Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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22<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>True</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Evident</strong><br />
something to <strong>the</strong> ideas on which <strong>the</strong>y are based. And in <strong>the</strong> fourth Meditation he refers<br />
to ano<strong>the</strong>r common character: <strong>the</strong> will decides with respect to both—it can initiate <strong>and</strong><br />
withhold, not only its own acts, but also <strong>the</strong> acts of judgement. It is this feature which<br />
seems to him to be all-important in <strong>the</strong> first part of <strong>the</strong> Principles (numbers 29 to 42) <strong>and</strong><br />
thus he contrasts ideas, which he takes to be operations of <strong>the</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>ing (“operationes<br />
intellectus”), with both judgement <strong>and</strong> will, which he takes to be operations of <strong>the</strong> will<br />
(“operationes voluntatis”). In <strong>the</strong> Notae in Pogramma, he again describes <strong>the</strong> acts of both<br />
judgement <strong>and</strong> will as being determinations of <strong>the</strong> will. “When I saw that, over <strong>and</strong> above<br />
perception, which is required as a basis for judgement, <strong>the</strong>re must needs be affirmation,<br />
or negation, to constitute <strong>the</strong> form of <strong>the</strong> judgement, <strong>and</strong> that it is frequently open to us<br />
to withhold our assent, even if we perceive a thing, I referred <strong>the</strong> act of judging which<br />
consists in nothing but assent, i.e., affirmation or negation, not to <strong>the</strong> perception of <strong>the</strong><br />
underst<strong>and</strong>ing, but to <strong>the</strong> determination of <strong>the</strong> will.”* Indeed, he does not hesitate to say in<br />
<strong>the</strong> Principles that both of <strong>the</strong>se “modes of thinking” are “modes of willing”, but from <strong>the</strong><br />
context it is clear that he wishes only to say that both fall within <strong>the</strong> domain of <strong>the</strong> will.<br />
We find additional support for this explanation if we consider <strong>the</strong> scholastic terminology<br />
with which Descartes had been familiar in his youth. It was customary to designate as<br />
actus voluntatis not only <strong>the</strong> motion of <strong>the</strong> will itself, but also anything that is performed<br />
under <strong>the</strong> control of <strong>the</strong> will. Hence <strong>the</strong>re were said to be two kinds of acts of will—actus<br />
elicitus voluntatis, <strong>the</strong> acts of <strong>the</strong> will itself, <strong>and</strong> actus imperatus voluntatis, <strong>the</strong> acts that<br />
are performed under <strong>the</strong> control of <strong>the</strong> will. In <strong>the</strong> same way Descartes includes under one<br />
category both <strong>the</strong> actus elicitus of <strong>the</strong> will <strong>and</strong> what, according to him, can only be an actus<br />
imperatus of <strong>the</strong> will. But his classification must not be taken to imply that <strong>the</strong> intentional<br />
relation is <strong>the</strong> same in <strong>the</strong> two cases.<br />
This explanation is clear enough if we consider all sides of <strong>the</strong> matter; yet we find Spinoza<br />
anticipating Windelb<strong>and</strong>’s misconception of <strong>the</strong> Cartesian doctrine. (It is more likely that<br />
Spinoza was misled by <strong>the</strong> passage in <strong>the</strong> Principles than by <strong>the</strong> one which Windelb<strong>and</strong><br />
cites from <strong>the</strong> Meditations.) In Proposition 49 of <strong>the</strong> Second Book of <strong>the</strong> Ethics, Spinoza<br />
himself interprets affirmation <strong>and</strong> negation as being, in <strong>the</strong> strictest sense, “volitions of <strong>the</strong><br />
mind” (“volitiones mentis”), <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n, as a result of still fur<strong>the</strong>r confusion, he abolishes<br />
<strong>the</strong> distinction between <strong>the</strong> class of ideas <strong>and</strong> that of acts of will. <strong>The</strong> <strong>the</strong>sis now reads,<br />
“Will <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>ing are one <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> same”*, so that <strong>the</strong> threefold classification of<br />
Descartes <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> twofold classification of Aristotle are both discarded toge<strong>the</strong>r. Here, as<br />
usual, Spinoza has served only to corrupt <strong>the</strong> doctrine of his great teacher.<br />
* Ego enim, cum viderem, praeter perceptionem, quae praerequiritur ut judicemus, opus esse<br />
affirmatione vel negatione ad formam judicii constituendam, nobisque saepe esse liberum ut<br />
cohibeamus assensionem, etiamsi rem percipiamus, ipsum actum judic<strong>and</strong>i, qui non nisi in<br />
assensu, hoc est in affirmatione vel negatione consistit, non rettuli ad perceptionem intellectus<br />
sed ad determinationem voluntatis. [English trans. from Haldane <strong>and</strong> Ross, Vol. I, p. 446.]<br />
* Voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt.