Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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22 The True and the Evident something to the ideas on which they are based. And in the fourth Meditation he refers to another common character: the will decides with respect to both—it can initiate and withhold, not only its own acts, but also the acts of judgement. It is this feature which seems to him to be all-important in the first part of the Principles (numbers 29 to 42) and thus he contrasts ideas, which he takes to be operations of the understanding (“operationes intellectus”), with both judgement and will, which he takes to be operations of the will (“operationes voluntatis”). In the Notae in Pogramma, he again describes the acts of both judgement and will as being determinations of the will. “When I saw that, over and above perception, which is required as a basis for judgement, there must needs be affirmation, or negation, to constitute the form of the judgement, and that it is frequently open to us to withhold our assent, even if we perceive a thing, I referred the act of judging which consists in nothing but assent, i.e., affirmation or negation, not to the perception of the understanding, but to the determination of the will.”* Indeed, he does not hesitate to say in the Principles that both of these “modes of thinking” are “modes of willing”, but from the context it is clear that he wishes only to say that both fall within the domain of the will. We find additional support for this explanation if we consider the scholastic terminology with which Descartes had been familiar in his youth. It was customary to designate as actus voluntatis not only the motion of the will itself, but also anything that is performed under the control of the will. Hence there were said to be two kinds of acts of will—actus elicitus voluntatis, the acts of the will itself, and actus imperatus voluntatis, the acts that are performed under the control of the will. In the same way Descartes includes under one category both the actus elicitus of the will and what, according to him, can only be an actus imperatus of the will. But his classification must not be taken to imply that the intentional relation is the same in the two cases. This explanation is clear enough if we consider all sides of the matter; yet we find Spinoza anticipating Windelband’s misconception of the Cartesian doctrine. (It is more likely that Spinoza was misled by the passage in the Principles than by the one which Windelband cites from the Meditations.) In Proposition 49 of the Second Book of the Ethics, Spinoza himself interprets affirmation and negation as being, in the strictest sense, “volitions of the mind” (“volitiones mentis”), and then, as a result of still further confusion, he abolishes the distinction between the class of ideas and that of acts of will. The thesis now reads, “Will and understanding are one and the same”*, so that the threefold classification of Descartes and the twofold classification of Aristotle are both discarded together. Here, as usual, Spinoza has served only to corrupt the doctrine of his great teacher. * Ego enim, cum viderem, praeter perceptionem, quae praerequiritur ut judicemus, opus esse affirmatione vel negatione ad formam judicii constituendam, nobisque saepe esse liberum ut cohibeamus assensionem, etiamsi rem percipiamus, ipsum actum judicandi, qui non nisi in assensu, hoc est in affirmatione vel negatione consistit, non rettuli ad perceptionem intellectus sed ad determinationem voluntatis. [English trans. from Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, p. 446.] * Voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt.
IV WINDELBAND’S ERROR WITH RESPECT TO THE CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA (From the notes to Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, 1889) All conscious phenomena fall into one or the other of these groups: (i) the mere contemplation of something, having the thing before the mind, (ii) judging, and (iii) the feelings or emotions.* I will not say, however, that there is now general agreement on this point. After all, if we had to wait for universal agreement, we could not even be sure of the law of contradiction; and in the present case there are some old prejudices that are not easily given up. Nevertheless it has not been possible to bring forward a single serious objection to this conception of psychological phenomena, and this fact itself is a significant confirmation. There are some—for example Windelband—who concede that judging and mere having before the mind should not be thought of as constituting one and the same type of phenomenon, but who do contend that judging and the feelings or emotions should be classified together. They make the mistake that Hume had made in his discussion of belief. The act of affirming is taken to be an instance of approval, or valuing or prizing, on the part of the feelings, and the act of denying is taken to be an instance of disapproval, a rejection on the part of the feelings. There is some analogy, to be sure, but it is difficult to see how this confusion could be made. There are people who affirm the goodness of God and the wickedness of the devil—the being of Ormuzd and that of Ahriman—and who affirm these things with the same degree of conviction, but they value and prize the being of the one, while feeling nothing but aversion and repulsion towards that of the other. Or again: we love knowledge and we hate error; hence it is entirely proper that we approve those judgements which we hold to be correct—and every judgement we make, after all, is one that we hold to be correct. Judging is related to feeling, then, in that we do thus approve of the judgements we make. But why would one confuse the judgement, which we may thus be said to approve, with the activity or feeling which is the approval itself? It is as though a man who loves his wife and child and material possessions were led to confuse these objects with the love that he feels for them. (Compare again what I have just said about Windelband’s mistake in ascribing such a doctrine to Descartes. One might also compare Sigwart’s note about Windelband, which, to an extent at least, is very much to the point.* If one needs further ground for distinguishing the second and third of these basic types of phenomena, perhaps I may be permitted to refer to my forthcoming Deskriptive * Brentano’s terms are Vorstellen, Urteilen, and Gemütstätigkeiten. * Sigwart’s Logik, 2nd edn, Book I, pp. 156 ff.
