Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

V
CRITIQUE OF SIGWART’S
THEORY OF THE EXISTENTIAL AND
THE NEGATIVE JUDGEMENT
(From the notes to Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, 1889) 39
Sigwart’s monograph, Die Impersonalien, attacking Miklosich, has recently appeated.*
There is a penetrating criticism of the monograph by Marty in the Vierteljahrsschrift für
wissenschaftliche Philosophie (Marty had previously criticized the relevant portions of
Sigwart’s Logik). 40 Quite unreasonably, Sigwart seems to have been considerably annoyed.
“II se fache,” as the French would say, “donc il a tort.” Steinthal burns thick clouds of
incense on behalf of Sigwart in his Zeitschrift (Vol. xviii, pp. 170 ff.), and in the foreword
to the fourth edition of his own Ursprung der Sprache we find him approving what any true
friend of the deserving Sigwart can only regret; yet even Steinthal admits that Sigwart’s
view is mistaken in its essentials. After the high praise with which he begins his review,
one finds oneself somewhat disillusioned at the end. Steinthal (pp. 177–180) rejects the
grammatical implications of Sigwart’s theory; hence the only real achievement of the
monograph would be its contribution to psychology. But psychology is not the area in
which Steinthal’s estimate is authoritative. If it were, one would even have to be serious
about the following remark: “On hearing the lines ‘Da bückt sich’s hinunter mit liebendem
Blick’ (from Schiller’s Taucher), one can only think of the daughter of the king. It is not
she who comes before the mind, however; it is only a subjectless bow or curtsey. And now
I feel for her all the more. According to my [i.e., Steinthal’s] psychology, the idea of the
king’s daughter hovers in the background, but does not enter consciousness.” The wise
man knows when he has had enough.
I.
The limitations of Sigwart’s psychological theory are apparent when he tries to come to
terms with the concept “Existence”. Aristotle had seen that this is a concept we acquire
through reflection upon the affirmative judgement.* But Sigwart, like most modern
* Miklosich, Subjektlose Sätze, 2nd edn, Vienna 1883. If the reader wishes to acquaint himself
with this valuable work, I may suggest that he read the notice of it which I prepared for the
Wiener Abendpost. Through a misunderstanding it was published as a feuilleton in the Wiener
Zeitung. Certainly no one would look for it there, and so I include it here [in the Vom Ursprung
sittlicher Erkenntnis] as an appendix. 41
* The concepts of existence and non-existence are correlatives to the concepts of the truth of
(simple) affirmative and negative judgements. 42 The judgement is correlative with that which
is judged; the affirmative judgement with that which is judged affirmatively, the negative