Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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On <strong>the</strong> Concept of Truth 11<br />
30. But <strong>the</strong>re are o<strong>the</strong>r problems which may seem less easy to dispose of. Some of <strong>the</strong>se<br />
are due to <strong>the</strong> particular features of Aristotle’s own formulation, stemming from <strong>the</strong> fact<br />
that his conception of judgement is not complete. When <strong>the</strong> relevant corrections are made,<br />
<strong>the</strong>se difficulties disappear. <strong>The</strong>re is ano<strong>the</strong>r type of case, however, which will not yield to<br />
such treatment.<br />
31. First a word about <strong>the</strong> problems that stem from Aristotle’s <strong>the</strong>ory of judgement. Aristotle<br />
states in <strong>the</strong> De Interpretatione that judgement is a combination of thoughts or concepts<br />
that it is a syn<strong>the</strong>sis He says that <strong>the</strong> syn<strong>the</strong>sis consists<br />
ei<strong>the</strong>r in taking one thing to be combined with ano<strong>the</strong>r, thus forming a unity, or else in<br />
taking one thing to be separated or cut off from ano<strong>the</strong>r. One judges truly when one takes<br />
as combined things that really are combined, or when one takes as separated things that<br />
really are cut off from one ano<strong>the</strong>r. One judges falsely, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, if one judges in<br />
a way that is contrary to <strong>the</strong> way in which <strong>the</strong> things are related.<br />
32. But this should give us pause. Consider above all <strong>the</strong> assertion that <strong>the</strong> separate or distinct<br />
existence of <strong>the</strong> things, which correspond to <strong>the</strong> subject <strong>and</strong> predicate in a judgement, is<br />
a condition for <strong>the</strong> truth of <strong>the</strong> negative judgement <strong>and</strong> a condition for <strong>the</strong> falsity of <strong>the</strong><br />
affirmative judgement. If I say of a dog that he is a cat, <strong>the</strong>n it is indeed <strong>the</strong> case that <strong>the</strong><br />
subject (dog) <strong>and</strong> predicate (cat) have separate existence, <strong>and</strong> that in taking <strong>the</strong> dog to be<br />
a cat I am judging falsely. But <strong>the</strong> falsity of my judgement does not lie in <strong>the</strong> fact that a<br />
dog <strong>and</strong> a cat exist separately; if <strong>the</strong>re were no cat at all—nei<strong>the</strong>r united with nor separated<br />
from <strong>the</strong> dog—my judgement would be still false.<br />
33. We may clarify this point, if it is necessary, by considering o<strong>the</strong>r cases. For example,<br />
if I judge that a certain tone “c” is a twentieth octave “a”, my judgement is certainly as<br />
false as if I had considered it a first octave “a”; <strong>the</strong> latter tone has a separate existence<br />
from <strong>the</strong> “c”; but <strong>the</strong> former tone is wholly imaginary. And instead of saying of a negative<br />
judgement that it is true provided that <strong>the</strong> predicate exists separate from <strong>the</strong> subject, we<br />
ought ra<strong>the</strong>r to say that <strong>the</strong> negative judgement is true provided <strong>the</strong> predicate does not exist<br />
combined with <strong>the</strong> subject.<br />
<strong>The</strong> definition of truth would now become: a judgement is true if it attributes to a thing<br />
something which, in reality, is combined with it, or if it denies of a thing something which,<br />
in reality, is not combined with it.<br />
34. This change provides us with an essential correction, but <strong>the</strong> definition is still<br />
unsatisfactory. Is it really <strong>the</strong> case that our affirmative judgements are always concerned<br />
with <strong>the</strong> combination of real determinations? Clearly not: If I believe, of a certain real<br />
thing, that that thing is a dog or a physical body, or if I believe that it is round or red, <strong>the</strong>n<br />
indeed I do combine real determinations. But consider those cases in which I do not believe<br />
of a thing that it is a dog or that it is a physical body, but believe simply in its existence—<br />
those cases in which I judge that a particular thing exists. <strong>The</strong>re have been philosophers<br />
who really supposed that attributing existence to a thing is a case of combining. But when<br />
asked what <strong>the</strong>y meant by this existence, <strong>the</strong>y would simply answer that “an existent”<br />
means no more than “a thing”, taken in an entirely indeterminate <strong>and</strong> general way. From