Page 2 and 3: Routledge Revivals The True and the
Page 4 and 5: Translated from the German WAHREIT
Page 6 and 7: x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
Page 8 and 9: xii Preface fortune to be able to c
Page 10 and 11: INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
Page 12 and 13: xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
Page 14 and 15: xviii Introduction of view—just a
Page 16 and 17: xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
Page 18 and 19: xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
Page 20 and 21: xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
Page 22 and 23: xxvi Introduction The motivation be
Page 24 and 25: I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
Page 26 and 27: 4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
Page 28 and 29: 6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
Page 30 and 31: 8 The True and the Evident No furth
Page 32 and 33: 10 The True and the Evident of cert
Page 34 and 35: 12 The True and the Evident this ex
Page 36 and 37: 14 The True and the Evident be give
Page 38 and 39: 16 The True and the Evident referen
Page 40 and 41: II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
Page 42 and 43: III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
Page 46 and 47: 24 The True and the Evident Psychol
Page 48 and 49: 26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
Page 50 and 51: 28 The True and the Evident logicia
Page 52 and 53: 30 The True and the Evident which i
Page 54 and 55: 32 The True and the Evident There i
Page 56 and 57: 34 The True and the Evident Are we
Page 58 and 59: 36 The True and the Evident way. On
Page 60 and 61: 38 The True and the Evident It is c
Page 62 and 63: 40 The True and the Evident is basi
Page 64 and 65: Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
Page 66 and 67: 44 The True and the Evident concept
Page 68 and 69: 46 The True and the Evident 13. But
Page 70 and 71: 48 The True and the Evident each of
Page 72 and 73: 50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
Page 74 and 75: I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
Page 76 and 77: II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
Page 78 and 79: III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
Page 80 and 81: 58 The True and the Evident When do
Page 82 and 83: 60 The True and the Evident I have
Page 84 and 85: 62 The True and the Evident the con
Page 86 and 87: 64 The True and the Evident to supp
Page 88 and 89: 66 The True and the Evident degree
Page 90 and 91: 68 The True and the Evident concept
Page 92 and 93: 70 The True and the Evident non-exi
Page 94 and 95:
Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
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74 The True and the Evident 6. And
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76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
Page 100 and 101:
II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
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80 The True and the Evident that re
Page 104 and 105:
82 The True and the Evident in whic
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84 The True and the Evident would s
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86 The True and the Evident 6. If e
Page 110 and 111:
VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
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APPENDICES
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92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 116 and 117:
94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 118 and 119:
2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
Page 120 and 121:
NOTES by Oskar Kraus
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100 Notes between saying (i) that i
Page 124 and 125:
102 Notes and futural thinking are
Page 126 and 127:
104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
Page 128 and 129:
106 Notes he held instead that the
Page 130 and 131:
108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
Page 132 and 133:
110 Notes given in some way or othe
Page 134 and 135:
112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
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114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
Page 138 and 139:
116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
Page 140 and 141:
118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
Page 142 and 143:
120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
Page 144 and 145:
122 Notes these consequences, which
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124 Notes someone who is judging wi
Page 148 and 149:
126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
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INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
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130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
Page 154 and 155:
132 Index propositions; see content
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