Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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4 The True and the Evident 9. What, then, is this one use to which all the others are related? Where is truth in the strictest sense to be found? Aristotle says that it is found in judgement. It is with reference to the truth or falsity of judgement that the other things which bear these names may properly be said to be true or false: some things because they express a true or a false judgement, such as a false assertion, or a false utterance; some things because they produce a true or false judgement, as in the case of hallucination, or a slip in uttering or in writing a word, or a metal which is taken for gold because of similarity in colour; some things because they are intended to produce a true or false judgement, as for instance a true spirit or a false mannerism; and some things because one who considers them real judges truly or falsely—for example, a true god, or a true stone in contrast to one that is painted. Some concepts are called true or false with respect to that which coincides, or fails to coincide, with their content, since here a true or erroneous judgement turns upon a discovery about this content; thus we may speak of rectangular figure as not being the true notion of square, and so forth. 10. Truth and falsity in the strict or proper sense, therefore, are found in judgement. And every judgement is either true or false. 11. But when—according to Aristotle—is a judgement true, and when is a judgement false? His answer is this: a judgement is true if the one who makes the judgement is related to things in a way which corresponds to them, and a judgement is false if the one who makes the judgement is related to things in a way which is contrary to them. “He who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose thought is in a state contrary to that of the objects is in error.” Metaphysics IX, 10, 1051, b 3.* 12. And so it was that truth was explicated as being a kind of agreement or correspondence obtaining between things and judgement. 13. A long history had prepared the way for this definition. a) According to the ancient Ionians, we know external things and forces by means of similar things that are within us. * * For with earth do we see earth, with water water, with air bright air, with fire consuming fire; with Love do we see Love, Strife with dread Strife. Aristotle, Metaphysics, B 4, 1000 b 6; trans. W.D.Ross. Empedocles* [Trans. W.D.Ross.]
On the Concept of Truth 5 b) And the paradoxical theses of the Sophists also play upon difficulties bound up with these early opinions. We have Gorgias denying that anything real can be known, and then adding that, even if there were anything that could be known, it would be impossible to communicate the knowledge from one person to another. There is nothing which corresponds completely to anything other than itself. What is external to me is not in me, and what is and remains in me, does not pass over into anyone else. Thus truth, as well as the communication of truth, is impossible. If any of our thoughts can be said to be true, then, according to Gorgias, everything else can be said to be true. For every thought is identical with itself as well as different from all other thoughts. But that every thought should be called true, even when I think of a chariot race on the sea, is an absurdity. c) Nevertheless, another Sophist comes forth to present the contrary thesis. Protagoras does not say that all our beliefs are false; he says instead that all our beliefs are true. Whatever one thinks a thing to be, it is, and whatever one thinks it not to be it is not. It is easy to see, I think, how Protagoras arrived at this idea. If a belief is true provided only it corresponds completely with something that exists, then every belief is true, for every belief is identical with itself. Aristotle also connects this thought with the doctrines of the Ionic school upon which the contrary thesis of Gorgias depends. Protagoras, who was a true Sophist, according to the classical portrait (that is to say, the portrait that was drawn by Plato and Aristotle, and not the one by Grote, who lived somewhat later), now quite obviously turns the paradox he had come upon into the starting-point of an ingenious game. The Down-Throwers was the name of the text in which Protagoras defended his thesis. In it, apparently, blows are being dealt, and threatening objections parried. To the objection that, if his view were correct, a thing could be said both to be and not to be at one and the same time, Protagoras seems to have replied that such a consequence is not absurd; the point just is that the thing is for one, and is not for another. But Protagoras did not even attempt to provide a scientific justification for his position. This is clear from the fact that neither Plato nor Aristotle—to whom the text was surely available— could trace the means by which he arrived at it. Both were guided wholly by conjectures, a procedure in which Aristotle, completely acquainted with the historical antecedents, and certainly more abundantly equipped with a historical sense, was the more successful. I have pointed out the steps on the path towards the Protagorean thesis. Parmenides also says: “What can be thought is only the thought that it is.”* What could be more obvious than the paradox that every thought is true? Every belief, obviously, is in complete agreement with itself, and therefore, given the presupposition in question, every belief is in complete agreement with its object. 14. But let us not remain any longer with the historical antecedents of the Aristotelian definition of truth. Let us see the effect it has had upon later thinkers. What we find is that, with insignificantly few exceptions, it is standard up to our own time. 15. Medieval thought agrees in saying that true and false in the strict sense is to be found in judgement, and defines truth as “adaequatio rei et intellectus”. * Trans. Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers.
Page 2 and 3: Routledge Revivals The True and the
Page 4 and 5: Translated from the German WAHREIT
Page 6 and 7: x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
Page 8 and 9: xii Preface fortune to be able to c
Page 10 and 11: INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
Page 12 and 13: xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
Page 14 and 15: xviii Introduction of view—just a
Page 16 and 17: xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
Page 18 and 19: xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
Page 20 and 21: xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
Page 22 and 23: xxvi Introduction The motivation be
Page 24 and 25: I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
Page 28 and 29: 6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
Page 30 and 31: 8 The True and the Evident No furth
Page 32 and 33: 10 The True and the Evident of cert
Page 34 and 35: 12 The True and the Evident this ex
Page 36 and 37: 14 The True and the Evident be give
Page 38 and 39: 16 The True and the Evident referen
Page 40 and 41: II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
Page 42 and 43: III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
Page 44 and 45: 22 The True and the Evident somethi
Page 46 and 47: 24 The True and the Evident Psychol
Page 48 and 49: 26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
Page 50 and 51: 28 The True and the Evident logicia
Page 52 and 53: 30 The True and the Evident which i
Page 54 and 55: 32 The True and the Evident There i
Page 56 and 57: 34 The True and the Evident Are we
Page 58 and 59: 36 The True and the Evident way. On
Page 60 and 61: 38 The True and the Evident It is c
Page 62 and 63: 40 The True and the Evident is basi
Page 64 and 65: Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
Page 66 and 67: 44 The True and the Evident concept
Page 68 and 69: 46 The True and the Evident 13. But
Page 70 and 71: 48 The True and the Evident each of
Page 72 and 73: 50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
Page 74 and 75: I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
Page 76 and 77:
II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
Page 78 and 79:
III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
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58 The True and the Evident When do
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60 The True and the Evident I have
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62 The True and the Evident the con
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64 The True and the Evident to supp
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66 The True and the Evident degree
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68 The True and the Evident concept
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70 The True and the Evident non-exi
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Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
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74 The True and the Evident 6. And
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76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
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II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
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80 The True and the Evident that re
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82 The True and the Evident in whic
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84 The True and the Evident would s
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86 The True and the Evident 6. If e
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VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
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APPENDICES
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92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
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94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
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2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
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NOTES by Oskar Kraus
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100 Notes between saying (i) that i
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102 Notes and futural thinking are
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104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
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106 Notes he held instead that the
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108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
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110 Notes given in some way or othe
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112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
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114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
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116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
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118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
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120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
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122 Notes these consequences, which
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124 Notes someone who is judging wi
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126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
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INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
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130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
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132 Index propositions; see content
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