Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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On <strong>the</strong> Concept of Truth 9<br />
“<strong>The</strong> pure concept of this transcendental object, which in reality throughout all our<br />
knowledge is always one <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> same, is what can alone confer upon all our empirical<br />
concepts in general relation to an object, that is, objective reality.”*<br />
“Underst<strong>and</strong>ing is, to use general terms, <strong>the</strong> faculty of knowledge. This knowledge<br />
consists in <strong>the</strong> determinate relation of given representations to an object; <strong>and</strong> an object is<br />
that in <strong>the</strong> concept of which <strong>the</strong> manifold of a given intuition is united. Now all unification<br />
of representations dem<strong>and</strong>s unity of consciousness in <strong>the</strong> syn<strong>the</strong>sis of <strong>the</strong>m. Consequently<br />
it is <strong>the</strong> unity of consciousness that alone constitutes <strong>the</strong> relation of representations to an<br />
object, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong>ir objective validity <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>y are modes of knowledge;<br />
<strong>and</strong> upon it <strong>the</strong>refore rests <strong>the</strong> very possibility of <strong>the</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>ing.Ӡ<br />
23. <strong>The</strong>re is not <strong>the</strong> slightest doubt! Kant, too, retained <strong>the</strong> Aristotelian definition of<br />
truth as correspondence of judgement with reality. And so we can assert that all epochmaking<br />
thinkers after Aristotle, however revolutionary <strong>the</strong>ir procedure when tackling o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
questions, found no reason to make any change here.<br />
24. But, as Windelb<strong>and</strong>’s own case makes clear, <strong>the</strong>re have been attempts to replace <strong>the</strong><br />
Aristotelian conception. <strong>The</strong>re have been o<strong>the</strong>rs who have tried to find a substitute for <strong>the</strong><br />
conception of correspondence with an object—if not, with Windelb<strong>and</strong>, in <strong>the</strong> notion of<br />
rule-direction as such, <strong>the</strong>n in that of a rule-directed, normative act of judging. 2 We find<br />
such a view in Sigwart, for example, although he occasionally has recourse to <strong>the</strong> old<br />
conception of truth. <strong>The</strong> whole of Sigwart’s Logic is muddy on this point. 3<br />
25. This attempt to reform <strong>the</strong> older conception is easily refuted.<br />
If truth were no more than judging according to rule, <strong>the</strong>n every judgement which is<br />
made on insufficient grounds or which is completely blind would have to be erroneous. But<br />
this is certainly not <strong>the</strong> case. Insight (Einsicht) must always be true; but a frivolously made<br />
assumption, a mere prejudice, or a view adopted by mere appeal to authority or because it<br />
is fashionable, may turn out to be true or may turn out to be erroneous. Aristotle himself<br />
points out that one frequently obtains true conclusions from false premises. If I should<br />
happen to reason in this way, my conviction has not been framed according to rule, <strong>and</strong><br />
thus, on <strong>the</strong> view in question, is to be disallowed—<strong>and</strong> yet <strong>the</strong> conviction is true.<br />
26. And so, of <strong>the</strong> traditional definitions, <strong>the</strong>re would seem to be only one that can claim<br />
our assent: <strong>the</strong> ancient one which <strong>the</strong> founder of logic had already given us.<br />
27. But we cannot deny that this definition is burdened with major difficulties.<br />
28. <strong>The</strong>re is, above all, a consideration which is essentially that of <strong>the</strong> ancient Gorgias.<br />
Correspondence, where this is understood in <strong>the</strong> fullest sense, is identity. And this, it<br />
would seem, is just what must be meant. Some kind of correspondence, a correspondence<br />
* Trans. Kemp Smith, p. 137.<br />
† Trans. Kemp Smith, p. 156.