Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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Windelb<strong>and</strong>’s Error with Respect to <strong>the</strong> Classification of Mental Phenomena<br />
(4) Windelb<strong>and</strong> wonders how I could think that <strong>the</strong> word “is” has one <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> same<br />
meaning in such sentences as “<strong>The</strong>re is a God”, “<strong>The</strong>re is a human being”, “<strong>The</strong>re is<br />
a deprivation”, <strong>and</strong> “<strong>The</strong>re is something which is true” (p. 183). Referring to my Von<br />
der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, he says that anyone who<br />
thus writes on <strong>the</strong> manifold significance of being ought to take account of this manifold<br />
significance himself (p. 184). I can only say that if Windelb<strong>and</strong> cannot see what my <strong>the</strong>ory<br />
of judgement obviously implies in this case, <strong>the</strong>n he has not understood <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory at all. 34<br />
Aristotle, in treating this question, dividesbeing in <strong>the</strong> sense of what is a thing into<br />
different categories <strong>and</strong> into actuality <strong>and</strong> potentiality but it never<br />
occurs to him to do <strong>the</strong> same with “is” which transforms <strong>the</strong> expression of an idea<br />
into that of a judgement, or with what he calls being in <strong>the</strong> sense of <strong>the</strong> true<br />
Such a thing could be done only if, like Herbart <strong>and</strong> so many after him, one failed to<br />
distinguish <strong>the</strong> concept of being, in <strong>the</strong> sense of <strong>the</strong> true, <strong>and</strong> being in <strong>the</strong> sense of a thing. 35<br />
(Compare <strong>the</strong> following discussion of Sigwart’s doctrine.)<br />
(5) I have said above that <strong>the</strong>re are simple <strong>and</strong> compound judgements, <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong>re are<br />
some compound judgements which cannot be resolved without remainder into judgements<br />
which are simple. We must consider this fact when we try to reduce to existential form<br />
those judgements which have a different linguistic formulation. For it is obvious that only<br />
simple judgements—those which are truly unitary—can be so reduced. It goes without<br />
saying that this qualification should be made, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore I did not mention it in <strong>the</strong><br />
Psychologie. And if <strong>the</strong> qualification holds generally, it also holds for <strong>the</strong> categorical forms<br />
of traditional logic. <strong>The</strong> A, E, I, <strong>and</strong> O statements are interpreted by <strong>the</strong> formal logician as<br />
expressions of judgements which are strictly unitary <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong>y can be reduced to<br />
existential form.* But such reduction is not possible when <strong>the</strong> ambiguity of our language<br />
allows us to use a single categorical statement to express a plurality of judgements.† <strong>The</strong><br />
existential formulas which can be used to express categorical judgements which are unitary<br />
do not adequately express those which are compound. 36<br />
Windelb<strong>and</strong> should have taken <strong>the</strong>se facts into consideration when, on page 184, he<br />
asks whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> statement “<strong>The</strong> rose is a flower” can be put into existential form. He is<br />
quite right in saying that <strong>the</strong> statement cannot be formulated as “<strong>The</strong>re is no rose which is<br />
not a flower”, but he is mistaken in thinking that I would disagree. I have never said—in<br />
<strong>the</strong> passage cited or anywhere else—that it could be so expressed. “<strong>The</strong> rose is a flower”<br />
cannot be expressed in this way, nor can it be expressed in <strong>the</strong> way in which Windelb<strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>and</strong> so many o<strong>the</strong>rs would have it. For <strong>the</strong> statement expresses two judgements, one of<br />
which consists in <strong>the</strong> acceptance or affirmation of <strong>the</strong> subject of <strong>the</strong> judgement—which<br />
could be “<strong>the</strong> rose”, in <strong>the</strong> usual sense of <strong>the</strong>se words, or “that which is called a rose”, or<br />
“that which is understood as a rose”. But, as we have remarked above, <strong>the</strong>re are statements<br />
of <strong>the</strong> form “All A are B” which do not express judgements in which <strong>the</strong> subject is thus<br />
accepted or affirmed. 37<br />
* See my Psychologie, Vol. I, p. 283, <strong>and</strong> Vol. II, pp. 5 3 ff.<br />
† See Vol. II of my Psychologie, p. 183 <strong>and</strong> pp. 158 ff, esp. pp. 164 ff.<br />
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