Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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The True and the Evident
be given an interpretation quite different from the one offered by those who think there is a
relation of identity, or of sameness, or of similarity, between a true thought and a thing.
47. Of these last two possibilities, the second is the one which is correct. 14 And now it
should be easy for us to give the proper sense of that formula which has been so long
unclear.
To do this we must pay proper attention both to the limits of the area to which judging
is applicable, and to the contrast between those judgements which affirm and those which
deny.
48. The area to which our judgements may be applied is unlimited, and the content of
judgement may be as we like. But our judgement always pertains to some entity or other.
And what does “entity” signify? It is a term that can be applied to God or to the world, to
anything whatever, and to any non-thing. 15
49. Now this limitless area can be divided into two parts. The opposition between the
affirmative and the negative judgement implies, as we know, that in any given case one, and
only one, of the two modes of judging is appropriate and that the other is inappropriate. 16
This fact is ordinarily expressed by saying that, of two contradictory judgements, one and
only one is true and the other false.
50. Let us say that the area to which affirmative judgement is appropriate is the area of the
existent, a concept to be sharply distinguished from that of thing; and that the area to which
the negative judgement is appropriate is the area of the non-existent.
51. Following Aristotle’s statement that a judgement is true if it takes as combined what
is combined, and so on, we can say: a judgement is true if it asserts of some object that
is, that the object is, or if it asserts of some object that is not, that the object is not—and a
judgement is false if it contradicts that which is, or that which is not. 17
we have heard so much. To correspond does not mean to be the same or to be similar;
but it does mean to be adequate, to fit, to be in agreement with, to be in harmony with, or
whatever equivalent expressions one may choose to apply. 18
52. And this is all there is to the correspondence of true judgement and object about which
53. We may make this concept clearer by drawing another obvious parallel. In the area of
emotion we also find an opposition—that between loving and hating. Of everything that
may be considered, one of these two attitudes may be said to be appropriate and the other
inappropriate. Accordingly, everything that can be thought about belongs in one of two
classes—either the class of things for which love is appropriate, or the class of things for
which hate is appropriate. Whatever falls into the first class we call good, and whatever
falls into the second we call bad. Thus we can say that love and hate are correct if we love
what is good and if we hate what is bad, and that love and hate are not correct if we love
what is bad and hate what is good. We can also say that in those cases where our attitude is
correct the emotion corresponds with the object, that it is in harmony with the value of the