Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

More documents

Recommendations

Info

8 The True and the Evident No further word, I daresay, need be spent on the first question, viz. the question where, according to Kant, truth is to be found. b) And now, what is this truth which Kant says is to be found solely in judgement? Does he part from the ancients and no longer understand by it the correspondence of judgement with its object? We heard Windelband’s remarks on this topic: let us also hear what Kant has to say. “What is truth?” he asks in the Introduction to the Transcendental Logic, Chap. III, p. 93, and he answers: “The nominal definition of truth, that it is the agreement of knowledge with its object, is assumed as granted; the question asked is as to what is the general and sure criterion of the truth of any and every knowledge.” What indeed does Kant teach here? Perhaps that it is false to say, as was said at one time, that truth is the correspondence of a judgement with its object? On the contrary, he presupposes this as generally known, and certainly in the familiar sense. But let us hear what follows immediately (p. 94): “If truth consists in the agreement of knowledge with its object, that object must thereby be distinguished from other objects; for knowledge is false if it does not agree with the object to which it is related, even though it contains something which may be valid of other objects.” Windelband says that Kant had altered the traditional definition, at least as far as its meaning is concerned, by understanding something different by object, namely a rule of the mind. But doesn’t this passage indicate that Kant is explicitly rejecting Windelband’s imputation? On Windelband’s interpretation, what would be the meaning of the expression: “even though it contains something which may be valid of other objects”? Of other rules? Of rules perhaps that are valid for another mind? Who is tolerant enough to stand for such tricks of interpretation?—But Kant has not yet finished. He continues by talking just about rules, distinguishing them from objects (p. 94). “Now a general criterion of truth must be such as would be valid in each and every instance of knowledge, however their objects may vary. It is obvious, however, that such a criterion [being general] cannot take account of the [varying] content of knowledge (relation to its [specific] object). But since truth concerns just this very content, it is quite impossible, and indeed absurd, to ask for a general test of the truth of such content. A sufficient and at the same time general criterion of truth cannot possibly be given. Since we have already entitled the content of knowledge its matter, we must be prepared to recognize that of the truth of knowledge, so far as its matter is concerned, no general criterion can be demanded. Such a criterion would by its very nature be self-contradictory”, and he continues in the same vein to the passage containing the words, “however uninstructed we may be with regard to its content” (p. 96). After this decisive evidence, no one, surely, would require additional confirmation. Nor would we have time to cite it all. Let me therefore simply append one or two passages indicating that Kant does not think of the object as being that which, in the manner of a rule, guides and influences the function of thinking. “All presentations have, as presentations, their object, and can themselves in turn become objects of other presentations. Appearances are the sole objects which can be given to us immediately, and that in them which relates immediately to the object is called intuition. But these appearances are not things in themselves; they are only presentations, which in turn have their object—an object which cannot itself be intuited by us, and which may, therefore, be named the non-empirical, that is transcendental object=x.
On the Concept of Truth 9 “The pure concept of this transcendental object, which in reality throughout all our knowledge is always one and the same, is what can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, that is, objective reality.”* “Understanding is, to use general terms, the faculty of knowledge. This knowledge consists in the determinate relation of given representations to an object; and an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united. Now all unification of representations demands unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object, and therefore their objective validity and the fact that they are modes of knowledge; and upon it therefore rests the very possibility of the understanding.”† 23. There is not the slightest doubt! Kant, too, retained the Aristotelian definition of truth as correspondence of judgement with reality. And so we can assert that all epochmaking thinkers after Aristotle, however revolutionary their procedure when tackling other questions, found no reason to make any change here. 24. But, as Windelband’s own case makes clear, there have been attempts to replace the Aristotelian conception. There have been others who have tried to find a substitute for the conception of correspondence with an object—if not, with Windelband, in the notion of rule-direction as such, then in that of a rule-directed, normative act of judging. 2 We find such a view in Sigwart, for example, although he occasionally has recourse to the old conception of truth. The whole of Sigwart’s Logic is muddy on this point. 