating he realized, however, that the terminology is not entirely appropriate and he noted that there is a sense in which both relations could be said to be a matter of combining see De Anima, III, 6. Scholastic logic and modern logic have retained the two terms “combining” and “separating”, but in grammar both relations are called “combining” and the symbol for combining is called the “copula”. Now Sigwart takes these expressions “combining” and “separating” literally. Hence a negative copula appears to him (see p. 153) to be a contradiction; and the negative judgement is said to presuppose a positive judgement. For how can we separate any two things unless they have first been combined? Thus we find that, according to Sigwart (p. 150 and the passages cited above), it makes no sense to speak of a negative judgement which does not presuppose a positive judgement. The consequence is that all the efforts of this distinguished thinker turn out to be in vain; the negative judgement is no longer even comprehensible. There is a note, beginning on p. 150, in which Sigwart tells us what finally confirmed him in his endeavours. What we have here is a remarkable description of the process by means of which we are supposed to arrive at the negative judgement. The attentive reader will be able to see the whole series of errors in succession, and he will find that the negative judgement is actually presupposed long before the point at which it is finally supposed to emerge. Sigwart proceeds from the correct observation that our first judgements are all positive. These judgements are evident and made with complete confidence. “But now”, he says, “our thought goes out beyond the given; as a result of recollections and associations, other judgements are formed, also with the thought that they express what is real.” (This means that the ideas are connected with a consciousness of objective validity, this being of the essence of judgement, according to Sigwart; sect. 14, p. 98.) These other judgements, he continues, might be exemplified by our “expecting to find some familiar thing in its usual place, or our assumption that we will be able to smell a certain flower. But now some part of what we thus suppose comes into conflict with what it is that we immediately know”. (Sigwart does not attempt to show how we are able to recognize that something “conflicts” with what we know, if we are not yet able to make negative judgements and
Critique of Sigwart’s Theory of the Existential and the Negative Judgement 35 are not in possession of negative concepts. The difficulty becomes even more apparent as he continues.) “In such cases, when we do not find what we had expected, we become aware of the difference between what is merely thought about and what is real.” (What does “not find” mean here? The phrase is one which, prior to this point, is not to be found. Clearly what I find, in the cases in question, is that something which I had expected to be accompanied by something else is in fact without that something else; but this is possible only to the extent that I am able to affirm the one and deny the other—i.e., affirm that the other does not accompany the one. And how are we to interpret the term “difference”? To be aware of a difference is to be aware, with respect to two things, that one of them is not the other. And, finally, what is the meaning of the phrase “merely thought about”? Clearly: something which is thought about but which is not at the same time real. Sigwart does not seem to realize that he has already allowed the negative judgement to come into play.) He continues: “What we are immediately certain of is something other than that which we had expected.” (Something other—i.e., something which is not the same, something which cannot possibly be the same.) “And now” (because of the fact that we have already made so many negative judgements) “negation finally enters into the picture, cancelling out the assumption in question and rejecting it as invalid. With this we have something entirely new; the subjective combination is separated from the consciousness of certainty. This subjective combination is contrasted with one that is certain and we recognize the difference between them; out of this the concept of invalidity arises.” The final sentence would seem to be sheer carelessness. If the word “invalid” is to mean false, and not merely uncertain, then the concept of invalidity cannot be acquired by comparing a combination of ideas which is certain with a combination of ideas which is uncertain; what we need is a contrast between a combination which is accepted and one which is rejected. But actually the conflicting affirmative judgement is not at all required. The conflict—the incompatibility of certain characteristics—is already apparent from the relation between the concepts of the conflicting characteristics. Even Sigwart himself, if I may be permitted to repeat it, is aware that his conflict cannot be grasped by any attempt at a positive judgement (see p. 89n. and pp. 98 ff.). It may well be that we often make negative judgements as a result of having first made the opposing positive judgement, but this is by no means the way in which negative judgements always come about. Suppose, for example, I am asked: “Is there a regular figure with a thousand angles and a thousand and one sides?” It will have occurred to me previously, as may be the case with most people, that I cannot be at all sure that there is such a thing as a regular figure with a thousand angles. Hence I may make the negative judgement, on the basis of a conflict of characteristics, that there is no such figure—without having previously made an attempt at a positive judgement. It is not at all necessary, as Sigwart thinks it is, that I must first make a “confident assumption” that there is a regular figure with a thousand angles and a thousand and one sides. The application of negation or denial is by no means restricted in the way in which Sigwart says it is. Sigwart betrays the fact that he realizes this too (see, e.g., p. 152 and even p. 150), despite his insistence that there can be no negative copula which performs a function of judgement on the same footing as affirmation or acceptance. It is false that, whenever a thing is denied, what it is that is denied is always the property “valid”. Even in the case of a judgement, we can deny not only its validity, but also, among other things, its certainty, or its being a priori. The subject of the judgement may be treated in a similar
