Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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On <strong>the</strong> Concept of Truth 5<br />
b) And <strong>the</strong> paradoxical <strong>the</strong>ses of <strong>the</strong> Sophists also play upon difficulties bound up with<br />
<strong>the</strong>se early opinions. We have Gorgias denying that anything real can be known, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n<br />
adding that, even if <strong>the</strong>re were anything that could be known, it would be impossible<br />
to communicate <strong>the</strong> knowledge from one person to ano<strong>the</strong>r. <strong>The</strong>re is nothing which<br />
corresponds completely to anything o<strong>the</strong>r than itself. What is external to me is not in me,<br />
<strong>and</strong> what is <strong>and</strong> remains in me, does not pass over into anyone else. Thus truth, as well as<br />
<strong>the</strong> communication of truth, is impossible. If any of our thoughts can be said to be true,<br />
<strong>the</strong>n, according to Gorgias, everything else can be said to be true. For every thought is<br />
identical with itself as well as different from all o<strong>the</strong>r thoughts. But that every thought<br />
should be called true, even when I think of a chariot race on <strong>the</strong> sea, is an absurdity.<br />
c) Never<strong>the</strong>less, ano<strong>the</strong>r Sophist comes forth to present <strong>the</strong> contrary <strong>the</strong>sis. Protagoras<br />
does not say that all our beliefs are false; he says instead that all our beliefs are true.<br />
Whatever one thinks a thing to be, it is, <strong>and</strong> whatever one thinks it not to be it is not.<br />
It is easy to see, I think, how Protagoras arrived at this idea. If a belief is true provided<br />
only it corresponds completely with something that exists, <strong>the</strong>n every belief is true, for<br />
every belief is identical with itself. Aristotle also connects this thought with <strong>the</strong> doctrines of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Ionic school upon which <strong>the</strong> contrary <strong>the</strong>sis of Gorgias depends. Protagoras, who was<br />
a true Sophist, according to <strong>the</strong> classical portrait (that is to say, <strong>the</strong> portrait that was drawn<br />
by Plato <strong>and</strong> Aristotle, <strong>and</strong> not <strong>the</strong> one by Grote, who lived somewhat later), now quite<br />
obviously turns <strong>the</strong> paradox he had come upon into <strong>the</strong> starting-point of an ingenious game.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Down-Throwers was <strong>the</strong> name of <strong>the</strong> text in which Protagoras defended<br />
his <strong>the</strong>sis. In it, apparently, blows are being dealt, <strong>and</strong> threatening objections parried.<br />
To <strong>the</strong> objection that, if his view were correct, a thing could be said both to be <strong>and</strong> not<br />
to be at one <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> same time, Protagoras seems to have replied that such a consequence<br />
is not absurd; <strong>the</strong> point just is that <strong>the</strong> thing is for one, <strong>and</strong> is not for ano<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
But Protagoras did not even attempt to provide a scientific justification for his position. This<br />
is clear from <strong>the</strong> fact that nei<strong>the</strong>r Plato nor Aristotle—to whom <strong>the</strong> text was surely available—<br />
could trace <strong>the</strong> means by which he arrived at it. Both were guided wholly by conjectures,<br />
a procedure in which Aristotle, completely acquainted with <strong>the</strong> historical antecedents,<br />
<strong>and</strong> certainly more abundantly equipped with a historical sense, was <strong>the</strong> more successful.<br />
I have pointed out <strong>the</strong> steps on <strong>the</strong> path towards <strong>the</strong> Protagorean <strong>the</strong>sis. Parmenides<br />
also says: “What can be thought is only <strong>the</strong> thought that it is.”* What could be more<br />
obvious than <strong>the</strong> paradox that every thought is true? Every belief, obviously, is in complete<br />
agreement with itself, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore, given <strong>the</strong> presupposition in question, every belief is in<br />
complete agreement with its object.<br />
14. But let us not remain any longer with <strong>the</strong> historical antecedents of <strong>the</strong> Aristotelian<br />
definition of truth. Let us see <strong>the</strong> effect it has had upon later thinkers. What we find is that,<br />
with insignificantly few exceptions, it is st<strong>and</strong>ard up to our own time.<br />
15. Medieval thought agrees in saying that true <strong>and</strong> false in <strong>the</strong> strict sense is to be found<br />
in judgement, <strong>and</strong> defines truth as “adaequatio rei et intellectus”.<br />
* Trans. Kirk <strong>and</strong> Raven, <strong>The</strong> Presocratic Philosophers.