3 25. This attempt to reform the older conception is easily refuted. If truth were no more than judging according to rule, then every judgement which is made on insufficient grounds or which is completely blind would have to be erroneous. But this is certainly not the case. Insight (Einsicht) must always be true; but a frivolously made assumption, a mere prejudice, or a view adopted by mere appeal to authority or because it is fashionable, may turn out to be true or may turn out to be erroneous. Aristotle himself points out that one frequently obtains true conclusions from false premises. If I should happen to reason in this way, my conviction has not been framed according to rule, and thus, on the view in question, is to be disallowed—and yet the conviction is true. 26. And so, of the traditional definitions, there would seem to be only one that can claim our assent: the ancient one which the founder of logic had already given us. 27. But we cannot deny that this definition is burdened with major difficulties. 28. There is, above all, a consideration which is essentially that of the ancient Gorgias. Correspondence, where this is understood in the fullest sense, is identity. And this, it would seem, is just what must be meant. Some kind of correspondence, a correspondence * Trans. Kemp Smith, p. 137. † Trans. Kemp Smith, p. 156.
Page 2 and 3: Routledge Revivals The True and the
Page 4 and 5: Translated from the German WAHREIT
Page 6 and 7: x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
Page 8 and 9: xii Preface fortune to be able to c
Page 10 and 11: INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
Page 12 and 13: xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
Page 14 and 15: xviii Introduction of view—just a
Page 16 and 17: xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
Page 18 and 19: xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
Page 20 and 21: xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
Page 22 and 23: xxvi Introduction The motivation be
Page 24 and 25: I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
Page 26 and 27: 4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
Page 28 and 29: 6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
Page 32 and 33: 10 The True and the Evident of cert
Page 34 and 35: 12 The True and the Evident this ex
Page 36 and 37: 14 The True and the Evident be give
Page 38 and 39: 16 The True and the Evident referen
Page 40 and 41: II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
Page 42 and 43: III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
Page 44 and 45: 22 The True and the Evident somethi
Page 46 and 47: 24 The True and the Evident Psychol
Page 48 and 49: 26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
Page 50 and 51: 28 The True and the Evident logicia
Page 52 and 53: 30 The True and the Evident which i
Page 54 and 55: 32 The True and the Evident There i
Page 56 and 57: 34 The True and the Evident Are we
Page 58 and 59: 36 The True and the Evident way. On
Page 60 and 61: 38 The True and the Evident It is c
Page 62 and 63: 40 The True and the Evident is basi
Page 64 and 65: Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
Page 66 and 67: 44 The True and the Evident concept
Page 68 and 69: 46 The True and the Evident 13. But
Page 70 and 71: 48 The True and the Evident each of
Page 72 and 73: 50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
Page 74 and 75: I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
Page 76 and 77: II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
Page 78 and 79: III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
Page 80 and 81:
58 The True and the Evident When do
Page 82 and 83:
60 The True and the Evident I have
Page 84 and 85:
62 The True and the Evident the con
Page 86 and 87:
64 The True and the Evident to supp
Page 88 and 89:
66 The True and the Evident degree
Page 90 and 91:
68 The True and the Evident concept
Page 92 and 93:
70 The True and the Evident non-exi
Page 94 and 95:
Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
Page 96 and 97:
74 The True and the Evident 6. And
Page 98 and 99:
76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
Page 100 and 101:
II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
Page 102 and 103:
80 The True and the Evident that re
Page 104 and 105:
82 The True and the Evident in whic
Page 106 and 107:
84 The True and the Evident would s
Page 108 and 109:
86 The True and the Evident 6. If e
Page 110 and 111:
VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
Page 112 and 113:
APPENDICES
Page 114 and 115:
92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 116 and 117:
94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 118 and 119:
2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
Page 120 and 121:
NOTES by Oskar Kraus
Page 122 and 123:
100 Notes between saying (i) that i
Page 124 and 125:
102 Notes and futural thinking are
Page 126 and 127:
104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
Page 128 and 129:
106 Notes he held instead that the
Page 130 and 131:
108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
Page 132 and 133:
110 Notes given in some way or othe
Page 134 and 135:
112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
Page 136 and 137:
114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
Page 138 and 139:
116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
Page 140 and 141:
118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
Page 142 and 143:
120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
Page 144 and 145:
122 Notes these consequences, which
Page 146 and 147:
124 Notes someone who is judging wi
Page 148 and 149:
126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
Page 150 and 151:
INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
Page 152 and 153:
130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
Page 154 and 155:
132 Index propositions; see content
show all

Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?