Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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16 The True and the Evident reference to the correlative term “existence of the object”, and if we explicate the concept of the truth of a negative judgement by the correlative term, “non-existence of the object”, our procedure is like that of one who defines the concept of effect by reference to that of cause, or the concept of the larger by reference to that of the smaller. What does this accomplish? The one expression is just as well known and just as much in use as is the other. 58. Nevertheless there are respects in which our investigation should be instructive. (1) The fact that we will no longer look for more than is really given in the definition is itself of considerable value. Tautological expressions, even without conceptual analysis, may be of considerable use in the task of explication, if one of the two synonymous terms is less subject to misunderstanding than the other. But the expression “correspondence with an object” had no such advantage, and we took precautions against going astray by noting the analogue between appropriate affirmation and denial and the kind of appropriateness which applies in the sphere of loving and hating. 24 And thus we are protected from conceptual confusions and from the blunders to which so many have been led as a result of misunderstanding the definition. (a) For example, we will not separate formal truth from material truth, as some have done; we see that what is sometimes called formal truth (the lack of inner contradiction) is truth, not in any proper sense, but only in an entirely improper sense—similar to the way in which we sometimes say, of something which is not a judgement at all, that it is true. 25 (b) Nor are we likely to think, as so many foolishly do, that whenever one is aware of the truth one must compare a thing with a judgement. People who think in this way do not realize that our judgements are not always concerned with things that are real. And they do not realize that when our judgements are concerned with what is real, we could not compare the judgement and the thing unless the thing were already known to us. The theory would thus lead to an infinite regress. 26 And finally we shall not be tempted, as so many have been, to confuse the concept of a thing with the concept of an existent. It is a few thousand years since Aristotle investigated the manifold senses of Being; it is regrettable that even today there are so many who have not learned from his investigation. 27 59. (2) Our results are significant in still another respect. We spoke earlier of equivocations, and noticed how, at the outset, Aristotle had recognized the extent to which failure to consider them may impair the success of our intellectual efforts. Indeed, we gain a clearer picture of the significance of this danger when we see that, because of the equivocal expression “Being”, a formula which has been used again and again may yet confuse the most important thinkers and keep them from being clear about something which is, basically, quite simple. 60. (3) Finally, we can derive still another lesson from our investigation, and forever impress it upon our minds. We have been concerned with a definition, i.e., with the elucidation of a concept connected with a name. Many believe such elucidation always requires some general determination, and they forget that the ultimate and most effective means of elucidation must always consist in an appeal to the individual’s intuition, from which all our general criteria are derived. What would be the use of trying to elucidate the
On the Concept of Truth 17 concepts red or blue if I could not present one with something red or with something blue? All this has been disregarded by those who were concerned with the nominal definition of truth, whose history we have pursued. If, as I hope, we have succeeded in clarifying this muddled concept, we have done so only by focussing primarily on examples of true judgements. In so doing we came to see that no such relation as that of sameness or equality could be identified with truth—if only because of the fact that affirmation and negation frequently do not pertain to things. Even now, after the elimination of confusions and misunderstandings, our definition would convey nothing to one who lacked the necessary intuition. 28 These are our rewards; they are adequate enough if we keep in mind that our modest problem was only that of explicating an expression which, in its ordinary use, is familiar to us all.
Page 2 and 3: Routledge Revivals The True and the
Page 4 and 5: Translated from the German WAHREIT
Page 6 and 7: x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
Page 8 and 9: xii Preface fortune to be able to c
Page 10 and 11: INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
Page 12 and 13: xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
Page 14 and 15: xviii Introduction of view—just a
Page 16 and 17: xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
Page 18 and 19: xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
Page 20 and 21: xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
Page 22 and 23: xxvi Introduction The motivation be
Page 24 and 25: I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
Page 26 and 27: 4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
Page 28 and 29: 6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
Page 30 and 31: 8 The True and the Evident No furth
Page 32 and 33: 10 The True and the Evident of cert
Page 34 and 35: 12 The True and the Evident this ex
Page 36 and 37: 14 The True and the Evident be give
Page 40 and 41: II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
Page 42 and 43: III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
Page 44 and 45: 22 The True and the Evident somethi
Page 46 and 47: 24 The True and the Evident Psychol
Page 48 and 49: 26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
Page 50 and 51: 28 The True and the Evident logicia
Page 52 and 53: 30 The True and the Evident which i
Page 54 and 55: 32 The True and the Evident There i
Page 56 and 57: 34 The True and the Evident Are we
Page 58 and 59: 36 The True and the Evident way. On
Page 60 and 61: 38 The True and the Evident It is c
Page 62 and 63: 40 The True and the Evident is basi
Page 64 and 65: Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
Page 66 and 67: 44 The True and the Evident concept
Page 68 and 69: 46 The True and the Evident 13. But
Page 70 and 71: 48 The True and the Evident each of
Page 72 and 73: 50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
Page 74 and 75: I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
Page 76 and 77: II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
Page 78 and 79: III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
Page 80 and 81: 58 The True and the Evident When do
Page 82 and 83: 60 The True and the Evident I have
Page 84 and 85: 62 The True and the Evident the con
Page 86 and 87: 64 The True and the Evident to supp
Page 88 and 89:
66 The True and the Evident degree
Page 90 and 91:
68 The True and the Evident concept
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70 The True and the Evident non-exi
Page 94 and 95:
Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
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74 The True and the Evident 6. And
Page 98 and 99:
76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
Page 100 and 101:
II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
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80 The True and the Evident that re
Page 104 and 105:
82 The True and the Evident in whic
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84 The True and the Evident would s
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86 The True and the Evident 6. If e
Page 110 and 111:
VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
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APPENDICES
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92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 116 and 117:
94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 118 and 119:
2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
Page 120 and 121:
NOTES by Oskar Kraus
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100 Notes between saying (i) that i
Page 124 and 125:
102 Notes and futural thinking are
Page 126 and 127:
104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
Page 128 and 129:
106 Notes he held instead that the
Page 130 and 131:
108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
Page 132 and 133:
110 Notes given in some way or othe
Page 134 and 135:
112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
Page 136 and 137:
114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
Page 138 and 139:
116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
Page 140 and 141:
118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
Page 142 and 143:
120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
Page 144 and 145:
122 Notes these consequences, which
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124 Notes someone who is judging wi
Page 148 and 149:
126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
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INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
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130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
Page 154 and 155:
132 Index propositions; see content
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