Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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8<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>True</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Evident</strong><br />
No fur<strong>the</strong>r word, I daresay, need be spent on <strong>the</strong> first question, viz. <strong>the</strong> question where,<br />
according to Kant, truth is to be found.<br />
b) And now, what is this truth which Kant says is to be found solely in judgement?<br />
Does he part from <strong>the</strong> ancients <strong>and</strong> no longer underst<strong>and</strong> by it <strong>the</strong> correspondence of<br />
judgement with its object? We heard<br />
Windelb<strong>and</strong>’s remarks on this topic: let us also hear what Kant has to say.<br />
“What is truth?” he asks in <strong>the</strong> Introduction to <strong>the</strong> Transcendental Logic, Chap. III, p.<br />
93, <strong>and</strong> he answers: “<strong>The</strong> nominal definition of truth, that it is <strong>the</strong> agreement of knowledge<br />
with its object, is assumed as granted; <strong>the</strong> question asked is as to what is <strong>the</strong> general <strong>and</strong><br />
sure criterion of <strong>the</strong> truth of any <strong>and</strong> every knowledge.”<br />
What indeed does Kant teach here? Perhaps that it is false to say, as was said at one<br />
time, that truth is <strong>the</strong> correspondence of a judgement with its object? On <strong>the</strong> contrary, he<br />
presupposes this as generally known, <strong>and</strong> certainly in <strong>the</strong> familiar sense. But let us hear<br />
what follows immediately (p. 94): “If truth consists in <strong>the</strong> agreement of knowledge with<br />
its object, that object must <strong>the</strong>reby be distinguished from o<strong>the</strong>r objects; for knowledge<br />
is false if it does not agree with <strong>the</strong> object to which it is related, even though it contains<br />
something which may be valid of o<strong>the</strong>r objects.” Windelb<strong>and</strong> says that Kant had altered<br />
<strong>the</strong> traditional definition, at least as far as its meaning is concerned, by underst<strong>and</strong>ing<br />
something different by object, namely a rule of <strong>the</strong> mind. But doesn’t this passage indicate<br />
that Kant is explicitly rejecting Windelb<strong>and</strong>’s imputation?<br />
On Windelb<strong>and</strong>’s interpretation, what would be <strong>the</strong> meaning of <strong>the</strong> expression: “even<br />
though it contains something which may be valid of o<strong>the</strong>r objects”? Of o<strong>the</strong>r rules? Of<br />
rules perhaps that are valid for ano<strong>the</strong>r mind? Who is tolerant enough to st<strong>and</strong> for such<br />
tricks of interpretation?—But Kant has not yet finished. He continues by talking just about<br />
rules, distinguishing <strong>the</strong>m from objects (p. 94). “Now a general criterion of truth must be<br />
such as would be valid in each <strong>and</strong> every instance of knowledge, however <strong>the</strong>ir objects may<br />
vary. It is obvious, however, that such a criterion [being general] cannot take account of <strong>the</strong><br />
[varying] content of knowledge (relation to its [specific] object). But since truth concerns<br />
just this very content, it is quite impossible, <strong>and</strong> indeed absurd, to ask for a general test of<br />
<strong>the</strong> truth of such content. A sufficient <strong>and</strong> at <strong>the</strong> same time general criterion of truth cannot<br />
possibly be given. Since we have already entitled <strong>the</strong> content of knowledge its matter,<br />
we must be prepared to recognize that of <strong>the</strong> truth of knowledge, so far as its matter is<br />
concerned, no general criterion can be dem<strong>and</strong>ed. Such a criterion would by its very nature<br />
be self-contradictory”, <strong>and</strong> he continues in <strong>the</strong> same vein to <strong>the</strong> passage containing <strong>the</strong><br />
words, “however uninstructed we may be with regard to its content” (p. 96).<br />
After this decisive evidence, no one, surely, would require additional confirmation. Nor<br />
would we have time to cite it all. Let me <strong>the</strong>refore simply append one or two passages<br />
indicating that Kant does not think of <strong>the</strong> object as being that which, in <strong>the</strong> manner of a<br />
rule, guides <strong>and</strong> influences <strong>the</strong> function of thinking.<br />
“All presentations have, as presentations, <strong>the</strong>ir object, <strong>and</strong> can <strong>the</strong>mselves in turn become<br />
objects of o<strong>the</strong>r presentations. Appearances are <strong>the</strong> sole objects which can be given to us<br />
immediately, <strong>and</strong> that in <strong>the</strong>m which relates immediately to <strong>the</strong> object is called intuition.<br />
But <strong>the</strong>se appearances are not things in <strong>the</strong>mselves; <strong>the</strong>y are only presentations, which in<br />
turn have <strong>the</strong>ir object—an object which cannot itself be intuited by us, <strong>and</strong> which may,<br />
<strong>the</strong>refore, be named <strong>the</strong> non-empirical, that is transcendental object=x.