Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

30
The True and the Evident
which is not can neither agree nor disagree with that which is. But the knowledge of the first
of these three items is itself already the knowledge of an existence. 48 Hence it is no longer
true that the knowledge of the other two is required in order that there be any knowledge
of existence; and therefore Sigwart’s theory leads to a contradiction. (Compare what is
said here with Sigwart’s polemic against my Psychologie, Book II, Chapter 7, in his Die
Impersonalien, pp. 50 ff., and his Logik, 2nd edition, Volume I, pp. 89 ff, See also Marty’s
polemic against Sigwart in the articles “Über subjektlose Sätze”, in the Vierteljahrsschrift
für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Vol. VIII. 49 *
II
If Sigwart misconceives the nature of judgement in general, then we can hardly expect him
to understand the nature of the negative judgement in particular. And indeed he goes so far
astray that he refuses to regard the negative judgement as being a species of judgement on
equal footing alongside the positive or affirmative judgement. No negative judgement is
direct, he says; its object is always some other judgement or an attempt to make some other
judgement. (Logik, 2nd edn, Vol. I, p. 150.)
With this assertion, Sigwart contradicts certain important psychological theses which
I have defended. 50 It seems to me appropriate, therefore, to counter his attack. I wish,
then, to show three things. (1) Sigwart’s own theory is without adequate foundation. (2) It
leads to hopeless confusion: for Sigwart’s affirmative judgement is negative; his negative
judgement—if it is a judgement and not merely the lack of a judgement—is positive;
his positive judgement strictly involves a negative judgement; and such confusions are
compounded. Finally (3) I wish to show the genesis of Sigwart’s mistake; Sigwart’s detailed
discussions make it possible to do this.
(1) The first question that arises, then, in the face of such a novel and outlandish assertion,
would be: What kind of basis does it have? Sigwart emphasizes above all else (p. 150) that
a negative judgement would have no meaning unless it were preceded by the thought of
the positive attribution of a predicate. But what is this assertion supposed to mean? Unless
it is a simple petitio principii, it tells us only that a connection of ideas must have preceded
the negative judgement. If we suppose for the moment that the latter is true (though I have
shown in my Psychologie that it is not true), then the thesis in question would still not be
established. For Sigwart himself (p. 89n. and elsewhere) realizes that no such “subjective
* I had already written my critique of Sigwart’s concept of existence when my attention was called to
a note in his Logik, 2nd edn, Vol. I, p. 390. The note does not make it necessary to change anything,
but I shall add it here for purposes of comparison. “‘Being’ in general”, Sigwart says, “cannot be
regarded as a true generic concept which applies to particular individuals; conceptually regarded
it is only a common name. Since ‘being’ is for us a relational predicate, it cannot be a common
characteristic; it is necessary to show, therefore, that this predicate is rooted in a determination which
is common to the concept of everything that there is.” I am afraid that, so far as Sigwart’s concept
of existence is concerned, this passage will be no more enlightening for the reader than it is for
me; it may help to show, however, why all my efforts to understand his concept have been in vain.