Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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12 The True and the Evident this explanation it would follow that to say “Something or other exists” is to say no more than “Something or other is a thing”. Aristotle was quite aware that this strange conception could hardly be correct. Indeed he says in the ninth book of the Metaphysics that in such a case there is no belief in anything “being-combined”, and certainly no combination of several different thoughts; here the act of thinking is perfectly simple. 5 35. Thus, according to Aristotle, God in apprehending himself as a perfectly simple entity does so by means of a thought which is perfectly simple and which does not combine a subject with a predicate. 36. But let us leave the realm of metaphysics, retaining just the general results it has yielded for the theory of judgement. Evidently we must make a substantial modification. As I think I have shown in my Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, the result will be a significant improvement in our theory of judgement. 6 37. We have noted that what Aristotle said about combining and separating continues to be influential; the result is particularly unhappy in the theory of judgement. While he conceded that affirmative belief is not always belief in a combination, he felt certain that negation must always involve belief in a separation; hence, according to him, the affirmation of a predicate is opposed to the denial of a predicate, but simple affirmation is not opposed to simple denial. And thus we read in the De Anima that while truth is to be found in simple thought, error can be found only in complex thought. And in the Metaphysics he states explicitly that what is opposed to a simple, true judgement is not error, but simply ignorance 38. I shall not take the time to show how this mistake is connected with the earlier one. However glaring the present mistake may be, we have ample reason to judge Aristotle more leniently when we consider the obscurity which has surrounded the conception of existential judgements in the views of virtually all philosophers up to the present time. 7 39. If now we go on to correct the mistake just considered, we arrive at the following modification of the Aristotelian definitions of truth and error. The truth of a judgement consists in this: either the judgement attributes to an object some thing which is combined with the object, or the judgement denies of the object some thing which is not constituent of the object; or, if the judgement is of the simplest sort, it asserts of some object that exists that that object exists, or it asserts of some object that does not exist that that object does not exist, And here we have what it is for a true judgement to correspond with reality. 40. But new difficulties emerge. For there are cases to which even this definition does not satisfactorily apply. I shall restrict myself to the two principal ones. 41. Above all, the definition would seem to be inadequate to all negative judgements— among these being, of course, those judgements which simply reject or deny the object, or
On the Concept of Truth 13 (as this is usually, but not very happily, expressed) “deny the existence” of the object. I say “not very happily”, because no one really supposes that in such cases we are still dealing with some object that may subsist but without existence. 42. The difficulty is especially clear in the case of simple denial. If the truth of “There is no dragon” were to reside in a correspondence between my judgement and an object, what would the object be? Certainly not the dragon, since there isn’t any dragon. Nor is there any other real thing which could count as the corresponding reality. 43. A similar situation holds when, instead of denying a thing simply, the judgement denies it only as being a real determination of some other object. Suppose I say, “Some man is not black”. What is required for the truth of the statement is, not that there is black separated from the man, but rather that on the man. There is an absence or privation of black. This absence, this non-black, is clearly not an object; thus again there is no object given in reality which corresponds to my judgement. It is quite obvious, therefore, that in the case of every true negative judgement—and unmistakably so when the judgement is simple—the correspondence which is supposed to hold between true judgements and reality is not to be found. 44. The other case, which seems to lead to a similar result, may be seen by noting the area in which the affirmative function is exercised. We find, of course, that the affirmative judgement often does apply to things; but we also find—I shall make the point clear with examples—that it often applies to objects to which the word “thing” should not be applied at all. Now whenever a true affirmative judgement does apply to a thing—whether the judgement be one which simply accepts or affirms the thing or one which attributes to it some further determination—we can indicate a correspondence between the judgement and the thing. But how are we to do this when the judgement does not apply to a thing? 45. A true affirmative judgement may, of course, apply to a single thing. But it may also apply to a collection of things, 8 or to a part of a thing, or to the limit or boundary of a thing, and the like—all these latter being objects which are not themselves things. 9 Or, if there were someone who ventured to say of such objects that they are really things, would he want to say the same of an object that I know to have perished a long time ago, or to exist in the distant future? Here we are not dealing with any thing that exists external to me. 10 And still more! What if I affirm the absence or the lack of a thing? Will it then be said that this absence, this lack of a thing, is itself a thing? 11 Or if I were to say that there is a certain impossibility, or that there are certain eternal truths (the laws of mathematics, for example), would it then be supposed that there are eternal things, perhaps similar to Platonic ideas, which exist in, or outside of, the world? Certainly not! 12 The whole idea of the adaequatio rei et intellectus seems to go completely to pieces. 13 46. And so we realize: the proposition that truth is the correspondence of judgement and thing (or however one may wish to put it) must either be completely false, or else it must
Page 2 and 3: Routledge Revivals The True and the
Page 4 and 5: Translated from the German WAHREIT
Page 6 and 7: x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
Page 8 and 9: xii Preface fortune to be able to c
Page 10 and 11: INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
Page 12 and 13: xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
Page 14 and 15: xviii Introduction of view—just a
Page 16 and 17: xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
Page 18 and 19: xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
Page 20 and 21: xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
Page 22 and 23: xxvi Introduction The motivation be
Page 24 and 25: I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
Page 26 and 27: 4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
Page 28 and 29: 6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
Page 30 and 31: 8 The True and the Evident No furth
Page 32 and 33: 10 The True and the Evident of cert
Page 36 and 37: 14 The True and the Evident be give
Page 38 and 39: 16 The True and the Evident referen
Page 40 and 41: II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
Page 42 and 43: III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
Page 44 and 45: 22 The True and the Evident somethi
Page 46 and 47: 24 The True and the Evident Psychol
Page 48 and 49: 26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
Page 50 and 51: 28 The True and the Evident logicia
Page 52 and 53: 30 The True and the Evident which i
Page 54 and 55: 32 The True and the Evident There i
Page 56 and 57: 34 The True and the Evident Are we
Page 58 and 59: 36 The True and the Evident way. On
Page 60 and 61: 38 The True and the Evident It is c
Page 62 and 63: 40 The True and the Evident is basi
Page 64 and 65: Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
Page 66 and 67: 44 The True and the Evident concept
Page 68 and 69: 46 The True and the Evident 13. But
Page 70 and 71: 48 The True and the Evident each of
Page 72 and 73: 50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
Page 74 and 75: I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
Page 76 and 77: II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
Page 78 and 79: III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
Page 80 and 81: 58 The True and the Evident When do
Page 82 and 83: 60 The True and the Evident I have
Page 84 and 85:
62 The True and the Evident the con
Page 86 and 87:
64 The True and the Evident to supp
Page 88 and 89:
66 The True and the Evident degree
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68 The True and the Evident concept
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70 The True and the Evident non-exi
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Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
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74 The True and the Evident 6. And
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76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
Page 100 and 101:
II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
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80 The True and the Evident that re
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82 The True and the Evident in whic
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84 The True and the Evident would s
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86 The True and the Evident 6. If e
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VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
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APPENDICES
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92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
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94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
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2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
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NOTES by Oskar Kraus
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100 Notes between saying (i) that i
Page 124 and 125:
102 Notes and futural thinking are
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104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
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106 Notes he held instead that the
Page 130 and 131:
108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
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110 Notes given in some way or othe
Page 134 and 135:
112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
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114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
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116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
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118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
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120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
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122 Notes these consequences, which
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124 Notes someone who is judging wi
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126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
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INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
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130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
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132 Index propositions; see content
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