Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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The True and the Evident
reference to the correlative term “existence of the object”, and if we explicate the concept
of the truth of a negative judgement by the correlative term, “non-existence of the object”,
our procedure is like that of one who defines the concept of effect by reference to that
of cause, or the concept of the larger by reference to that of the smaller. What does this
accomplish? The one expression is just as well known and just as much in use as is the
other.
58. Nevertheless there are respects in which our investigation should be instructive.
(1) The fact that we will no longer look for more than is really given in the definition
is itself of considerable value. Tautological expressions, even without conceptual analysis,
may be of considerable use in the task of explication, if one of the two synonymous terms
is less subject to misunderstanding than the other. But the expression “correspondence with
an object” had no such advantage, and we took precautions against going astray by noting
the analogue between appropriate affirmation and denial and the kind of appropriateness
which applies in the sphere of loving and hating. 24
And thus we are protected from conceptual confusions and from the blunders to which
so many have been led as a result of misunderstanding the definition.
(a) For example, we will not separate formal truth from material truth, as some have
done; we see that what is sometimes called formal truth (the lack of inner contradiction) is
truth, not in any proper sense, but only in an entirely improper sense—similar to the way in
which we sometimes say, of something which is not a judgement at all, that it is true. 25
(b) Nor are we likely to think, as so many foolishly do, that whenever one is aware of
the truth one must compare a thing with a judgement. People who think in this way do
not realize that our judgements are not always concerned with things that are real. And
they do not realize that when our judgements are concerned with what is real, we could
not compare the judgement and the thing unless the thing were already known to us. The
theory would thus lead to an infinite regress. 26
And finally we shall not be tempted, as so many have been, to confuse the concept of a
thing with the concept of an existent. It is a few thousand years since Aristotle investigated
the manifold senses of Being; it is regrettable that even today there are so many who have
not learned from his investigation. 27
59. (2) Our results are significant in still another respect. We spoke earlier of equivocations,
and noticed how, at the outset, Aristotle had recognized the extent to which failure to
consider them may impair the success of our intellectual efforts.
Indeed, we gain a clearer picture of the significance of this danger when we see that,
because of the equivocal expression “Being”, a formula which has been used again and
again may yet confuse the most important thinkers and keep them from being clear about
something which is, basically, quite simple.
60. (3) Finally, we can derive still another lesson from our investigation, and forever
impress it upon our minds. We have been concerned with a definition, i.e., with the
elucidation of a concept connected with a name. Many believe such elucidation always
requires some general determination, and they forget that the ultimate and most effective
means of elucidation must always consist in an appeal to the individual’s intuition, from
which all our general criteria are derived. What would be the use of trying to elucidate the