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Routledge Revivals The True and the
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Translated from the German WAHREIT
Page 6 and 7: x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
Page 8 and 9: xii Preface fortune to be able to c
Page 10 and 11: INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
Page 12 and 13: xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
Page 14 and 15: xviii Introduction of view—just a
Page 16 and 17: xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
Page 18 and 19: xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
Page 20 and 21: xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
Page 22 and 23: xxvi Introduction The motivation be
Page 24 and 25: I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
Page 26 and 27: 4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
Page 28 and 29: 6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
Page 30 and 31: 8 The True and the Evident No furth
Page 32 and 33: 10 The True and the Evident of cert
Page 34 and 35: 12 The True and the Evident this ex
Page 36 and 37: 14 The True and the Evident be give
Page 38 and 39: 16 The True and the Evident referen
Page 40 and 41: II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
Page 42 and 43: III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
Page 44 and 45: 22 The True and the Evident somethi
Page 46 and 47: 24 The True and the Evident Psychol
Page 48 and 49: 26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
Page 50 and 51: 28 The True and the Evident logicia
Page 52 and 53: 30 The True and the Evident which i
Page 54 and 55: 32 The True and the Evident There i
Page 58 and 59: 36 The True and the Evident way. On
Page 60 and 61: 38 The True and the Evident It is c
Page 62 and 63: 40 The True and the Evident is basi
Page 64 and 65: Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
Page 66 and 67: 44 The True and the Evident concept
Page 68 and 69: 46 The True and the Evident 13. But
Page 70 and 71: 48 The True and the Evident each of
Page 72 and 73: 50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
Page 74 and 75: I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
Page 76 and 77: II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
Page 78 and 79: III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
Page 80 and 81: 58 The True and the Evident When do
Page 82 and 83: 60 The True and the Evident I have
Page 84 and 85: 62 The True and the Evident the con
Page 86 and 87: 64 The True and the Evident to supp
Page 88 and 89: 66 The True and the Evident degree
Page 90 and 91: 68 The True and the Evident concept
Page 92 and 93: 70 The True and the Evident non-exi
Page 94 and 95: Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
Page 96 and 97: 74 The True and the Evident 6. And
Page 98 and 99: 76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
Page 100 and 101: II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
Page 102 and 103: 80 The True and the Evident that re
Page 104 and 105: 82 The True and the Evident in whic
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84 The True and the Evident would s
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86 The True and the Evident 6. If e
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VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
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APPENDICES
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92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
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94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
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2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
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NOTES by Oskar Kraus
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100 Notes between saying (i) that i
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102 Notes and futural thinking are
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104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
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106 Notes he held instead that the
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108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
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110 Notes given in some way or othe
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112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
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114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
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116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
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118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
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120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
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122 Notes these consequences, which
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124 Notes someone who is judging wi
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126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
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INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
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130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
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132 Index propositions; see content
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